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From the introduction of slavery to British North America, the concurrent 
presence of freedom and slavery fostered much tension. Still, in the early 1800s, slavery 
was not yet the intransigent issue that would lead to civil war. Amidst mounting tensions 
and declining, yet still viable, possibility for resolution, a nationwide effort to colonize 
free blacks to Africa began. Positioned as neither immediate emancipation, nor the 
continuation of the status quo, colonizationists framed their scheme as a solution to the 
problem of slavery. With the discourse generated at a germinal meeting on December 21, 
1816, the American Society for Colonizing the Free People of Colour of the United 
States (later called the American Colonization Society) was created and motivations for 
African colonization were set forth. 
 This project explores the rhetorical development of the national African 
colonization movement in The United States. To begin, this project traces the discursive 
tensions between discourses of security and morality to which colonizationists would 
 
need to attend to advance their scheme. Driving this tension was an emerging antagonism 
between instrumental and pathetic dimensions of rhetoric. The project then illuminates 
the potential to overcome such tensions that had been cultivated in political economic 
(i.e., legislative) discourse about slavery. This potential resolution was defined by the 
development of moderate rhetorical strategies to address the problem of slavery. Turning 
to the initial meeting of the Colonization Society, this project attends to how 
colonizationists negotiated the discursive tensions and used the rhetorical resources of the 
moment to motivate colonization.  
Ultimately, this project argues that the motivations offered by colonizationists in 
support of African colonization failed in their attempt to use moderate rhetorical 
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PART I:  




A MEETING IN GEORGETOWN 
 On December 18, 1816 like any other day, the National Intelligencer of the 
District of Columbia published dozens of advertisements. The subjects ranged from the 
sale of sugar and coffee to the promotion of a dancing assembly. Crowded between an 
announcement from a visiting New Jersey businessman and a sales pitch for a flour and 
meal producer was an inauspicious announcement of a meeting. The notice proclaimed, 
"A meeting of those gentlemen who are friendly to the promotion of a plan for colonizing 
the free blacks of the United States, is requested at the Davis Hotel, in the city of 
Washington, on Saturday the 21st day of December, at 11 o'clock, A. M."1 Its eighty-three 
words, sparse verbiage, and bleak aesthetic, made the ad appear no more important than 
the others. Yet, the subject of the meeting—the colonization of free blacks—and the 
rhetorical efforts surrounding that movement were connected to one of the most 
disconcerting questions to U.S. society: How to solve the problems of slavery? 
The practice of slavery and the competing discourses that developed tore at the 
loose seams of U.S. society. The perpetuation of the slave system had been facilitated by 
public discourse primarily concerned with white security and the maintenance of social 
order. Over time, however, some Americans began questioning the morality of slavery 
and often did so with highly emotive language that challenged the docility of security 
discourse. As such moral discourse grew more prominent and more intense, rhetors 
concerned with security took an even stronger stance in their attempts to insulate slavery 
from interference and change. The growing tension between security and morality 
discourses were linguistic manifestations of a great paradox in U.S. history: the 
                                                 
1 National Intelligencer, December 18, 1816, n.p. 
3 
simultaneous rise of appeals to freedom and liberty and the growing practice of slavery.2 
By the mid 1810s, a country that had at one time seemed united began to grow apart.3 As 
historian George Dangerfield observes, after the end of the War of 1812, "American 
sectionalism came snarling to the front."4 In the waning days of 1816, sitting at the 
precipice of this snarling sectionalism, the organizers of the colonization meeting saw an 
opportunity to relieve the discursive tensions over slavery and to achieve a United States 
of America. 
 Colonizationists faced a situation with tremendous obstacles. The controversy 
over slavery had been brewing for nearly two centuries prior to the meeting. From 1808 
to 1831, security and morality discourses, although initially accommodating of slavery, 
grew in opposition to one another and intensified divisions on the subject of slavery.5 
Edwin Black persuasively argued that this period was not so much marked by peace on 
the issue of slavery, but marked by the suppressed emotions toward slavery.6 As those 
emotions began to surface, the possibility of a peaceful resolution to slavery diminished.  
                                                 
2 Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1975), 4. 
 
3 Rebecca Brooks Gruver, American Nationalism, 1783-1830: A Self-Portrait (New York: Capricorn 
Books, 1971), 249. 
 
4 George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (London: Methuen, 1953), 91. 
 
5 Alice Adams begins her study of anti-slavery sentiment from the assumption that the study of slavery has 
been neglected from 1808 to 1831. Her contention is that anti-slavery societies burgeoned at the local 
levels, yet lacked the national voice. See Alice Dana Adams, The Neglected Period of Anti-Slavery in 
America, 1808-1831 (Gloucester, MA: P. Smith, 1964). Larry Tise further demonstrated the importance of 
this era, focusing on the proslavery arguments of the time. Tise argued, "Although historians have 
traditionally skipped over the period from 1790 to 1820 in their overviews of proslavery in America, it 
actually turns out to be the most important era for the shaping of American proslavery ideology." Larry E. 
Tise, Proslavery: A History of the Defense of Slavery in America, 1701-1840 (Athens: The University of 
Georgia Press, 1987), 42.  
 
6 Edwin Black, "The Sentimental Style as Escapism, or the Devil with Dan'l Webster," in Form and Genre: 
Shaping Rhetorical Action, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, ed. (Annandale, VA: 
Speech Communication Association, 1978), 75-86.  
4 
 However, all was not lost. Colonizationists seized an opportunity to overcome 
these tensions through the discourse of political economy. Such discourse pervaded the 
legislative sphere as rhetors attempted to craft some agreement (albeit tenuous) on the 
subject of slavery. Winthrop Jordan has boldly claimed that with the passage of the Slave 
Trade Act of 1808, "slavery was no longer a critical issue. . . the albatross of the slave 
trade no longer hung painfully on the national conscience."7 Through political economic 
discourse, a moderate rhetorical approach to slavery helped to quell the discursive 
tensions. The meeting of supporters of colonization attempted to address the problem of 
slavery in The United States by advancing a nationally-supported African colonization 
scheme using the powerful potential of moderate rhetoric.  
 This project attends to the rhetorical genesis of the national African colonization 
movement in The United States. To establish a foundation for this inquiry, the present 
chapter details how the colonization meeting was organized within the troubled context 
of U.S. slavery. Next, the purpose of this study is contextualized within the relevant 
literature on colonization and early nineteenth-century U.S. public discourse. Finally, this 
chapter offers a brief outline for this study. 
 
The Colonization Meeting of December 21, 1816: 
Seeking a Middle Ground 
On December 21, 1816, the national movement for African colonization was 
initiated. Meeting in a popular Georgetown tavern, this assemblage of religious leaders, 
politicians, wealthy landowners, and philanthropists discussed the necessity of a 
                                                 
7 Winthrop D. Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 331. See also Adams, Neglected Period of Anti-Slavery, 2.  
5 
colonization scheme to address the slave question for the betterment of the nation. Those 
attending the meeting represented Northern, Southern, and Western heritage. Yet, 
colonization was not a Northern, Southern, or Western solution. To the diverse cadre 
assembled, colonization was considered a U.S. solution. The diversity of vocation and 
geographical representation at the meeting demonstrated the compromising spirit that 
guided the speakers. Believing that colonization was beneficial for the United States, the 
result of the meeting was the establishment of the American Society for Colonizing the 
Free People of Colour of the United States, later called the American Colonization 
Society (hereafter referred to as the "Colonization Society"). The way in which the 
meeting was organized illustrates the potential for colonization to bring together 
opposing discourses to resolve the tensions of slavery. 
The growing tensions of slavery led states to explore the possibility of 
colonization as a remedy to the problems of slavery. In 1815, the Union Humane Society 
of Ohio called for common action and the removal of blacks away from elite whites.8 
While the Ohio group called for unified action, it did not push for national aid. A move 
toward mobilizing broader support for colonization was attempted in March of 1816 by a 
resident of Georgetown and "several citizens of two neighboring states." The inability of 
this meeting to nationalize the issue of colonization owed to the participants' regional 
isolation, a point that the North American Review would make in describing the March 
meeting: "This [the meeting] was without the knowledge or participation of any 
                                                 
8 Henry Noble Sherwood, "The Formation of the American Colonization Society," The Journal of Negro 
History 2 (1917): 211.  
6 
individual whatever, living north of Maryland."9 When conducted at the local level, 
colonization schemes had marginal rhetorical or practical effect on slavery. 
Recognizing that the federal government could provide the necessary means to 
make colonization work, a few states—Kentucky and Virginia—turned their efforts 
toward involving the national government. In a meeting held on October 18 and 19, 1815, 
the Kentucky Colonization Society petitioned Congress for land "to be laid off as an 
asylum for all those Negroes and mulattoes who have been, and those who may hereafter 
be, emancipated within the United States."10 Similarly, a small assemblage in New Jersey 
drafted a resolution on November 6, 1816, asking the state legislature "to use their 
influence with the National Legislature to adopt some plan of colonizing the Free 
Blacks."11 State legislatures and colonization societies recognized that colonization was a 
significant issue and a massive undertaking, thus, they began directing their persuasive 
efforts toward the federal government. 
The organization of the colonization meeting of December 21 reflected advocates' 
attempts to nationalize the U.S. movement for African colonization. Creating a national 
organization would bring together the efforts and resources of the various state 
legislatures and colonization societies to more forcefully advance their cause. 
Significantly, a national effort would bring together advocates from Northern, Southern, 
and Western states, a diverse group whose motivations for colonization varied. These 
motivations tended toward the dominant discourses of slavery at the times—security and 
                                                 
9 "American Colonization Society," North American Review 35 (1832): 126. 
 
10 This petition reached the Congress on January 18, 1816, and was referred to the Committee on Public 
Lands. Annals of Congress, 14th Cong., 1st sess., 691.  
 
11 "Colony of Free Blacks," National Intelligencer, December 14, 1816, n.p. This was also relayed in 
"Chronicle," Niles' Weekly Register, December 14, 1816, 259. 
7 
morality. The organization of the colonization meeting represented the coming together 
of these two discourses in the seat of governmental power. With Southerners concerned 
with securing plantations from free blacks and Northerners pushing to afford blacks (free 
blacks to start with) the rights granted by God and nature, the orchestration of the 
colonization meeting foreshadowed the rhetorical alternative to the contemporary 
discourse on slavery that colonization would create. 
 To begin, security discourse played a significant role in motivating the 
colonization meeting of 1816. In February of that year, Virginia Assemblymen Charles 
Fenton Mercer became captivated with the concept of colonization after becoming aware 
of secret Virginia General Assembly journals from 1800.12 The journals revealed that 
after the rebellion of the slave Gabriel in 1800, the Assembly went into closed sessions to 
discuss how to contain slave insurrections. The results of these proceedings were official 
communications from Virginia Governor James Monroe to President Thomas Jefferson 
asking that land in western territories, or elsewhere, be set aside as a colony for blacks.13 
With the legislative session over by February, Mercer was unable to act on the subject of 
colonization in the legislative arena.  
 Mercer's advocacy for colonization went beyond the Virginia General Assembly, 
as he began to spread word of the benefits of such a plan. On a trip to Washington, 
Mercer encountered Elias Boudinot Caldwell—an old schoolmate from New Jersey—and 
Francis Scott Key. During this April 1816 encounter, Mercer relayed his intent to 
                                                 
12 Mercer first became aware of the secret journals after a night of drinking with fellow Assemblymen, one 
of whom had participated in the secret session. C[harles] F[enton] Mercer, "Address of the Hon. Charles 
Fenton Mercer, AT THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE AM. COL. SOCIETY. JANUARY 18, 1853," The 
African Repository, May 1853, 143. See also Douglas R. Egerton, Charles Fenton Mercer and the Trial of 
National Conservatism (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1989), 105-7. 
 
13 The Jefferson-Monroe correspondence can be found in Philip Slaughter, The Virginian History of African 
Colonization (Richmond, VA: Macfarlane and Fergusson, 1855), 2-5. 
8 
introduce a colonization measure in the next session of the Virginia Assembly. Curiously, 
in March of 1816, a group of men had called a meeting to discuss the merits of 
colonization.14 Though no formal actions came from this March colonization meeting, 
that such a meeting would be called demonstrated that colonization was gaining attention. 
The social and political relevance similarly interested Mercer's interlocutors. Key seemed 
interested in the plan and intimated that he might pursue a seat in the Maryland 
legislature with colonization as a policy objective. Caldwell took interest in Mercer's 
ideas, but could not return to New Jersey to garner support due to the financial needs of 
his family. Instead he wrote letters to his acquaintances extolling the virtues of 
colonization. One such correspondent was his brother-in-law, Robert Finley, a 
Presbyterian minister who directed the Andover Theological Seminary in New Jersey. 
The communication campaign undertaken by Mercer, Key, and Caldwell enhanced the 
exigency of colonization, arguing that the scheme provided a politically viable solution to 
the problems of slave revolts.15 
 Caldwell's correspondence with Finley may or may not have been the first that the 
Reverend had heard of colonization.16 Regardless, Finley identified with the aims of 
colonization. With Finley, though, colonization was discussed less as a political solution 
to slave rebelliousness and more as a moral cause. The increase in moral improvement 
societies during the early nineteenth century created an environment encouraging 
                                                 
14 "American Colonization Society," 126. 
 
15 The detailed accounting of Mercer's role in motivating colonization in 1816 is found in Egerton, Charles 
Fenton Mercer, 107-112. 
 
16 Egerton makes a point to correct the record, which had previously positioned Finley as the impetus for 
the Society's meeting. See Douglas R. Egerton, "'Its Origin is Not a Little Curious': A New Look at the 
American Colonization Society," in Egerton, Rebels, Reformers, & Revolutionaries: Collected Essays and 
Second Thoughts (New York: Routledge, 2002), 107-19. 
9 
outreach, evangelism, and missionary zeal. Prior to the colonization meeting, Finley 
pondered his own actions toward moral improvement: "When I consider what many 
others have effected for the benefit of their suffering fellow-creatures at an earlier age 
than mine, I am humbled and mortified to think how little I have done."17 In November of 
1816, Finley shared his thoughts on colonization with the New York and New Jersey 
Synod of the Presbyterian Church. In this setting, Finley revealed a colonization scheme 
that differed from Mercer's. Mercer's colonization plan aimed at having numerous states 
send requests to the president to remove free blacks to Africa; Finley sought to create a 
national organization to lobby Congress for the funding needed to colonize.18  
 Just as Finley's discourse employed moral rhetoric in support of colonization, the 
Reverend was well-equipped to bring such rhetoric to bear in political situations. Upon 
ordination as a Presbyterian clergyman in 1795, Finley began ministering at a small 
church in Baskingridge, New Jersey, where he was also the master of the local academy. 
Some of his students included future national figures like Samuel Southard, secretary of 
the Navy, senator, and governor of New Jersey; and Theodore Frelinghuysen, senator and 
governor of New Jersey. The Bible served as a primary text for Finley's instruction of the 
elite men at Baskingridge, a point Finley made emphatically to the school master while at 
the academy. Finley's adherence to the Bible, in and out of religious settings, 
demonstrated his commitment to translating moral lessons into all areas of life. Finley 
gained such influence through his marriage to Esther Caldwell. Wealthy New Jersey 
resident Elias Boudinot became Esther's foster father after her parents were killed by the 
                                                 
17 Finley quoted in P.J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1961), 17. 
 
18 Egerton, Charles Fenton Mercer, 110. 
10 
British. Boudinot had been president of Congress, an associate of Alexander Hamilton, 
held political office under George Washington, served as president of the Presbyterian 
General Assembly, and held a seat on the board of trustees at Princeton.19 Finley's 
dedication to the Bible as a socially relevant text, as well as his exposure to the world of 
political and social elites, provided a foundation for Finley's participation in creating the 
Colonization Society. 
 Planning for the colonization meeting began in earnest in December of 1816. 
Finley traveled from New Jersey to Washington in early December, continuing to discuss 
the benefits of colonization in the familiar settings of religious institutions. Finley 
garnered an audience at the F Street Presbyterian Church (often called Dr. Laurie's 
Presbyterian Church as Rev. Dr. James Laurie was the sole pastor there) with Caldwell, 
Samuel Mills (who would become the Colonization Society's first agent to Liberia), and 
Dr. Laurie, among others.20 The moral virtues of colonization drove Finley's interest in 
colonization. But to spread the word about the moral virtues of colonization, preaching in 
religious circles would not be enough. 
Finley not only continued to spread the word among Presbyterian parishioners, he 
began to engage the political process as well. Upon arriving to Washington, Finley began 
distributing his pamphlet, Thoughts on the Colonization of Freed Blacks, among 
congresspeople.21 Finley also became a presence in Washington social circles. Escorted 
by Elias Caldwell's wife, Finley visited the home of Samuel Harrison and Margaret 
Bayard Smith on December 4. The social event that evening included President James 
                                                 
19 Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, 16. 
 
20 "The Presbyterian Church and Colonization," African Repository, July 1860, 205-08. 
 
21 Robert Finley, Thoughts on the Colonization of Freed Blacks (Washington: n.p., 1816). 
11 
Madison and President-elect James Monroe. In a letter, Mrs. Smith reported that Finley 
was introduced to Monroe and "several other gentlemen" and that Finley "went home, to 
use his own expression, perfectly satisfied and gratified."22  
In a slightly different vein, Key and Caldwell had also engaged the political and 
legal dimensions of slavery in Washington since their meeting with Mercer. In the 
summer of 1816, Key had offered free legal services to a man who came to Washington 
to sue for the freedom of himself and other free blacks who were kidnapped and sold into 
slavery. Caldwell helped to advertise the case and raised money for the cause of the 
kidnapped free blacks.23 The activities of colonization supporters during the year 1816 
advanced the cause of a national colonization movement. Although colonization 
advocates continued to appeal to specific audiences—often defined by the use of security, 
moral, or political economic rhetoric—supporters also took actions that attempted to 
diffuse colonization sentiment beyond their core audience. 
 The Colonization Society held its first meeting on December 21, at the Davis 
Hotel in Georgetown. Between its brick walls were a collection of politicians, clergy, and 
philanthropists assembled "for the purpose of considering the expediency and 
practicability of ameliorating the condition of the Free Black People of Colour now in the 
United States."24 The National Intelligencer played an important role in generating 
                                                 
22 Margaret Bayard Smith to Mrs. [Jane] Kirkpatrick, Dec. 5, 1816 reprinted in Gaillard Hunt, ed. The First 
Forty Years of Washington Society, Portrayed by the Family Letters of Mrs. Samuel Harrison Smith 
(Margaret Bayard) From the Collection of Her Grandson, J. Henley Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1906), 131. 
 
23 Jesse Torrey, Jr., A Portraiture of Domestic Slavery, in the United States: with Reflections on the 
Practicability of Restoring the Moral Rights of the Slave, without impairing the Legal Privileges of the 
Possessor; and a Project of a Colonial Asylum for Free Persons of Colour; including Memoirs of Facts on 
the Interior Traffic in Slaves and on Kidnapping (Philadelphia: n.p., 1817), 48-53. 
 
12 
interest in the colonization meeting.25 On December 14, 1816, the paper published a 
report of a November 6 colonization meeting in Princeton, New Jersey, after which the 
paper printed the memorial to the New Jersey legislature. The same announcement 
appeared the same day in the Baltimore-based paper Niles' Weekly Register. News about 
colonization was spreading in and around the District of Columbia. 
 In response to its early reporting on colonization, a letter to the editor appeared in 
the December 17 issue, lauding the editors for bringing this subject to public attention. 
The writer, "Penn," proclaimed colonization to be "one of the most important and 
interesting subjects that ever claimed public attention."26 The letter of Penn—likely a 
pseudonym for long-time colonization supporter William Thornton—continued the 
movement of bringing together the various discourses on slavery in support of 
colonization.27  
Penn's structure for analyzing the subject of colonization was to consider two 
questions—"1st. will the free blacks consent to go to the new colony?" and "2dly. Can a 
territory be obtained?"28 Penn's answers to these questions relied on appeals germane to 
the moral discourse of the time. Noting the "rights of man" and "the independence of 
their ancestors," Penn called upon "a Christian people [white Americans]" to act on 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 "Origin, Constitution, and Proceedings of the American Society for Colonising the Free People of Colour 
of the United States," Vol. 1, 1816, American Colonization Society Papers, Library of Congress, reel 289. 
 
25 After the formation of the Colonization Society, Gales aided in the management of the Society until he 
moved to Raleigh. Seaton also took on leadership roles in the organization. See Josephine Seaton, William 
Winston Seaton of the "National Intelligencer." A Biographical Sketch. With Passing Notices of His 
Associates and Friends (Boston: James R. Osgood and Company, 1871), 76, 264, 
 
26 National Intelligencer, December 17, 1816, n.p. 
 
27 P.J. Staudenraus opines that Penn was likely William Thornton. Staudenraus, African Colonization 
Movement, 26n8. 
 
28 National Intelligencer, December 17, 1816, n.p. Capitalization consistent with original. 
13 
colonization. Penn also noted the importance that government would play in this plan, 
reflecting the importance of political economic discourse as an alternative to security and 
morality discourses. Colonization supporters, Penn claimed, wanted "but the sanction of 
our government, and a well digested system to be presented to the country, to command 
the united, the almost unanimous support of the nation."29 Penn's appeals to rights and 
independence (being part of the available moral rhetoric) and to the unified power of the 
national government (a dimension of the political economic rhetoric of the moment) 
helped the movement to gain broad-based support for colonization. Noticeably absent 
from Penn's letter, however, was the security rhetoric that appealed to many white 
Americans at the time. To best bring together the different discourses on slavery in 
support of colonization, the rhetors at the colonization meeting could not be silent on the 
subject of security as Penn had. Despite this oversight by Penn, the discourse before the 
meeting increasingly emphasized the unifying potential of a national colonization effort. 
  After Penn's letter, Caldwell and Key filled the National Intelligencer with 
publicity. In the December 18 issue, the advertisement requested that notice of the 
meeting be published in all papers in the District of Columbia, Baltimore, Annapolis, 
Fredericktown, and Fredericksburg. Both the December 18 and 21 advertisements invited 
"Gentlemen from all parts of the United States" to attend.30 Colonization remained in the 
news near the nation's capital, with Niles' Weekly Register, a Baltimore paper, relaying 
news of the Virginia Assembly's closed-door session concerning the colonization of 
blacks. Upon removing the injunction of secrecy, the Assembly reported that a resolution 
had passed that instructed the governor to correspond with the President of the United 
                                                 
29 National Intelligencer, December 17, 1816, n.p. 
 
30 National Intelligencer, December 18, 1816, n.p. and National Intelligencer, December 21, 1816, n.p. 
14 
States about obtaining land "to serve as Asylum for such persons of colour, as are now 
free, and may desire the same."31 Notices concerning the meeting and other colonization 
information printed in December positioned colonization as a national issue, one which 
the federal government ought to address. Although framed as such, those who could act 
on the issue—the political, social, and religious elite—were likely to be found in the 
immediate vicinity of the District of Columbia. Thus, the colonization meeting was 
considered as a site where men of vaunted stature would address a subject of national 
importance. Such characteristics would inform the discourse of the colonization meeting. 
 On the evening of the meeting, Henry Clay presided. The scheduled chair was to 
be Bushrod Washington, Supreme Court justice, nephew of George Washington and a 
man whose name the organizers counted on for notoriety. With Clay presiding, Caldwell 
became the featured speaker, a task originally assigned to Clay. John Randolph of 
Roanoke, Congressman Robert Wright of Maryland, and Francis Scott Key also made 
brief remarks at the meeting. Also in attendance that night were men such as Senator 
Robert H. Goldsborough of Maryland, Ferdinando Fairfax, a wealthy landowner and 
early supporter of colonization, Reverend Samuel J. Mills of Rhode Island, and Reverend 
William Meade of Virginia.32 They represented wealthy philanthropists, men of politics, 
and religious leaders, bringing a diversity of motivations for supporting colonization. 
                                                 
31 As quoted in "Chronicle," Niles' Weekly Register, 275.  
 
32 According to Staudenraus, the attendees were: Elias B. Caldwell, Francis Scott Key, John Taylor, Daniel 
Webster, Henry Clay, John Randolph, Richard Bland Lee, Edmund I. Lee, Robert Wright, John Carlyle 
Herbert, John Lee, Robert H. Goldsborough, General Walter Jones, John I. Stull, Ferdinando Fairfax, 
Thomas Dougherty, Reverend William Meade, Reverend William H. Wilmer, Stephen B. Balch and 
Samuel J. Mills. Staudenraus offers no evidence of where this list comes from, but the account seems to 
originate in the National Intelligencer, December 31, 1816. The accuracy of Staudenraus's list is 
questionable, as those names Staudenraus listed appeared in the resolutions assigning future duties. One of 
those names listed, Bushrod Washington, we know to have not been present given the remarks of Henry 
Clay speaking to this point. Thus, it is possible that others assigned to such duties were not present. 
15 
Absent from the meeting were any people of color or women, a fact that would not go 
unnoticed in public discourse. 
 Attendees deliberated and voted to create an organization aimed at "collecting 
information" to aid Congress in creating a colony in Africa, or elsewhere.33 The group 
reconvened on December 28, 1816, for the purpose of creating a constitution for the 
organization, electing officers, and drafting a memorial to Congress. With this memorial, 
dated January 1, 1817, and read in Congress on January 14, 1817, the men of the 
colonization meeting announced to U.S. lawmakers their intentions to quell the conflict 
of slavery by means of African colonization. 
 Mercer's support of colonization was informed by the perspective of the 
slaveholders and the desire to maintain an orderly, and thus productive, slave labor 
system. Finley's motivation for colonization drew upon the moral principles of natural 
rights and Christian good-will. It was not difficult to see that many agreed upon the end 
goal of colonization, but that the motivation for the end goal varied considerably. The 
discourses of security and morality had grown increasingly incompatible and, at times, 
hostile to one another. Support for colonization came down from the north and up from 
the south. Meeting in the middle—in the District of Columbia—was symbolic of how a 
national colonization effort would need to develop rhetorically in order to find a 





                                                 
33 National Intelligencer, December 31, 1816.  
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This Project and Previous Studies of the Colonization Meeting and its Context 
 This project explores how the rhetorical strategies that motivate the Colonization 
Society's scheme attempted to overcome the discursive tensions of slavery. The 
colonization meeting was a pivotal event in the attempted transformation of the discourse 
on slavery. The political economic discourse, which the movement's focus on Congress 
encouraged, provided an alternative to the divisiveness of security and morality 
discourses on colonization. Within the political economic discourse, colonizationists 
found a complement of moderate rhetorical strategies that had helped foster some 
agreement on the issue of slavery in Congress. Ultimately, this project will argue that the 
use of moderate rhetoric to motivate the Colonization Society's efforts failed to overcome 
the discursive tensions of slavery.  
 Most studies of the colonization meeting frame it as one bookend of the 
colonization movement, downplaying the centrality of the event in establishing the 
motivation for a national colonization movement. By positioning the colonization 
meeting of 1816 as its conceptual center, this project explores how the rhetorical 
strategies of the colonizationists addressed the exigencies of a unique moment in the 
history of slavery and attempted to create compromise by transcending the tensions of 
slavery. Thus, this study attempts to answer two questions: 1) What do we know about 
the colonization meeting of 1816? and 2) What do we know about the context in which 
the meeting took place?  To answer these questions, it is necessary to turn to the literature 
pertaining to the colonization meeting of 1816, the rhetorical studies significant to my 
project, and works concerning the general context in which the colonization meeting took 
place. 
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  Scholarly works about the colonization meeting of December 21, 1816, have 
successfully assembled the historical details of the event. The most valuable study for the 
comprehension of the colonization convention, and the African colonization movement in 
general, is Philip J. Staudenraus's book, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-
1865.34 Many scholars consider Staudenraus the most comprehensive and thorough 
chronicler of the meeting.35 Though some readers have challenged where Staudenraus 
placed germinal impulse for the creation of the Society,36 the book has been lauded as 
"the standard reference on [the African colonization movement]," and proved "a distinct 
improvement over the older work" on the subject.37  
 Prior to Staudenraus's book, works about colonization lacked the critical distance 
to provide a scholarly assessment. Histories of colonization dating from the mid 
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century looked appreciatively upon 
                                                 
34 Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement. 
 
35 See E. David Cronon, "Review of P.J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865," 
Journal of Southern History 27 (1961): 543; and Wood Gray, "Review of P.J. Staudenraus, The African 
Colonization Movement, 1816-1865," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 345 
(1963): 172. 
 
36 Douglas Egerton has argued that the typical account of the colonization meeting, echoed in Staudenraus, 
wrongly identifies Reverend Finley as the catalyst for the meeting. Instead, argued Egerton, Charles Fenton 
Mercer sparked the move for a national colonization by corresponding with Caldwell one year prior to 
Finley's first mention of colonization. This project takes Egerton's position, yet, also realizes that Finley's 
pamphlet was an important articulation of the religious reasons for colonization. Recognizing the discursive 
value of both Finley and Mercer furthers the claim of the present project, namely that arguments for 
colonization sought compromise from different factions in the slavery debate. See Egerton, "'It's Origin is 
Not a Little Curious,'" 107-119.  
 
37 The previous work on the subject to which Fladeland referred was Early Lee Fox, The American 
Colonization Society 1817-1840 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1919). Betty Fladeland, "Review of P. J. 
Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865" Mississippi Valley Historical Review 48 
(1961): 521. 
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colonizationists' efforts to solve the problems of slavery.38 Staudenraus was aware of the 
apologetic leanings of previous authors.39  
Like the literature concerning the meeting, scholarship on the development of 
colonization sentiment before 1816 is a product of historians. Of such studies, the most 
insightful works demonstrate that colonization encompassed numerous perspectives from 
different geographic locales. Henry Noble Sherwood, for example, documents state and 
local colonization efforts before a national colonization effort was created.40 Many 
scholars of colonization use the publication of Jefferson's 1787 book, Notes on the State 
of Virginia, as their starting point.41 In tracing what he called the "Taproots of 
Colonization," Staudenraus began with Jefferson's colonization scheme in Notes and 
detailed the idea of African colonization through the Quakers, mercantilists, Southern 
planters, free blacks, Northern evangelicals, and British philanthropists.42 Sherwood's and 
Staudenraus's works demonstrate the diversity of colonization support prior to the 
meeting.  
                                                 
38 For examples of sympathetic interpretations of the colonization meeting, see Archibald Alexander, A 
History of Colonization on the Western Coast of Africa (1846; repr., New York: Negro Universities Press, 
1969); Sherwood, "The Formation of the American Colonization Society;"  Fox, American Colonization 
Society; Frederic Bancroft, "The Early Antislavery Movement and African Colonization," in Frederic 
Bancroft: Historian, Jacob E. Cooke, ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), 147-91. 
 
39 Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, 309. See also David Kazanjian, The Colonizing Trick: 
National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2003), 94-95. 
 
40 The earliest efforts were termed "transportation," with the terms "deportation," "gradual emancipation," 
"manumission," "reexportation," and "colonization."  Henry Noble Sherwood, "Early Negro Deportation 
Projects," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 1 (1916): 484-508. 
 
41 See Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, chap. 1; Kazanjian, Colonizing Trick, chap. 2; Allan 
Yarema, American Colonization Society: An Avenue to Freedom? (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 2006), chap. 1. 
 
42 Staudenraus, African Colonization Movement, chap. 1. 
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 Rhetorical studies of the colonization meeting or the development of colonization 
before 1816 are sparse. The most important rhetorical work on early colonization efforts, 
by Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, traced the development of the white 
founders' "minimalist notions of equal liberty and equal representation," one component 
of which was colonization.43 Equality was an important concept in colonization 
arguments, specifically in morality discourse. Other rhetorical works concerning early 
colonization efforts concentrate on the ACS in the 1830s and beyond.44 Such projects are 
instructive of colonization in the age of radical abolitionism, but they reveal very little 
about colonization rhetoric in the unique social and political context of the 1810s. 
 Additionally, some works in the field of rhetoric contribute to my project's 
understanding of the rhetorical practices in the early nineteenth century. Scholarship on 
the transformative rhetoric in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century U.S. context 
shows that the moderate rhetoric of colonization occurred at a moment of great 
possibility.45 African American rhetoric in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
                                                 
43 Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, "The Rhetoric of Equality and Expatriation of African 
Americans, 1776-1826," Communication Studies 42 (1991): 2. Condit and Lucaites expanded this analysis 
in Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, Crafting Equality: America's Anglo-African Word 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). The colonization meeting receives a passing mention in 
Ernest G. Bormann, Forerunners of Black Power: The Rhetoric of Abolition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1971), 1. 
 
44 Some studies of colonization rhetoric in the 1830s and beyond include, Philip Wander, "Salvation 
Through Separation: The Image of the Negro in the American Colonization Society," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 57 (1971): 57-67; Delandis R. Brown, "Free Blacks' Rhetorical Impact on African Colonization:  
The Emergence of Rhetorical Exigence," Journal of Black Studies 9 (1979): 251-265; Stephan Donald 
Julian, "Moral Agency in Rhetorical Controversy: A Study of Gradualism and Immediatism in American 
Antislavery Movements" (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1994); Stephen H. Browne, "Textual Style 
and Radical Critique in William Lloyd Garrison's Thoughts on African Colonization," Communication 
Studies 47 (1996): 177-190; Alisse Portnoy, Their Right to Speak: Women's Activism in the Indian and 
Slave Debates (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), chaps. 4 and 5.  
 
45 Jennifer R. Mercieca and James Arnt Aune, "A Vernacular Republican Rhetoric: William Manning's Key 
of Libberty," Quarterly Journal of Speech 91 (2005): 119-143; and Stephen John Hartnett and Jennifer 
Rose Mercieca, "'Has Your Courage Rusted?': National Security and the Contested Norms of 
Republicanism in Post-Revolutionary America, 1798-1801," Rhetoric and Public Affairs 9 (2006): 79-112. 
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centuries has received renewed attention, primarily through the works of Jacqueline 
Bacon and Glen McClish.46 The work of Bacon and McClish illuminates African 
American rhetoric before the rise of radical abolition and the more well-known rhetorical 
performances Frederick Douglass and others. The transformative political rhetoric of the 
early nineteenth century and the dynamic rhetoric of African Americans during this 
period provide a rhetorical context in which the colonization meeting took place. 
 During the 1810s and 1820s, The United States was in a state of transition, 
shaping the motivational field for colonization. The monikers used to describe the time 
period from which the Colonization Society emerged include "the middle period," "the 
era of good feelings," "the neglected period of anti-slavery," and "the rain between the 
storms."47 Henry Adams, in his history of the Jefferson and Madison administrations, 
illustrated the change in the United States' perspective after the War of 1812. "The 
continent lay before [Americans]," Adams states, "like an uncovered ore-bed."48 Though 
a bit of an overstatement, Adams's comment captures the general feeling of expansion, 
nationalism, and growth that pervaded the late 1810s and 1820s. George Dangerfield 
writes, "The American people, in 1815, endeavored to turn their backs upon Europe, 
                                                 
46 Glen McClish, "William G. Allen's 'Orators and Oratory': Inventional Amalgamation, Pathos, and the 
Characterization of Violence in African –American Abolitionist Rhetoric," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 35 
(2005): 47-72; Jacqueline Bacon and Glen McClish, "Descendents of Africa, Sons of '76: Exploring Early 
African-American Rhetoric," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 36 (2006): 1-29; Glen McClish and Jacqueline 
Bacon, "'I am Full of Matter': A Rhetorical Analysis of Daniel Coker's A Dialogue Between a Virginian 
and an African Minister," Journal of Communication & Religion 29 (2006): 315-346; and Glen McClish, 
"A Man of Feeling, a Man of Colour: James Forten and the Rise of African American Deliberative 
Rhetoric," Rhetorica 25 (2007): 297-328.  
 
47 The scholarly works associated with each of these descriptors are, respectively: John W. Burgess, The 
Middle Period: : 1817-1858 (New York: Charles Scribner, 1901); Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings; 
Adams, Neglected Period of Anti-slavery; and Matthew E. Mason "The Rain between the Storms: The 
Politics and Ideology of Slavery in the United States, 1808-1820" (PhD. diss, University of Maryland, 
2002). 
 
48 Henry Adams, A History of the United States of America During the Administration of Jefferson and 
Madison, 9 vols. (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1889-91), 9: 173. 
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insofar as Europe represented the kind of world history they most detested."49 As the 
symbolic end to the War of 1812, the negotiation of the Treaty of Ghent represented a 
chance for The United States "to grow up" and proceed in its aggressive expansion.50 In 
the many scholarly characterizations of the post-war 1810s, the spirit of change pervades. 
From within the context of a changing nation came both optimism and fear of the future, 
both sentiments to be harnessed by the advocates of colonization. 
In addition to addressing the transformations occurring during the 1810s, scholars 
have also recognized the anxiety of slavery that festered as U.S. identity changed. 
Rebecca Brooks Gruver describes an country that was at once unified and growing apart 
in the years following the end of the War of 1812.51 Dangerfield notes the "odd irony" 
associated with titling the 1810s and 1820s as the "era of good feelings," for as soon as 
Americans could declare victory in the War of 1812, tensions rose.52  
Alice Adams reminds us of three important features of antislavery sentiment in 
the years from 1808 until 1831. First, the early nineteenth century was not a "stagnant" 
but rather a robust time for antislavery activists. Second, Adams argues, "In the South the 
[antislavery] societies were more numerous [than the North], the members no less 
earnest, and the hatred of slavery no less bitter in the later than the earlier part of the 
period under discussion [1808-1831]."53 Third, Adams complicates the matter of 
antislavery in the early nineteenth century, concluding that "it is difficult to calculate the 
                                                 
49 George Dangerfield, The Awakening of American Nationalism: 1815-1828 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1965), 1. 
 
50 Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings, 90.  
 
51 Gruver, American Nationalism, 249. 
 
52 Dangerfield, Era of Good Feelings, 91. 
 
53 Adams, Neglected Period of Anti-Slavery, 250. 
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effective strength of this [antislavery] sentiment."54 Thus, in the years preceding the 
colonization meeting, sectionalism began to emerge, but not so much that it ended 
antislavery societies in the South. Antislavery sentiment was present, but not so vocal as 
to make a notable difference in the debate over slavery at the time.  
The literature concerning the colonization meeting treats the historical 
development of the meeting, some of the rhetorical forces at work, and the transitional 
nature of The United States in the early nineteenth century. This project extends these 
conversations in order to offer a cogent understanding of the rhetorical development of 
colonization: the tension, the possible solution, and the execution. Such insights are 
important to understanding a movement that attempted to solve the problem of slavery; 
tried to do so through moderate rhetorical strategies that might avoid discursive tension; 
garnered the support of many powerful men in The United States such as Henry Clay, 
Daniel Webster, Bushrod Washington and Presidents from Madison to Lincoln; and yet, 
ultimately failed in its efforts. Considering the tremendous energies devoted to the 
subject of slavery in the early nineteenth century and decades thereafter, the development 
and ultimate failure of colonization discourse has a provocative story that is worth 
understanding.  
 
Outline of Study 
 The movement for African colonization emerged as the result of the convergence 
of long-developing problems of slavery and the unique opportunities of the moment. The 
structure of this project attends to both the general quality and the unique texture of 
                                                 
54 Adams, Neglected Period of Anti-Slavery, 249. 
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slavery discourse implicated in the development of a national colonization movement. 
The story of colonization is, at its core, a drama in four parts.  
 In Part I, where the reader is currently situated, provided a glimpse into the 
meeting. The details of the meeting provide a sense that there was a problem in The 
United States and colonization supporters believed they could solve it with their scheme. 
The depth of that problem, the possibility for solving it, the moment of consummation, 
and the denoument are the subjects addressed throughout the remainder of this project. 
Part II establishes the scene facing colonizationists: the growing tension within 
slavery discourse and potential rhetorical means to resolve that tension. Chapter One 
provides an understanding of the underlying rhetorical forces within which the discourse 
of U.S. slavery would develop. The struggle between supporters and opponents of the 
peculiar institution intensified with the growing tension between two discourses that 
framed slavery: a security discourse constructing the great fears that an end to slavery 
presented, and a moral discourse casting slavery as an evil that the society must purge 
from its character. If the nation was to resolve the slavery dilemma without breaking 
apart, this was the tension that would have to be rhetorically managed.  
 Chapter Two explores political economic discourse as a potential rhetorical 
alternative to the increasingly-contentious security and morality discourses. The unique 
character of political economic discourse resided as a confluence of rhetorical theory and 
practice within the moment. Scottish Enlightenment thinker Adam Smith tightly linked 
political economy—that is, the business of governing—to moderate rhetorical practices. 
The rhetorical practices described by Smith were expounded in U.S. political economic 
discourse. Beginning with the Articles of Confederation and continuing up to the time of 
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the colonization meeting, the use of moderate rhetoric in political economic discourse 
helped to create and maintain the Union. Moderate rhetoric was not without its flaws, yet 
it provided a timely and appropriate mode of address which colonizationists could use in 
their efforts to overcome discursive tensions, craft compromise, and solve the dilemma of 
slavery in The United States.  
In Part III, we see how the theory and practice of moderate rhetoric were used to 
try to overcome the discursive tensions of the moment and advance the cause of 
colonization. Chapter Three attends to Henry Clay's opening remarks at the colonization 
meeting. Serving as chair of the meeting and being a notable public figure of the time, 
Clay's remarks helped to define the rhetorical motivations of the colonization movement. 
When his colonization remarks are juxtaposed with his prior rhetorical performances on 
subjects closely related to colonization, Clay's moderate rhetoric failed to provide the 
rhetorical force and political vision of his previous performances.  
The featured oration of Elias B. Caldwell—the subject of Chapter Four—
constituted the fullest declaration of the goals and motivations of the colonization 
meeting. In that speech, Caldwell's moderate rhetoric brought together many different 
appeals from the security and morality discourses. But, in doing so, he failed to merge the 
appeals in the service of a powerful statement aimed at overcoming the thrust of the 
security-morality tension.  
Chapter Five turns to a third deployment of moderate rhetoric in which the 
rhetorical motivations established by Clay and Caldwell were redressed. In a "Counter 
Memorial" to be sent to Congress in opposition to the Colonization Society—the 
presumed clarity and prudence of colonization was called into question. The Counter 
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Memorial was a polysymous response to the moderate rhetoric of colonization, as it had 
many levels of interpretation. Taken individually or as a group, the multiple 
interpretations demonstrated the weakness of the moderate rhetoric used by 
colonizationists and, ultimately, the failure of moderate rhetoric to overcome the security-
morality tension in slavery discourse.  
 Part IV of the colonization meeting drama traces the pragmatic and rhetorical 
legacies of the colonization meeting. Colonizationists attempted to generate a national 
program for colonization. To that end, the pragmatic legacy of colonization after the 
meeting is traced, including the number of free blacks removed, the political relevance of 
the Colonization Society over time, the history of the Liberia colony, and later iterations 
of the colonization movement. The colonization meeting also had rhetorical implications 
for future colonization efforts, specifically related to the legacy of the moderate rhetoric 
of colonization, and the legacy of the critiques against colonization. Despite the failure of 
the Colonization Society to solve the problem of slavery, the discourse of the Society 
played a significant role in the public debate over slavery in The United States. 
 Before radical abolitionism, before the Missouri Compromise, before gag rules on 
slave petitions in Congress, before efforts at Southern secession, before bleeding Kansas, 
before John Brown and Harpers Ferry, before the Emancipation Proclamation, and before 
the Civil War, colonizationists attempted to overcome the tension of slavery through 
moderate rhetoric and a national colonization project. The national colonization effort 
was forged in the context of immense discursive tension and limited, but plausible, 
rhetorical opportunities. By studying the rhetorical dynamics of colonization—the 
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obstacles, the opportunities, the execution, and the critiques—we can better understand 











DISCURSIVE TENSION AND RHETORICAL POSSIBILITY IN  
U.S. SLAVERY DISCOURSE 
In 1619, a Dutch man-o'-war sold twenty African slaves to colonists in Virginia. 
This event marked the beginning of African slavery in British North America. Over the 
next two centuries, the increase of slavery was accompanied by increasing discursive 
tension about the keeping of human chattel. Many rhetors defended the practice of 
slavery, arguing that it was natural and necessary to keep the dominant culture, that is 
elite whites, secure. Over time, however, an increasingly intense oppositional voice 
developed that decried slavery as immoral. The security-morality tension was not beyond 
relief. Within the legislative sphere, representatives from throughout The United States 
were able to deliberate on matters relating to slavery. Within political economic 
discourse, Americans developed the rhetorical resources to assuage the discursive tension 
of slavery. Chapter One traces the development of the tension between security and 
morality discourses, demonstrating the need for a rhetorical alternative that 
colonizationists sought to create. Chapter Two explains the rhetorical possibilities that 
developed within political economic discourse. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
THE SECURITY-MORALITY TENSION IN SLAVERY DISCOURSE: 
INSTRUMENTAL RHETORIC, PATHETIC RHETORIC,  
AND THE COLONIZATIONISTS' DILEMMA 
In 1800, word of a slave insurrection in Richmond spread throughout the United 
States. The anxiety inspired by this news invited a unique response from an anonymous 
Virginian in the form of a publicly circulated letter to a member of the Virginia General 
Assembly. "Here, then, is the true picture of our situation," the unnamed writer observed, 
"These [slaves], our hewers of wood and drawers of water, possess the physical power of 
doing us mischief; and are invited to it by motives which self-love dictates, which reason 
justifies."1 As the Virginian noted, the "celestial spark" of freedom "is not extinguished in 
the bosom of the slave."2 Recognizing that slaves were capable and justified in rebelling 
against slaveholders, the letter expressed concern that, "Our [elite white society's] sole 
security consists, then, in their ignorance of this power, and in their means of using it."3  
The anxiety of the Virginian was reflective of a much larger tension in U.S. public 
discourse. Herbert Aptheker argues, "The dozen years following 1790 formed a period of 
more intense and widespread slave discontent than any that had preceded [it]."4 The 
extent to which slaves were ignorant of their power diminished, aided by the increasing 
frequency and intensity of anti-slavery arguments. The American Revolution had 
                                                 
1 Letter to a Member of the General Assembly of Virginia on the Subject of the Late Conspiracy of the 
Slaves; with a Proposal for their Colonization (Baltimore: Bonsal & Niles, 1801), 7. 
 
2 Letter to a Member, 6. 
 
3 Letter to a Member, 7. 
 
4 Herbert Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts (1943; New York: International Publishers, 1974), 209. 
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inflected anti-slavery discourse with a moral certitude, based in the rhetoric of natural 
rights, which emboldened resistance to the peculiar institution. In style and in substance, 
these arguments challenged the docility and calmness that white slaveholders coveted. 
Thomas Branagan's anti-slavery 1804 pamphlet illustrated the increasing intensity of 
moral arguments against slavery: 
To the mortification of philanthropy, to the grief of humanity, to the indignation 
of morality, and the astonishment of patriotism, the degrading tale must be told  
that in this country, where so much precious blood has been spilt in the cause of 
freedom, where so many heroic and patriotic lives have been sacrificed at the 
shrine of liberty, in this free country where our motto is virtue, liberty, 
independence. . .  that these republicans whose bosoms glow at the name of 
liberty, who profess to be her most zealous votaries, and indefatigable defenders, 
in the commencement of the nineteenth century, have not only established, but 
consolidated the most horrid despotism, and riveted the chains of the most 
diabolical slavery, that ever tormented and disgraced the human species.5  
If patriots and republicans spilt blood for the causes of liberty and freedom, why would 
slaves not do the same? The argument for natural rights, conveyed through vivid 
language, energized anti-slavery sentiment and challenged the calm order constructed by 
security discourse. Tensions mounted in public forums, as pro-slavery whites deliberated 
about ways to retain their security while slaves, free blacks, and anti-slavery whites 
levied moral challenges against the social order of slavery. Any attempt at change—such 
as colonization—would need to negotiate this tension.  
                                                 
5 Thomas Branagan, Serious Remonstrances, Addressed to the Citizens of the Northern States, and Their 
Representatives: Being an Appeal to Their Natural Feelings & Common Sense . . . (Philadelphia: Thomas 
Stiles, 1805), 25-26 (emphasis in original). 
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The evocativeness of the Virginian's letter of 1801 and Branagan's pamphlet of 
1804 remind us of the multiple dimensions of rhetorical discourse. One dimension of 
rhetorical discourse is that it is instrumental. That is to say, rhetoric is what humans use, 
in particular situations, to accomplish a goal or purpose. To this point, Donald C. Bryant 
suggests that rhetoric is "the basic instrument for the creation of informed public opinion 
and the consequent expedient public action."6 "Situational" serves as a sufficient 
summary term of the instrumental dimension of rhetoric, particularly from the 
perspective advanced by Lloyd Bitzer's conceptualization of the "rhetorical situation."7 
Another dimension of rhetorical discourse is the emotional, or pathetic, dimension. 
Pathos is generally connected with the grand style, with the aim being to excite, rather 
than to calm, emotions.8 Instrumental and pathetic dimensions of rhetoric are not 
mutually exclusive—as situations can invite heightened emotion and emotion can be used 
to accomplish a discrete goal—however, within discourse, a particular dimension of 
rhetoric is likely to emerge as the primary force.  
The variety of rhetoric can be seen in the Virginian's letter and Branagan's 
pamphlet. The Virginian's letter highlights the instrumental dimension of rhetoric, as the 
author's purpose was connected to the situation. The instrumental dimension of rhetoric 
became closely tied to security discourse, where white rhetors expressed concern about 
their safety within the context of a slave society. In the aftermath of Gabriel's rebellion, 
the pathos of the situation was enthymematic. The author need not remind the audience 
                                                 
6 Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and its Scope," Quarterly Journal of Speech 39 (1953): 410. 
 
7 Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric 1 (1968): 1-14. 
 
8 Mary A. Grant and George C. Fiske, "Cicero's Orator and Horace's Ars Poetica, " Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology 25 (1924): 34. 
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of the heightened tension that the insurrection created. They knew. Brought to the 
forefront was how actions could be taken to address the situation and restore order for the 
politically powerful white society. The letter was not devoid of emotional content, but the 
focus on the problems of the moment highlight the instrumental function that rhetoric can 
serve. 
By contrast, Branagan's pamphlet highlighted the pathetic dimension of rhetoric 
in his denouncement of slavery. Unlike the letter, where action was motivated by a 
specific set of circumstances rooted in a moment, Branagan's pamphlet used the pathetic 
dimension of rhetoric to make a sweeping claim against all slavery. Branagan's pamphlet 
was part of an increasingly bold discourse that opposed slavery on moral grounds. In 
morality discourse, rhetors called attention to the violation of enduring principles, values, 
and rights caused by slavery. Contributing to this discourse, Branagan's call to action was 
not a response to a particular event; rather, Branagan used the expansiveness of pathetic 
rhetoric to address the broad spectrum of abuses caused by slavery. Branagan was 
certainly attempting to "use" rhetoric as an instrument for change; however, the scope of 
his appeal went beyond a narrow situation. Although discourse is not limited to one 
dimension of rhetoric, the Virginian's letter and Branagan's pamphlet help to demonstrate 
the ways that various rhetorical dimensions can be brought to the forefront.  
In slavery discourse, the multiple dimensions of rhetoric were not independent of 
one another. Although security and morality discourses circulated with little antagonism 
in British North America's early colonial years, the different dimensions of rhetoric 
guiding each of these two discourses began to generate tension in the public discourse on 
slavery. These two dimensions of rhetoric sought to move rhetoric and slaves in opposite 
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directions: the instrumental rhetoric of security discourse valued control and boundaries, 
keeping slaves and rhetoric within a limited scope; while the pathetic rhetoric of morality 
discourse valued transcendence and effervescence, pushing against the barriers inscribed 
by the security discourse. The story of how the rhetorical relationship between security 
and morality discourses became increasingly tense is the province of this chapter.  
Tracing the development of the security-morality tension in slavery discourse 
unfolds in four parts. First, security and morality discourses are shown to originate in 
agreement and not in opposition to one another, with both discourses approaching slavery 
with instrumental strategies. Next, the origins of the pathetic rhetorical approach to 
slavery are connected to morality discourse. Then, the focus turns to the injunction of the 
American Revolution and the way in which the security and morality discourses were 
transformed. Lastly, through the discourse of the War of 1812, the security-morality 
tension galvanized, creating the rhetorical situation that colonizationists would face as 
they advanced their plans. By the time the colonization meeting convened in 1816, 
colonization supporters faced long-developing discursive tensions and the dilemma of 
reconciling these tensions. The purpose of this chapter is to map the tension in British 
North American and, later, U.S. public discourse that colonizationists would need to 
overcome to gain widespread support.  
 
Accommodating Slavery within Security and Morality Discourses:  
Instrumental Rhetoric and the Strategies of Containment and Deterrence 
The British North American colonies were founded by peoples of two 
orientations. The pilgrims of the New England colonies came to pursue "an errand into 
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the wilderness," seeking a new beginning that would allow them to practice their religion 
as they thought God wanted.9 By contrast, Virginia was founded by entrepreneurs and 
paupers who sought economic success in the New World. Although these two areas were 
founded by peoples of differing purposes, both colonies faced the same hardships 
associated with building a functioning colony. When slaves were introduced into the 
colonies, the colonists' reaction of reflected the complexities of the colonists' beliefs. 
Colonists were forced to consider slavery in relation to Christian principles, colonial 
industry, and everyday life. Colonial life was already fraught with difficulties—disease, 
famine, and conflict—and slavery added another layer of struggle.   
As colonists considered how slavery fit in their everyday lives, there were far 
more similarities than differences in the ways that colonists rhetorically approached 
slavery. Forged at a time amidst great uncertainty, an instrumental rhetorical approach to 
slavery defined early discourses of slavery in British North America. The instrumental 
approach was manifested by two strategies in particular: the strategies of containment and 
deterrence. As this section will show, instrumental rhetorical strategies were important to 
how slavery was negotiated throughout both security and moral discourses during the 
early colonial years. Over time, however, pathetic rhetorical strategies developed through 
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Instrumental Rhetoric in Security and Morality Discourse:  
The Strategy of Containment 
About the practice of slavery, one Virginian wrote, "In a word, if we will keep a 
ferocious monster in our country, we must keep him in chains."10 The fear of insurrection 
by "a ferocious monster" led whites to devise ways to keep slaves in chains, both 
physically and rhetorically. One such strategy that developed to rhetorically control 
slaves was the strategy of silence. To be sure, the preference of most whites was that 
there be no discussion of slave insurrections, for the absence of this rhetoric would 
perhaps signify that there was no threat to their life and the established social order. The 
absence of discourse was instrumental in its rhetorical power, as whites could reason that 
the threat of insurrection was minimal if security discourse did not exist.  
Although the stability of silence was the ideal for whites, it was indeed an ideal. 
More often, whites turned to strategies of containment to decrease the potential for 
insurrection and downplay any rumors of insurrection. Like the preference for silence, 
containment operated from the assumption that rhetoric was instrumental, because 
containment worked actively to use rhetoric to contain the immediate danger. The 
strategy of containment was used on a variety of topics in colonial British North 
America, most notably in the discussions of slave communication and education.  
Whites recognized that slave insurrections were fostered through collective action 
and thus, created laws to limit the ability for slaves to organize. A 1680 law in Virginia 
made it illegal for slaves to assemble and was amended in 1682 to add that no slave from 
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one plantation could remain at another for more than four hours at a time.11 After 
defeating a slave insurrection in 1723, Virginia Governor Hugh Drysdale used the 
opportunity to urge stronger laws against slaves, stating, "I am persuaded you are too 
well acquainted with the Cruel dispositions of these Creatures, when they have it in their 
power to destroy or distress, to let Slipp this faire opportunity of making more proper 
Laws against them."12 Understanding that slaveholders could not monitor every action of 
the slaves, laws were also passed to create incentives for slaves to inform their masters of 
potential uprisings. In 1751, a South Carolina law provided a reward to any slave who 
provided information on attempts to poison a white master.13 Such practices limited the 
ability of slaves to communicate, identify with each other's common plight, and unify 
against the people facilitating their oppression.  
Accompanying the passage of laws were practices that encouraged containment of 
slaves. One such practice was to frame the potential allies of slaves as enemies, 
particularly American Indians. A persistent concern of whites was that the American 
Indian populations would bond with slaves and take-up arms together. As Merton L. 
Dillon notes, "Everything was done to prevent the two threatening groups from 
recognizing and taking advantage of their common interest," which led slaveholders to 
work diligently to frame Indians as an enemy of slaves.14 Slaveholders also attempted to 
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create divisions within the slave community by either making some slaves spies or 
personal assistants to the master, or by keeping slaves from their family or tribe.   
Portents of the security-morality tension were evident when containment was 
incorporated into slaves' religious education. For Quakers, George Fox was the first to 
bring the problem of religious instruction and slavery to light. Fox broached the subject 
in a 1657 epistle, "To Friends beyond the sea that have Blacks and Indian Slaves." Fox's 
message did not decry slavery; it simply asked that slaves' religious instruction not be 
forgotten.15 Similarly, Puritans argued that religious instruction of slaves ought to be of 
the utmost importance to colonists in the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Richard Baxter's 
"Directions to Those Masters in Foreign Plantations Who Have Negroes and Other 
Slaves" a chapter in his Christian Directory, implored slaveholding British North 
American colonists, "Teach them the way to heaven, and do all for their souls which I 
have before directed you to do for all your other servants."16 The pressure to instruct 
slaves was political, as well as moral, as French and Spanish settlers in British North 
America were liberal in their instruction of slaves. Such practices made religious 
instruction about international standing as well as maintaining a docile slave population.17 
If slaves were educated, would this lead to increased resistance to their condition? If 
Christians were to spread the gospel according to Jesus Christ, how could they not share 
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the gospel with slaves? In morality discourse, questions such as these complicated the use 
of containment toward the religious instruction of slaves.  
Despite such complexities, containment pervaded morality discourse in the pre-
Revolutionary phase. Typically, when confronted by slaveholders, religious leaders made 
clear the limits of their outreach. While in Barbados, Quaker William Edmundson was 
brought before the governor and charged with stirring rebellion among the slaves by 
preaching to them. Edmundson's defense was to the contrary; that preaching to the slaves 
would make them Christian, thus calming their savage inclinations and preventing their 
rebellion.18 During the 1740s George Whitefield, who converted many blacks to 
Christianity during his missionary work near Philadelphia, vigorously attacked the 
treatment of slaves while continuing to hold slaves himself. In an open letter to Maryland, 
Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina, Whitefield wrote, "I challenge the whole 
World to produce a single Instance of a Negroe's being made a thorough Christian, and 
thereby a worse servant."19 Laws were even passed to clarify that baptism did not change 
one's condition, bondage, or freedom.20  
While containment in security discourse sought to literally and symbolically 
contain the potential insurrection of slaves, containment in morality discourse at least 
sought to educate slaves in the process. Although some considered religious instruction a 
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breach of containment, those who offered such instruction did so to ultimately achieve 
containment by fashioning a more docile slave population. Thus, both security and 
morality discourses employed the instrumental functions of containment.     
 
The Strategy of Deterrence and Instrumental Rhetoric 
When the strategy of containment seemed to fail—namely, when a slave 
insurrection was attempted or a rumor of an attempted revolt swelled—whites employed 
a strategy of deterrence in an attempt to restore order. Deterrence was similar to 
containment as both strategies were employed by whites to maintain and exert control 
over the slave class. The difference was defined by context and audience. The context for 
containment was that of relative calm and thus, the strategy was meant to keep slaves in 
their current state of containment. The context of deterrence was disorder, wherein the 
strategy focused on regaining social order that had been disrupted. The audience for 
containment was primarily whites, whereas the audience for deterrence included blacks.21 
Although the strategy of deterrence discussed the harsh punishments of black 
insurrectionists, such a strategy was also meant to reassure whites that order was being 
restored.   
The distinguishing move of the deterrence strategy was the vivid description of 
the punishment inflicted upon insurrectionists. By spreading word of the horrific 
punishment of black insurrectionists, the general population was led to believe that order 
was being restored. In contrast to the strategy of containment—where control was 
attained through staunchly instrumental rhetorical strategies—the strategy of deterrence 
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called upon the pathetic power of language to overwhelm the energy that emanated from 
news of insurrections. It should be noted, however, that deterrence was a defensive 
strategy and only used at times of intense unrest. The white social order was not well-
served to evoke intense emotions on the subject of slavery. To do so would disrupt the 
calm, orderly society that the strategy of containment aimed to create. Yet, when 
emotions intensified across white and black communities, the white social order saw a 
need to reassert its power and restore white security. Thus, pathetic rhetoric was used 
sparingly, and only for the purpose of returning a sense of order in which instrumental 
rhetoric thrived.   
The strategy of deterrence played a marginal role in early morality discourse. 
Where deterrence was used in morality discourse it tended to be directed at deterring 
whites rather than blacks. For example, in 1630, a Virginia Court sentenced Hugh Davis 
to "be soundly whipped, before an assembly of Negroes and others, for abusing himself 
to dishonor and shame of Christians, by defiling his body and lying with a negroe; which 
fault he is to acknowledge next Sabbath day."22 A decade later in Virginia, Robert Sweet 
(a white man) was required "to do penance in church according to the laws of England, 
for getting a negroe woman with child and the woman whipt."23 Most reports of 
punishment of slaves lacked mention of Christian principles or moral reasoning. Instead, 
the strategy of deterrence found greatest usage in security discourse and, more 
specifically, in response to rumored or attempted insurrection. 
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The strategy of deterrence depended upon the publicity of punishments. If silence 
and containment of slavery were challenged, and an insurrection occurred, then a forceful 
public response was used to reassert order. For example, during the New York 
insurrection of 1712, "The terror of black insurrection . . . ran like a fever through the 
white community." Once the New York insurrectionists were caught, the punishments 
inflicted were very public: "thirteen slaves died on the gallows, one was starved to death 
in chains, three were burned publicly at the stake, and one was broken on the wheel."24 
All of these punishments took place within the eye of the public. Additionally, details of 
the punishments were relayed in newspapers, most explicitly in Boston's Weekly News-
Letter.25 The deterrent force wielded by public punishments, such as those in New York, 
was known to the political elites in The United States. In a letter to the mayor of New 
Orleans, Louisiana Governor William Claiborne noted that if slaves on trial were 
convicted, he would punish them "in such a manner and at such places as may best serve 
to terrify those who may be inclined to commit similar enormities."26 Deterrence was not 
the preferred strategy of slaveholding whites, as such a strategy brought to light the 
violent possibilities of slavery. Yet, in moments in which order needed to be restored—
where neither silence nor containment would sufficiently restore calm and order—the 
strategy of deterrence proved necessary.  
One of the assumptions of the strategy of deterrence was that, upon responding to 
the disorder of slave insurrections, it was possible to return to the previous order. Prior to 
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the American Revolution, insurrections were largely isolated incidents. Pre-Revolution 
revolts were what Marion D. De B. Kilson refers to as vandalistic or opportunistic 
revolts.27 Insurrections were not discussed as part of a larger political or ideological 
movement related to slavery. Instead, insurrections were discussed as pockets of rebellion 
where slaves sought their own freedom and not the destruction of the slave system. In the 
post-Revolutionary United States, transcendent principles, such as equality, liberty, and 
natural rights, began to connect insurrections and thus limited the potential for deterrence 
to contain slaves. Absent such principles, slaves were "pre-political" and were without "a 
specific language in which to express their aspirations about the world."28 Yet, armed 
with principles that could unite slaves geographically and ideologically, slave 
insurrections could transform from isolated pockets of unrest to a widespread threat to the 
whites in power. Each insurrection would only embolden such principles and curry the 
pathetic rhetoric against slavery. 
The New York slave insurrection of 1741 foreshadowed the discursive impact of 
the American Revolution and the diminished capacity of whites to regain control through 
the strategy of deterrence. The investigation and trial that followed the weeks of violence 
and fires throughout the city—a scene that led one colonist to refer to the situation as the 
"Bonfires of the Negros"— challenged the assumptions that slaves or rhetoric could be 
instrumentally controlled. The court record suggested that "tens and possibly hundreds of 
black men had been meeting secretly, gathering weapons and plotting to burn the city, 
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murder every white man, appoint [local tavern owner John] Hughson their king, and elect 
a slave named Caesar governor."29 The ruling class of New Yorkers employed the 
strategy of deterrence by executing suspected slaves in a very public manner and 
spreading the word in print. Yet, such attempts to restore control proved challenging. The 
organization and principles that connected the New York conspirators spread beyond 
New York and the moment. As Jill Lepore argues, the conspirators were not bandits out 
for their own freedom and nothing more; rather, the "slaves suspected of conspiracy 
constituted both a phantom political party and an ever-threatening revolution."30 While 
whites could previously contain or deter the potential of bodily harm, this insurrection 
demonstrated that whites were now confronted with the challenge of containing or 
deterring the growing political agency of blacks and the effervescent (and less 
controllable) concept of freedom. Although the American Revolution was decades away, 
the New York insurrection of 1741 provided a glimpse into how political consciousness 
could destabilize the instrumental strategies of white control.  
Whites used the strategies of containment and deterrence to keep and restore 
order. These strategies reflected an instrumental approach to rhetoric that fit with the 
white slaveholder's desire to control slaves and discourse about slaves. Prior to the 
American Revolution, instrumental rhetorical strategies dominated both security and 
morality discourses. However, within morality discourse opposition to instrumentalism 
slowly gained voice.  
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Portents of Discursive Tension: Morality Discourse, Pathetic Rhetoric, and the 
Initial Challenge to the Social Order of Slavery 
Prior to the American Revolution, security and morality discourses approached 
slavery with similar arguments that highlighted the instrumental dimension of rhetoric. 
Although some considered slavery immoral, moral discourses tended to fall in line with 
the strategies of containment and deterrence. Despite the overwhelming presence of 
instrumental strategies prior to the Revolution, there were portents of the pathetic power 
that rhetoric could wield in morality discourse. Specifically, the use of empathetic 
appeals and an increasingly confrontational style undercut the instrumental control of 
rhetoric and slavery. 
 
Challenging the Instrumental Rhetoric in  
Slavery Discourse through Empathetic Appeals 
Empathy pervaded one of the first public challenges to slavery: the Germantown 
Friends' petition of April 1688.31 That petition, created by a group of Dutch-speaking 
Mennonites and Quakers in Germantown, Pennsylvania, was submitted to a local 
Meeting of Friends.32 The Germantown Friends' petition asked its readers to reflect upon 
the treatment of slaves, "Is there any that would be done or handled at the manner? Viz., 
to be sold or made a slave for all the time of his life?"33 The empathetic appeal in the 
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petition was supported by reference to the Golden Rule. To wit "There is a saying, that 
we shall doe [sic] to all men like as we will be done ourselves; making no differences of 
what generation, descent or colour they are."34 Such an appeal confronted the sinful 
practice of slavery (although in less strident terms when compared to later attacks on 
slavery). The Friends equated the selling and keeping of slaves with more agreed-upon 
sins, such as adultery, stealing, and writing, "And we know that men must not comitt 
adultery,—some do commit adultery, in others, separating wives from their husbands and 
giving them to others."35 Thus, slavery was not like adultery (or stealing); it was adultery 
(and stealing). The petition further pushed Quakers to justify the keeping slaves given the 
violence that slavery invited. Such an appeal resonated with the Quaker belief in 
pacifism.36 As the petition sought empathy from their audience by asking Friends to 
consider themselves as slaves, it invoked both guilt and fear by demonstrating how 
slavery violated core Quaker principles.   
The appeal to empathy of the Germantown Friends' petition was popularized in 
the mid-eighteenth century by Quaker John Woolman. Woolman's style privileged unity 
over division, which allowed him to critique slavery while avoiding personal criticism of 
his opponents.37 In his heralded pamphlet, Some Considerations on the Keeping of 
Negroes, Woolman reminded the reader that "that all Nations are of one Blood" and "that 
we are subject to the like Afflictions and Infirmities of Body, the like Disorders and 
Frailties in Mind, the like Temptations, the same Death, and the same Judgment." Most 
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importantly, Woolman unified human kind by arguing "that the Alwise Being is Judge 
and Lord over us all."38 The relationship among humans as described by Woolman 
posited an equality of physical experiences, mental capacity, and standing before God. 
Such principles were the ideological underpinnings of the rhetoric of natural rights during 
the Revolution. Woolman omitted the phrase "natural rights" in the pamphlet; yet, that 
Woolman described natural rights rather than declared them illustrated the indirect style 
that Woolman used in addressing the evils of slaveholding. Additionally, the concept of 
"natural rights" had not yet gained the symbolic capital and ideographic quality that 
would imbue the phrase during the American Revolution. In style and substance, 
Woolman represented, at the very least, the appreciation of pathetic rhetoric as a way to 
bring together audiences against slavery, rather than to cultivate animus against slaves or 
slaveholders.  
The empathetic appeals of the Germantown Friends and Woolman brought the 
evil of slavery to the surface, without making abrasive anti-slavery appeals. Despite their 
efforts, and a similar approach by Quaker George Keith in 1693, the Germantown 
Friends petition proved too aggressive in its pursuit of universal human equality. 39 After 
being presented at the meeting at Richard Worell's (a local, subordinate meeting of 
Friends), the petition was passed on to the Monthly Meeting at Dublin, Pennsylvania. The 
petition was subsequently passed all the way to the Yearly Meeting at Burlington, New 
Jersey, where the petition was deemed "not to be so proper for this Meeting."40 Keith's An 
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Exhortation to Friends put more pressure on Friends and their complicity with 
instrumental strategies of control, as he argued that not only should slaves be freed, "but 
being escaped from his Master, should have the Liberty to dwell amongst us, where it 
liketh him best."41 Woolman's appeal to unity confronted slavery without confronting 
slaveholders. This approach avoided creating enemies, but it also failed to overcome the 
instrumental strategies that supported the slavery system. Many who opposed the slave 
trade (which was not akin to opposing all slavery) were supportive of repressive 
measures such as the Black Codes of 1700, which enacted harsher punishments on blacks 
than on whites for the same crime.42 Although appeals to empathy did not shift attitudes 
within the immediate context, this pathetic strategy continued to develop in opposition to 
the instrumental rhetoric within security discourse.  
 
Forcing the Anti-Slavery Position:  
Pathetic Rhetoric and the Confrontational Style  
Confronting the practice of slavery through public discourse was not necessarily a 
confrontational act. The empathy of the Germantown Friends and Woolman, which 
focused on the similarities between slaves and non-slaves, confronted the issue of slavery 
and not the person keeping slaves. Empathetic appeals showed how all people could 
agree that being a slave would not be a desirable condition in which to live, therefore 
slavery should not be practiced. Empathetic appeals moved to create unity among people 
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that slavery should not be practiced. The confrontational style, by contrast, had radical 
aims and created "a dramatic sense of division."43 In morality discourse, the key division 
was between right and wrong, moral and immoral. Guided by a sense of rightness, and in 
some cases, righteousness, the confrontational style did not seek unity as its primary aim. 
Rather, the denouncement of wrongs was the primary concern. The underlying 
instrumentalism of anti-slavery discourse was the same for those who appealed to 
empathy and those who were more confrontational in tone: the goal was the end to 
slavery. However, the way that emotion was evoked to advocate for that goal was quite 
different. 
The first published anti-slavery pamphlet in British North America initiated the 
confrontational challenge to slavery. Samuel Sewall, a Puritan, served as a judge on the 
Massachusetts Superior Court and it was in this capacity that he took notice of the 
hypocrisy of Christian slaveholders and worked to create such a sense of division.44 In 
1700, he published The Selling of Joseph, a Memorial, where the confrontational style 
was deployed. 
Sewall's dramatic usage of the confrontational style was achieved through two 
moves. First, unlike the Germantown Friends' inferences to biblical principles, Sewall 
quoted the Bible in the Puritan style, providing explicit citations to book, chapter, and 
verse. For example, a basic premise of Sewall's argument against slavery was that in the 
time of Adam slavery did not exist, thus slavery was not a natural condition authorized by 
God. To this point, Sewall wrote,  
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God hath given the Earth [with all its commodities] unto the Sons of Adam, Psal., 
 115, 16. And hath made of one Blood all Nations of Men, for to dwell on all the 
 face of the Earth, and hath determined the Times before appointed, and the 
 bounds of their Habitation: That they should seek the Lord. Forasmuch then as we 
 are the Offspring of God, &c. Acts 17. 26, 27, 29."45  
The Biblical evidence led Sewall to conclude, "So that Originally, and Naturally, there is 
no such thing as Slavery."46 This explicit clinch of his argument reinforced the 
confrontational nature of his style. Sewall's second move was similar to the Germantown 
Friends' petition as it compared slavery to other crimes. As slavery was not original and 
natural, Sewall contended that slavery was akin to stealing, a crime "ranked among the 
most atrocious of Capital Crimes." Describing the crime as "atrocious" reflected Sewall's 
moral certitude. In style, the specific citations and moral certitude differed from the sense 
of deference created in the more general statements against slavery offered by the 
Germantown Friends. 
 The second move in Sewall's confrontational style was the explicit refutation of 
pro-slavery arguments. He identified the standard pro-slavery arguments—most of which 
were based in Christian theology—answering each objection with reference to books, 
chapters, and verses from the Bible. Sewall's use of the refutative form (i.e., identify 
claim, respond to claim, provide evidence for the response) proved more brazen than the 
Germantown Friends' petition. Rather than implying the opposing claims in his 
arguments, as was the case with the Germantown Friends, Sewall made the opposition's 
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arguments clear, his responses clear, and his biblical justifications clear. For example, 
Sewall wrote the following in response to the pro-slavery argument that slavery took 
blacks out of a pagan nation: 
Obj. 2. The Nigers are brought out of Pagan Country, into places where the 
Gospel is Preached. 
Answ. Evil must not be done, that good may come of it. The extraordinary and 
comprehensive Benefit accruing to the Church of God, and to Joseph personally, 
did not rectify his brethrens Sale of him.47  
Sewall's clear arguments against slavery could potentially invite similarly obvious and 
clear responses to The Selling of Joseph. Moving beyond the gradual and vague 
antislavery opinions of the previous generation, Sewall's piercing argumentation presaged 
the anti-slavery discourse of generations to come.  
Sewall's style appeared quite hostile in relation to the Germantown Friends or 
Woolman. However, the confrontational style characteristic of Sewell's pamphlet grew 
more intense in later moral discourses against slavery. For example, in 1714, John 
Hepburn, a native of Great Britain living in New Jersey, published American Defence of 
the Christian Golden Rule. In that pamphlet, Hepburn berated the U.S. Quaker 
community for not uniformly opposing slavery. Hepburn developed a biting description 
of slaveholders as self-interested, image-conscious elites who  
can afford to keep themselves with white hands, except at some Times  they 
chance to be besparkled with the Blood of those poor Slaves, when they fall to 
beating them with their twisted Hides and Horse-whips, . . . to go with fine 
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powdered Perri-ivigs, and great bunched Coats; and likewise keep their Wives 
idle (Jezebel-like) to paint their Faces, and Puff, and powder their Hair, and to 
bring up their Sons and Daughters in Idleness and Wantonness, and in all manner 
of Pride and Prodigality, in decking and adorning their Carkasses . . . All, and 
much more, the miserable Effects produced by the Slavery of the Negroes.48 
Hepburn's vivid imagery of stark whiteness with only the occasional dirtying of the hands 
and clothes more graphically chastised the slaveholder than previous rhetors.  
 Ralph Sandiford and Benjamin Lay extended Hepburn's confrontational style in 
criticizing slavery and slaveholders. Sandiford was an Englishman who, after living in 
Pennsylvania for one year, became mortified by the slave auctions and wrote A Brief 
Examination of the Practice of the Times. The 1729 pamphlet used the same types of 
arguments Hepburn used to critique slavery and slaveholders.49 Sandiford brought the 
critique of slaveholders to its logical completion, arguing that the keeping of slaves 
proved that ministers, elders, and religious leaders possessed no spiritual gift.50 Benjamin 
Lay's criticism followed in the same vain as Sandiford, writing,  
 [W]e appear very Religious and Demure, Preaching against Iniquity and Vice;  
they appear to be what they are . . . how does our Demure Slave-Keepers 
remember them that are in Bonds as bound with 'em, except as Slaves are bound 
to them, so they to the Devil, and stronger, for as Death loosens one, it fastens the 
other in eternal Torments if not repented and forsaken.51  
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Sandiford's and Lay's confrontational style aided their development of prophetic 
personae. Historian David Brion David explains, "Modeling themselves on Isaiah and 
Jeremiah, the antislavery prophets knew that the devil could not be intimidated by sweet 
language. . . But the antislavery martyrs took courage in the thought that they stood with 
such men of the past as Fox and Keith."52 As prophets for the antislavery cause, 
Sandiford and Lay were emboldened to harshly criticize slaveholders in order to fight the 
devil. 
 Such courage led to dramatic performances against slavery in Quaker meetings 
and public spaces.53 With this prophetic persona, devotion to the truth proved more 
important than creating unities or identification with slaveholders. As a result, Sandiford 
and Lay created intense divisions with slaveholders while believing in the eternal truth of 
the antislavery position.  Sandiford and Lay boldly attacked their religious brethren for 
their complicity in slavery, a move that ultimately, led to the expulsion of each from the 
Society of Friends. Their attacks on the "Demure" façade of Quaker preaching were also 
an attack on the strategy of containment that was so important to security discourse and 
early morality discourse. 
The empathetic appeals and confrontational style did not go unnoticed by 
proslavery whites who preferred the control afforded by instrumental rhetorical 
strategies. The most enduring response for the next century was a rather simple counter 
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claim to moral attacks on slavery; namely, that slavery was biblically justifiable. For 
example, Rev. Thomas Bacon of Maryland advised a congregation of Episcopal slaves 
that "Almighty God hath been pleased to make you slaves here, and to give you nothing 
but Labour and Poverty in this world."54 Bacon told the slaves that their owners were 
"GOD'S OVERSEERS."55 Rhetors also justified bondage on Earth by focusing on the life 
hereafter. Bacon preached, "If you desire Freedom, serve the Lord here, and you shall be 
his Freemen in Heaven hereafter."56 No longer was the question whether to educate the 
slaves. The debate had shifted to the far more poignant and essential question of whether 
slavery was morally and biblically justified. On this question, the discursive tension 
between the instrumental rhetoric of control and the pathetic rhetoric of freedom became 
more intensely contested.  
Opposition to the instrumental approach to slavery developed slowly within 
morality discourse. Through appeals to empathy and the confrontational style, pathetic 
rhetorical strategies were cultivated to challenge the control afforded by instrumental 
strategies. Within morality discourse the barriers between races and classes were being 
blurred, an unsettling rhetorical phenomenon for proslavery advocates who relied upon 
strict boundaries to keep slavery functional. Thus, the security-morality tension mounted 
as the rumblings of the American Revolution began. 
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The Age of Revolution and Natural Rights:  
Catalyzing the Security-Morality Tension 
 The year 1760 marked the beginnings of rhetorical transformations that 
intensified the security-morality tension.57 Violent slave revolts occurred in the British 
Caribbean, and antislavery literature was on the rise.58 Most importantly, however, was 
the battle to be waged by American Patriots against the British government. Security 
discourse retained a prominent and powerful place in public life, but took on new 
meaning with Patriot rhetors definition of colonists as "slaves" fighting the British 
"master." The slavery metaphor, Peter A. Dorsey notes, was a "fluid concept that had a 
major impact on the way early Americans thought about their political future as well as 
the future of chattel slavery." The slavery metaphor "destabilized previously accepted 
categories of thought about politics, race, and the early republic."59  
 Yet, it was the transformation of morality discourse that was the hallmark of the 
Revolutionary Era. With the Revolution came a secular morality that challenged the 
instrumental strategies of slavery discourse. "Natural rights," a dominant theme of the 
Revolutionary Ideology that pervaded the United States (and later, France), came to mean 
that all humans were equal and should be free. Such claims were made in religiously-
based morality discourse, but the connection between natural rights and the fight for 
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sovereignty allowed for moral arguments rooted in the common experience of becoming 
the United States of America. Within the crucible of the American Revolution, the 
pathetic rhetorical approach to slavery expanded. The expansion of the pathetic rhetorical 
approach can be seen in two ways. First, the scope of the moral discourse spread beyond 
religion to encompass the more secular, but still powerful, appeals to natural rights. 
Second, such a powerful rhetorical force could not be contained within U.S. borders, as 
the pathetic rhetorical appeals within morality discourse were used more frequently and 
more forcefully to challenge the control of the slave labor system.  
 
Expanding the Scope of Morality Discourse:  
Natural Rights, Slavery, and the American Revolution 
As British North American colonists became more dissatisfied with the colonial 
rule of Great Britain, the language of natural rights emerged as a way for colonists to 
claim autonomy from London.  As James Otis wrote in 1764, in one of the initial salvos 
against the government in London, "In order to form an idea of the natural rights of the 
colonists, I presume it will be granted that they are men, the common children of the 
same Creator with their brethren of Great Britain."60 But the appeal to natural rights, 
almost by definition, could not be limited only to the political situation with Britain. As 
Otis wrote, "The colonists are by the law of nature freeborn, as indeed all men are, white 
or black."61 Unlike previous anti-slavery advocates, Otis's argument was primarily 
focused on the political slavery of white colonists and not the chattel slavery of blacks. 
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More important to the motivational thrust was that similar to previous anti-slavery 
advocates, Otis drew authority from God as the guarantor of rights.  
As tensions between colony and empire escalated, arguments about the consistent 
application of natural rights increased in public forums. Anti-slavery advocates exposed 
the hypocrisy of colonists' both holding slaves and demanding rights from Britain. Boston 
merchant Nathaniel Appleton, writing in 1767, made such an appeal:  
Oh! Ye sons of liberty, pause a moment, give me your ear, Is your conduct 
consistent? can you review our late struggles for liberty, and think of the slave-
trade at the same time, and not blush? Methinks were you an African, I could see 
you blush. How should we have been confounded and struck dumb, had Great 
Britain thrown this inconsistency in our faces? how justly might they, and all 
mankind have laughed at our pretensions to any just sentiments of Liberty, or 
even humanity?62 
Unlike Appleton, who simply asked for his audience to examine their own conduct, 
others demanded action to rectify the hypocrisy. In 1769, Rev. Samuel Webster of 
Salisbury, Massachusetts, urged followers to "break every yoke and let these oppressed 
ones go free without delay—let them taste the sweets of that liberty, which we so highly 
prize, and are so earnestly supplicating God and man to grant us: nay, which we claim as 
the natural right of every man."63 As the Revolution drew closer, North Church pastor 
Nathaniel Niles of Newbury, Massachusetts, stated, "God gave us liberty, and we 
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enslaved our fellow-men. . . For shame, let us either cease to enslave our fellow-men, or 
else let us cease to complain about those who enslave us."64 The fervor of revolution and 
the hypocrisy of its discourse infused the morality discourse on chattel slavery with 
renewing energy. 
The expansiveness of natural rights rhetoric, the critiques of slavery that 
motivated the Patriot rhetoric, and the momentum of change in U.S. culture reduced the 
barriers to opposing slavery. As a result, numerous religious sects that were previously 
silent or ambivalent towards slavery began opposing the practice. American Methodism, 
whose leader John Wesley was inspired by Quaker Anthony Benezet, drafted and passed 
statements urging emancipation at a 1780 conference in Baltimore. The Methodist 
Conference held that slavery was "contrary to the laws of God, man, and nature."65 In 
1784, Methodist circuit riders voted to expel members of the church who sold or bought 
slaves for "nonhumanitarian reasons."66 In 1787, Charles Carroll, a member of the 
Catholic faith, supported emancipation in Maryland. Baptist opposition to slavery came 
after the Revolution as well, with a 1785 acknowledgement from the Baptist General 
Committee that slavery was against the word of God.67 The antislavery sentiment among 
Baptists demonstrated that the moral dissent against slavery was not confined to the 
northeast, as approximately half of all Baptists resided in Virginia, Kentucky, North 
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Carolina, and South Carolina.68 For Presbyterians, communion against slavery began 
after the American Revolution commenced.69 Even among Friends, the Revolutionary era 
fostered greater determination against slavery, with the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting 
being nearly slaveholder free by 1779.70 Natural rights rhetoric and the revolutionary zeal 
of the 1770s and 1780s provided an opportunity and a language by which reluctant 
Christians were empowered to oppose slavery. 
The rhetoric of natural rights not only provided whites with a language to 
challenge instrumental strategies of control, slaves and free blacks were also empowered 
by the language of natural rights. The intense emotional associations with slave 
insurrections that made the metaphor so powerful in fighting the Revolution were turned 
loose on the domestic practice of slavery. The dominant history of the American 
Revolution tells the tale of the British (and the American Loyalists) against the American 
Patriots. Yet, the American Revolution, remarks historian Sylvia R. Frey, was not simply 
between the white Americans and the white British. Rather, the revolution was a complex 
"triangulation" between two groups of white "belligerents" and approximately four 
hundred thousand slaves.71  
The Revolution forced unities and divisions in U.S. society that were previously 
untenable. Slaveholders were faced with the choice of whether or not to allow slaves to 
fight for the Patriot cause. As Ira Berlin notes, "The War for American Independence in 
particular gave slaves new leverage in their struggle with their owners, offering the 
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opportunity to challenge both the institution of chattel bondage and the allied structures 
of white supremacy."72 Slaves throughout the colonies were aware of the presence of 
British forces and devised plans to find "the enemy" to gain freedom.73 The participation 
of slaves in the political revolution in British North America brought slaves into a realm 
where they had not been allowed previously. To remove slaves from this domain and 
return them to a life of servile dependence further challenged the instrumentalist 
approach of the politically-powerful whites in society.  
Whites throughout the Northern colonies wavered on the issue of black service in 
the Patriot army. Local, state, and continental laws opened and closed the enlistment of 
black soldiers many times before the summer of 1776.74 As the Revolution progressed, 
white colonists in the North, a minority of whom actively supported the war, realized that 
the troop shortages "highlighted the advantages, if not the necessity of enlisting blacks as 
troops."75 With state troop enlistment quotas and the substitution system (e.g., for every 
black man serving a white man stayed home), the enlistment of blacks gained acceptance 
in the North. In exchange for service, some states offered emancipation or manumission. 
The relationship between blacks and whites in the North during the Revolution was far 
from ideal, yet, it marked a turning point. The freedom and political agency afforded to 
and asserted by blacks broke through the containment strategy that the discourse of slave 
revolts sustained. The participation of blacks in a different revolt helped to shift rhetoric 
away from fear and anxiety and more toward liberty and equality. 
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Below the Potomac River, slaveholders heatedly debated proposals to enlist their 
slaves in combat.76 The political debate over arming slaves brought forward slaveholders 
in favor of the proposition, most notably George Washington, South Carolina 
representative to the Continental Congress Henry Laurens, and his son John Laurens. The 
Continental Congress unanimously approved enlisting and arming slaves from South 
Carolina and Georgia. The South Carolina and Georgia legislatures rejected the proposal 
and held strong to the containment logic. The South attempted to maintain their slave 
system, yet the Revolution forced a division between slaveholding and nonslaveholding 
whites. The concept of slavery "rested upon the unity of the planter class and its ability to 
mobilize the state and rally nonslaveholders to slavery's defense."77  Still, the presence of 
a debate about enlisting slaves in the military represented a shift in the containment of 
slaves and the language about slavery. The debate had shifted from punishing and 
restricting the actions of slaves to exploring their freedom. Such a move placed the 
pathetic rhetorical strategies from morality discourse at odds with the instrumental 
approach of the security discourse. 
 Seizing upon the rhetoric of natural rights and the use of slaves in Patriot forces, 
British authorities also exposed the failure of the strategy of containment. Lord Dunmore, 
the Royal Governor in Virginia realized the military, economic, and symbolic power of 
gaining the favor of black slaves. In April of 1775, Dunmore "threatened that he would 
proclaim liberty to the slaves and reduce Williamsburg to ashes if the colonists resorted 
to force against British authority."78 Whites and blacks were aware of the power of this 
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offer. For example, in North Carolina, blacks planned to rebel and retreat to the frontier 
where they believed British Loyalists would receive them with open arms.79 John Adams 
noted in his diary on November 24, 1775, that two Southern delegates to the Continental 
Congress, Archibald Bulloch and John Houston, were concerned that the British would 
fight under an antislavery banner and that this message would get to the slaves. These 
men remarked that, "The Negroes have a wonderful art of communicating intelligence 
among themselves; it will run several hundreds of miles in a week or a fortnight."80 In the 
build up to the Revolution one understands that the concerns of Bulloch and Houston 
were not misplaced. In November of 1774, for example, an uprising in St Andrew's 
Parrish, Georgia, occurred, "possibly stimulated by the excitement that was at the 
moment running through all of the colonies."81 Dunmore, Bulloch, and Houston 
recognized that gaining the adherence of slaves was of great value in the war. Slaves 
represented military and economic strength. If the British could convince slaves to cross 
the battle lines or flee from their owners, the Loyalist cause would simultaneously gain 
military strength and decrease both the military and economic strength of the Patriots. 
In many respects, the containment strategy employed before the Revolution never 
died in the Lower South. But it was tested. The revolutionary fervor that developed in the 
mid 1770s served as a warning to most slaveholders that harsher restrictions were needed 
to avoid slave revolts. "As nowhere else on the North American continent," Berlin writes, 
"the War for American Independence in the Lower South became a bitter civil war, filled 
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with a savage, fratricidal violence that tore at the fabric of society."82 Rumors of slave 
revolts persisted in the Lower South, with the Revolution bringing increased concern due 
to the new divisions between Patriots and Loyalists. The slaveholders of the Lower 
South, more than the North and Upper South, continued to employ the strategy of 
containment. Some planters moved their slaves to more remote areas to avoid slave 
revolts or flight. The Loyalist slaveholders, as well as many Patriot slaveholders, in the 
Lower South considered the language of the Declaration of Independence a threat to the 
maintenance of the slave system. Some slaves fled from their masters, with most headed 
for urban areas or in search of British forces to join. But these fugitives served only to 
intensify the slaveholders' fear of slave revolt and insurrection.83  
The rhetoric of natural rights presented competing exigencies for whites. In one 
sense, such rhetoric was a powerful motivational force used to rally colonists against the 
British. Yet, natural rights created another problem: it threatened the instrumental 
strategies used by pro-slavery whites to maintain order. The rhetoric of natural rights and 
participation of blacks in the war transgressed the barriers established by the instrumental 
strategy. Thus, the spread of natural rights rhetoric further compromised the instrumental 
strategy of containment. 
 
Compromised Social Order:  
Slave Insurrections and the Spread of Pathetic Rhetoric 
The domestic application of natural rights that successfully marshaled troops to 
fight against the British provided a new rhetorical strategy for antislavery advocates and 
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created a new problem for proslavery whites. The natural rights philosophy of the 
Declaration of Independence was applied to slavery even before Independence was won. 
On January 13, 1777, Prince Hall and seven other blacks petitioned the Massachusetts 
General Court for their freedom. The petition cited the war with Britain and the 
Declaration as a warrant for the petition, stating, "[The Petitioners] Cannot but express 
their Astonishment that It has Never Bin Considered that Every Principle in which 
Amarica has Acted in the Cours of their unhappy Difficultes with Great Briton Pleads 
Stronger than A thousand arguments in favowrs of your petitioners."84 The Pennsylvania 
Assembly used the patriot logic to pass the first gradual emancipation law on March 1, 
1780. Section one of that law argued that the "abhorrence of that condition, to which the 
arms and tyranny of Great Britain were exerted to reduce us" had made the 
Pennsylvanians aware of the importance of freedom and the "duty. . . to extend a portion 
of that freedom to others."85 The same application of the principles of the Declaration 
continued after Patriots had won independence. On October 4, 1783, over five hundred 
members of the Society of Friends petitioned the Continental Congress to end the slave 
trade based on the "solemn declarations often repeated in favor of universal liberty."86  
The legal application of natural rights rhetoric gained momentum from the rise of 
black secular organizations after the war. These groups emerged from urban contexts, but 
were not specific to the North. Examples of such groups include the African Union 
Society of Newport, Rhode Island (1780), Free African Society of Philadelphia (1787), 
Brown Fellowship Society (Charlestown, SC, 1790), African Society of Providence, 
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Rhode Island (1793), African Society of Boston (1796), and the Friendly Society of St. 
Thomas (Philadelphia, 1797). Blacks organized, met, and discussed the pressing issues of 
the time. Such organized political action by blacks helped resist the strategies of 
containment and deterrence that allowed the slave system to operate.  
The legal and political application of the Revolutionary ideology seemed to ease 
the tension of slave revolts, as the 1780s saw a decrease in reported slave revolt 
conspiracies.87 Exercising political agency and wielding the powerful symbols of liberty 
and equality, blacks began to fight not only for personal freedom, but also against the 
system of slavery in the United States. Legal and political battles against slavery never 
waned, yet the degree to which such institutional means were a substitute for violence 
was short lived. When the promise of liberty and equality failed to come to fruition after 
the Revolution, insurrections again became viable solutions for slaves. Two insurrections 
were particularly debilitating to the instrumental strategies of security discourse: The 
rebellion on the island of Saint-Domingue and the slave insurrection conspiracy of 1800 
in Charleston, South Carolina. 
The slave rebellion in Saint-Domingue (present-day Haiti) validated the use of 
pathetic rhetoric, showing that the fight for natural rights could be fought and won by 
slaves. The Saint-Domingue rebellion also increased the demand for slaveholders to 
restore order generated by instrumental rhetorical strategies. As a territory of France, 
Saint-Domingue was impacted by the spread of revolutionary ideals from the United 
States across the Atlantic. In France, the revolutionary spirit manifested in the fall of the 
Bastille on July 14, and the Declaration of the Rights of Man on August 26, 1789. In the 
French Declaration, a pronouncement of equality, similar to the American Declaration, 
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stated, "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights." The French Declaration 
exacerbated political, social, and economic tensions on the island nation of Saint-
Domingue.88 By 1791, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Vincent Ogé, Jean-Baptiste Chavannes, 
and André Rigaud among others, had produced the largest slave uprising in modern 
history. As David P. Geggus notes, the Saint-Domingue slave rebellion brought about the 
first wholesale emancipation of a major slave society (1793), the granting of full racial 
equality in a U.S. colony (1792), and the first independent nation in Latin America 
(1804).89 At just over one-thousand miles from South Carolina, the proximity of the 
events in Saint-Domingue and their aftermath significantly impacted American colonists, 
white and black.  
With such a tremendous challenge to the institution of slavery so close to the 
United States, the tension between security and morality discourses grew. The words 
"Santo Domingo," when spoken in the United States, "evoked at least a moment of alarm 
and terror in the minds of slaveholders throughout the Americas."90 The sentiment 
permeated federal and local politics. On December 23, 1793, a letter from Thomas 
Jefferson (then secretary of state) to Governor John Drayton of South Carolina 
communicated that two Frenchmen from "St. Domingue" were setting out for Charleston 
with the intent to excite the slaves.91 In 1801, Secretary of State James Madison was 
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careful to tell Robert Livingston, the newly appointed U.S. minister to France, to beware 
of Southern slaves learning that the French were their allies.92  
In the United States, the increased anxiety led to a redoubled emphasis on 
containment. Officials attempted to censor any word of the uprising and passed 
legislation to prohibit the importation (or immigration) of non-whites from Saint-
Domingue.93 Similar fears pervaded local efforts in the South. In 1792, South Carolina 
banned the importation of African and West Indian (which included Saint-Domingue) 
slaves. Maryland, North Carolina, and Kentucky passed similar laws.94 In 1803, South 
Carolina reopened the African slave trade, yet maintained a ban on West Indian slaves.95 
The same year, North Carolina sent a memorial to Congress regarding the recent arrival 
of free blacks from Guadeloupe (another West Indian island). The memorial reported a 
feeling of "much danger to the peace and safety of the people of the Southern States of 
the Union," to which the House committee considering the petition agreed: "[t]he system 
of policy stated in the said memorial to exist, and to be now pursued in the French 
colonial governments, of the West Indies, is fraught with danger to the peace and safety 
of the United States."96 Anti-slavery advocates also used the Saint-Domingue revolution 
as evidence, yet for a different claim. Thomas Branagan, a reformed slave trader and 
opponent of slavery, warned that if slaves were not freed and colonized west, then blacks 
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would enact another Saint-Domingue.97 Saint-Domingue was a weighty symbol of the 
power of slaves--one that fueled the tensions in U.S. slavery discourse. 
For blacks, particularly those enslaved, the practical example of Saint-Domingue 
made its way into their considerations of revolts. The frequency of slave revolts and 
conspiracies in the United States increased in the 1790s, with the largest rebellions 
occurring in the forty years after the Saint-Domingue rebellion.98 In 1793, an anonymous 
white man in Virginia filed a deposition after spying on blacks, recalling, "The one who 
seemed to be the chief speaker said, you see how the blacks has killed the whites in the 
French Island and took it a while ago."99 Although documentary evidence of slave 
conversations is hard to come by, James Sidbury argues that slaves in Virginia during the 
1790s used the events in Saint-Domingue to forge a new interpretation of "frenchness as 
a metaphor for their own notions of race, revolution, and freedom."100 Decades later, 
James Forten, a man of means and a free black, explained that Saint-Domingue was an 
exemplar of how blacks "would become a great nation" because they "could not always 
be detained in their present bondage."101 For slaves in the United States, particularly in 
the South,  "[I]t was the spirit of the Declaration of Independence—accessible to any 
slave who heard political campaign rhetoric—and the legend of L'Ouverture that 
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provided the intellectual foundations for true antislavery violence."102 The American 
Revolution provided the language and the political agency, while Saint-Domingue 
provided the exemplary case for slaves to fight their oppression. 
The fears of antislavery violence further intensified in 1800, when a domestic 
slave revolt demonstrated the bloody potential manifested by the security-morality 
tension. The slave revolt conspiracy was led by Gabriel, a slave of Thomas Prosser, in 
Richmond, Virginia. The insurrection was planned for August 30, 1800, with an expected 
army of two thousand slaves prepared to take-up arms against the whites of Richmond.103 
Were it not for a terrible rainstorm that washed out the bridge connecting Prosser's 
blacksmith shop in the woods to Richmond, as well as the information provided by the 
slave Pharoah to the white planter Mosby Sheppard, the revolt would have been more 
than simply a conspiracy.104 In the immediate aftermath of the failed insurrection, a court 
convened on September 11 to begin trying the conspirators. Gabriel was captured in 
Norfolk, Virginia on September 23, returned to Richmond, summarily convicted and 
sentenced to hang. Gabriel's hanging was delayed until October 9, in hopes that he would 
elaborate on his plot and implicate all of his co-conspirators. Neither Gabriel, nor any of 
the men sentenced to hang, confessed or expanded upon the plot. On October 9, Gabriel 
was hanged, joining thirty-six other men who had been executed for their role in the 
conspiracy.  
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"Gabriel's Rebellion" actualized the fears of Saint-Domingue within U.S. borders. 
Like Saint-Domingue, Gabriel's plot escalated slaveholding society's fears because of the 
expansive potential of the event. Unlike most previous slave revolt plots, particularly 
those before the American Revolution, John R McKivigan and Stanley Harrold note that 
Gabriel's insurrection clearly contemplated "political violence."105 Like the revolt in 
Saint-Domingue, Gabriel was not seeking to flee from the area, but sought to overthrow 
the slave system and create a new government. Another one of Prosser's slaves, Ben, 
provided testimony that illuminated this dimension of the plot. Gabriel's plan was to 
begin with the murder of Prosser and the "White Neighbors." The group was then "to 
repair to Richmond and Seize upon the Arms and Ammunition."106  
The politics of antislavery were present in Gabriel's planning, as Ben later 
testified that "all whites were to be massacred, except the Quakers, the Methodists, and 
the Frenchmen, and they were spared on account as the conceived of their being friendly 
to liberty, and also they had understood that the French were at war with this country for 
the money that was due them."107 This was not to be an opportunistic revolt; rather, the 
plans were well organized. Ben relayed details of such organization, stating that 
"Solomon was to be Treasurer" of the group and that Gabriel and Solomon kept a list of 
names of the conspirators.108 The duration of the plot further emphasized the level of 
organization, as Ben recalled that Solomon, a blacksmith, had begun fashioning swords 
during the previous harvest. The purpose, targets, and organization of Gabriel's rebellion 
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revealed a politically aware, if not politically motivated, leader seeking to overthrow the 
slave system in order to create a new, black-led government.  
 In Richmond, the rhetorical aftermath of Gabriel's rebellion saw whites 
attempting to restore order through instrumental rhetoric. As with the slave revolts before 
1760, the white response turned to containment and deterrence: lawmakers attempted to 
downplay the rebellion in public statements while demonstrating concern by legislating 
harsh laws against slaves. In a letter to Jefferson, Virginia Governor James Monroe 
wrote, "It is unquestionably the most serious and formidable conspiracy we have ever 
known of the kind." Yet, once the conspiracy became known to the government, the 
strategy of deterrence was enacted where, as Monroe stated, "We then made a display of 
our force and measure of defense."109 The same distressed hubris was demonstrated again 
in the New York Gazette of September 18, 1800, which quoted from a Richmond paper, 
"the plot has been entirely exploded, which was shallow; and had an attempt been made 
to carry it into execution, but little resistance would have been required to render the 
scheme entirely abortive."110 Monroe explicitly directed the Virginia Assembly to 
downplay Gabriel's plot in order to allow time for defense measures to be put into 
place.111  
 Beyond Richmond, reaction to the failed plot was also defined by instrumental 
rhetorical strategies. In Massachusetts many free blacks were ordered out of the state 
following word of Gabriel's rebellion, as free blacks were seen as the greatest challenge 
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to the perpetuation of the slave system. In another move to contain slaves and their 
communication, a slave code was passed in South Carolina that restricted the movement 
of slaves.112 Despite legislation to bolster white security, the importance of reinforcing a 
sense of order in public statements proved paramount. Federalists claimed that the 
insurrection, and its French connections, demonstrated the problem with electing the 
Republican Jefferson with his known ties to France.113 Jefferson, too, was aware of the 
need to manage public perception of the event. In a letter to Monroe on Sept 20, 1800, 
Jefferson wrote, "The other states & the world at large will forever condemn us if we 
indulge the principle of revenge, or go one step beyond absolute necessity. They cannot 
lose sight of the rights of the two parties, & the object of the unsuccessful one."114 
Containment and deterrence served as the stock responses to insurrection. Yet, as 
Jefferson realized, the situation was more complicated.  
Gabriel's rebellion represented a key moment for security discourse after the 
American Revolution, for it demonstrated the erosion of key rhetorical strategies used to 
alleviate white fear of insurrection. First, Gabriel's rebellion and the discourse concerning 
security nearly extinguished anti-slavery activities in the South. As David Brion Davis 
posits, Gabriel's "well-organized slave conspiracy" proved to be the "critical event that 
helped to paralyze antislavery zeal in the South." Davis goes on to state, "By 1806, few 
ties remained between the southern antislavery societies and the larger 'parent' groups in 
Philadelphia and New York." 115 Second, and more generally, Gabriel's rebellion 
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illustrated the rhetorical situation within the United States of the early nineteenth century: 
pro-slavery whites called upon the strategies of the past in order to manage the problems 
of security and slavery in the present, whereas, blacks and anti-slavery advocates called 
upon the more recent and powerful resources of the Revolution in order to fight slavery. 
  
Renewing Revolutionary Time:  
The War of 1812 and the Reinvigoration of Discursive Tension 
 The War of 1812 presented elements of permanence and change concerning the 
discourse of slavery. As had been done in the American Revolution, Americans turned to 
emotionally charged language of slavery to motivate a war with Britain. As before, such 
language helped to motivate whites to support the war, but also invited increased 
resistance from chattel slaves within U.S. borders. One difference from previous 
rhetorical efforts was that Americans, white and black, had experienced the American 
Revolution. This experience led to greater awareness of the repercussions of war on 
slavery. In particular, the security-morality tension grew with war hysteria. Another 
difference was the status of the United States at the conclusion of the War of 1812. 
Unlike the Revolution, the perceived U.S. victory was not followed by the business of 
building a nation, but by a heightened sense of U.S. nationalism. The rhetorical situation 
created by the War of 1812 galvanized the security-morality tension in slavery discourse. 
This was the situation that colonizationists would face as they articulated the need for 
colonization. 
 The War of 1812 employed the highly emotive meanings associated with slavery 
to motivate war with Great Britain. During the American Revolution, many Patriot 
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rhetors described the relationship between the Great Britain and the colonies as one of 
master and slave. In the build-up to the War of 1812, the issue was not the relationship 
between sovereign and colony, but the impressments of U.S. seamen by the powerful 
Royal Navy of Great Britain. The need for strong naval forces led British naval officers 
to board U.S. frigates to find British deserters and expatriates. These searches often led 
the impressments into service of native-born Americans. As Matthew Mason notes, the 
problem of impressments "had long been a diplomatic sticking point" and had brought 
the two nations close to war on a number of occasions.116 When the two nations were 
brought to war in 1812, both sides took use of the rhetorical power of the term slavery.  
 Like the American Revolution, many important American rhetors used the 
metaphor of slavery to describe the British practice of impressments. For example, 
Madison compared Britain's policies to the slave trade, stating that "such an outrage on 
all decency was never before heard of even on the shores of Africa."117 Hezekiah Niles, 
editor and publisher in of The Weekly Register in Baltimore, opined that impressments, 
"has no parallel either for atrocity or extent, in any thing of modern times, but the 
business of Negro-stealing on the coasts of unfortunate Africa."118 John Quincy Adams 
echoed these sentiments, calling impressments "as oppressive and tyrannical as the slave 
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trade."119 Americans had fought against the "slavery" of the British once before and their 
discourse concerning impressments suggested that they would do it again. 
It was not surprising that government denouncement of "slavery" impacted the 
practice of chattel slavery. As had occurred during the Revolution, thousands of slaves 
fled for British ships in hopes of gaining their freedom. Other slaves sought to exploit the 
situation for the purpose of rebellion and uprising. In 1812 and 1813, large-scale 
conspiracies in Virginia were thwarted.120 Rumors of revolt spread whenever British 
forces neared, as was the case in Washington, D.C., in the summer of 1814.121 In the 
immediate context, these plots and rumors were handled in the same manner as earlier 
slave rebellions. As had occurred during the Revolution, slaveholders attempted to 
contain and minimize the problem. For example, an 1814 slave rebellion scheme in 
Frederick, Maryland, was referred to in the newspapers as "The Little Plot."122 The 
rhetorical containment of slave insurrections continued, particularly in the South, but 
such containment was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. The use of the 
metaphor of slavery could not be limited only to white audiences. As had occurred 
previously in the United States, explicit attacks on slavery led to heightened tension in 
discourse.  
The newest deployment of anti-slavery discourse (as it related to both chattel and 
political slavery) impacted the U.S. rhetorical culture in both familiar and new ways. In a 
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manner similar to the Revolution, Americans could unite against the common foe of 
Great Britain and speak of the problems of "slavery." And, like before, a rash of pathetic 
rhetoric against chattel slavery ensued. With victory, one would then expect many rhetors 
to attempt to restore a social order in which slavery was contained and not laden with 
such emotion. Unique to the post-War of 1812 situation was that there was no need to 
turn to the business of creating a nation.  
 Unique to the rhetorical situation after the War of 1812 was the new sense of 
nationalism and internationalism. Unlike the years after the Revolution, Americans did 
not have to transition into the mode of nation building. This time, Americans had claimed 
victory in war as a sovereign nation. As a result, William Warren Sweet writes, 
"[Americans] had come to believe that no longer was their country merely a temporary 
experiment in popular government which the nations of the Old World could flout and 
bully as they pleased." Sweet continues, "Economically. . . the new nation had achieved a 
degree of stability and the leading statesmen were concerning themselves with measures 
that would bind the nation more firmly together into an economic, political, and social 
unity."123 Donald L. Robinson adds, "With the end of the War of 1812, consumers whose 
appetites had gone unsatisfied for several years, owing to embargoes, blockades, and 
internal disruptions, now sought manufactured items with great intensity."124 The United 
States had arrived on the international scene, a situation that expanded—both 
geographically and economically—the range of possible governmental actions. 
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Conclusion: Security and Morality, Incommensurate  
Prior to the American Revolution, instrumental rhetorical strategies provided the 
dominant mode of discussing slavery. The Revolution elevated pathetic rhetorical 
strategies in slavery discourse to a prominence to challenge the instrumental strategies. 
The rhetorical movement of these two approaches to slavery worked in opposite 
directions. Instrumental rhetoric pushed inward for the purpose of maintaining control. 
Pathetic rhetoric pushed outward, looking to break the instrumental control that 
subjugated blacks as slaves. For decades, the tension between instrumental and pathetic 
dimensions of rhetoric festered. The long trajectory of such tension would only increase 
the difficulty of resolving this conflict. 
The tension between instrumental and pathetic dimensions of rhetoric was laid 
bare in the aftermath of the War of 1812. Peter Onuf judges that before 1815 (the end of 
the War), Americans were more concerned about "foreign manipulation of the 'clashing 
jurisdictions and jarring interests' of widely dispersed and doubtfully loyal frontier 
settlements" than they were about the internal practice of slavery. Such interference, 
Onuf claims, was seen as "the clearest and most present danger to the union."125 Yet, the 
end of the War of 1812 turned attention inward, to the domestic problems that had been 
neglected in the name of an international threat.  
Within the U.S. borders, the nation and its rhetors faced a daunting situation. 
Seeing the promises of the Revolution unfulfilled, rebellious activities among slaves rose 
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from 1810 to 1816.126  Fear of insurrection spread to new corners of a still-expanding 
United States. The population of slaves was again on the upswing after a decade where 
the free population had grown faster than the enslaved.127 By 1816, the potential for 
insurrection had only grown with the population of slaves and the proliferation of natural 
rights rhetoric in the United States. The increase in slave insurrections was a symptom of 
the tension that was calcifying in public discourse. Rhetors who addressed the problem of 
slavery faced the difficult task of arguing about slavery without fueling the tension and 
unrest. Fueling unrest, whether in favor or opposition to slavery, risked the tenuous union 
created between states with increasingly divergent perspectives on slavery. Such unrest 
was the goal of some. But for those who sought to maintain the union, the security-
morality tension would need to be overcome. Absent a rhetorical alternative, the security-
morality tension would only foster more unrest throughout the United States.  
What might such an alternative be? The letter from the anonymous Virginian to 
the Virginia General Assembly provided some insight. Any solution must occur through 
"moderation and humanity," the letter observed.128 The Virginian argued that the plan 
that best fit those standards, and could avoid the security-morality tension, was 
colonization. The moderate rhetorical strategies that could support such a plan had been 
developing with political economic discourse and are the subject of the next chapter.  
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A RESOLUTION TO THE SECURITY-MORALITY TENSION?: 
POLITICAL ECONOMIC DISCOURSE AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MODERATE RHETORIC 
In 1804, William Thornton drafted a pamphlet in the form of a letter to a friend, 
titled, Political Economy: Founded in Justice and Humanity. The pamphlet addressed the 
practices of the legislator and suggested that individuals currently in political office "be 
not unmindful of the welfare of futurity." "The legislator," Thornton reminded his friend, 
"would be sunk in apathy" if the demands of the present impeded consideration of the 
future. Such short sightedness was not characteristic of Americans, as it was Americans 
who, "declared to the whole world in their great charter of independence, that every man 
is equally entitled to the protection of life, liberty, and property." Despite the general title 
of the pamphlet and the expansiveness of his initial statements, Thornton's particular 
interest in political economy was narrowed to the question of "how the negroes are still in 
slavery?"1  
Thornton's emphasis on the political economy of slavery was appropriate in the 
context of early-nineteenth-century U.S. politics. Slavery was perhaps the most 
complicated subject on which legislators deliberated. The tension between security and 
morality discourses had been developing well-before the United States came into 
existence. Since the introduction of slaves into British North America, elite whites used 
the instrumental dimension of rhetoric to maintain the security of whites and the system 
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of slavery. Over time, the moral discourse against slavery developed, creating an 
increasingly intense counterpoint to the dominant security discourse. Through morality 
discourse, rhetors challenged slavery by highlighting the pathetic dimension of rhetoric. 
The tension between security and morality discourse cultivated the problem of slavery 
that legislators would seek to solve. 
Legislators were not immune to the tension between security and morality 
discourses concerning slavery. To the contrary, the deliberative forum further 
complicated the tension. In Congress, rhetors were charged with representing their state, 
while also creating policy for the Union. The rhetorical situation facing legislators was 
complex. Thomas Jefferson noted the difficulties of the legislator, stating, "In so 
complicated a science as political economy, no one axiom can be laid down as wise and 
expedient for all times and circumstances, and for their contraries."2 Extending 
Jefferson's sentiment to the realm of slavery discourse, the complexities of political 
economy encouraged legislators to deliberate, and thus engage other positions on slavery. 
Because of the added element of deliberation, which was not endemic of public discourse 
beyond the legislative arena, political economic discourse on slavery took on different 
rhetorical dimensions.  
The different rhetorical dimensions of political economic discourse had the 
potential to address the security-morality tension. Where the security and morality 
discourses created divisions in society, political economy had the potential to bring 
together discursive commitments. As Drew R. McCoy explains, "The concept of 'political 
economy,' as distinct from 'economics,' is particularly symbolic of this eighteenth-century 
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fusion of empirical science and ethical concerns."3 Where instrumental and pathetic 
rhetoric had grown contentious in public discourse on slavery, those same rhetorical 
approaches were merged within political economic discourse. Thus, a different dimension 
of rhetoric was brought to the surface in political economic discourse on slavery, the 
moderate dimension of rhetoric.  
The moderate dimension of rhetoric emphasized the role of reasoning and process 
in rhetorical practice. The ends of that process could be instrumental or pathetic, so long 
as the rhetor used sound reasoning to arrive at the eventual conclusion. The development 
of the moderate dimension of rhetoric in political economic discourse offered the 
potential to overcome the security-morality tension. Aiming to relieve the tensions of 
slavery in the United States through a widely supported scheme, rhetors at the 
colonization meeting would attempt to harness the power of moderate rhetoric to 
motivate their efforts. Before turning to the speeches at the colonization meeting and the 
use of moderation to motivate their efforts, the rhetorical potential of moderation toward 
slavery will be explored. 
To understand the development of the moderate dimension of rhetoric within 
political economic discourse, this chapter will first, explain the importance of moderation 
in both the study of political economy and rhetoric in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. From an understanding of how moderate rhetoric and political 
economy relate, the chapter then traces the development of moderate rhetoric within U.S. 
political economic discourse, beginning with the need for moderation that emerged from 
the debates concerning the Articles of Confederation and slavery. Next, the potential for 
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moderate rhetoric to overcome the security-morality tension in slavery discourse is 
analyzed in the context of the 1787 Federal Convention and the creation of the 
Constitution. The moderate rhetoric that helped create agreement on the Constitution is 
illustrated in its full voice during the 1806 and 1807 debates concerning the end of the 
international slave trade. Finally, having established the need, potential, and efficacy of 
moderate rhetoric in political economic discourse related to slavery, this chapter 
concludes by showing how political economic discourse, moderate rhetoric, and 
colonization could potentially come together to address the security-morality tension in 
the discourse on slavery. 
   
Considering Political Economy Rhetorically: 
Adam Smith and the Moderate Dimension of Rhetoric 
 When British North America transformed from a collection of British colonies to 
a sovereign nation, the subject of slavery also changed. To grapple with the role of 
slavery in the United States, and not just in individual states, U.S. statesmen looked to 
writings of the Scottish Enlightenment. There, colonists found a language to make sense 
of their new status as a nation.4 Americans found further resonance with the Scottish 
Enlightenment's efforts to avoid the abuses and excesses of British rule. No writer of the 
Scottish Enlightenment was of greater importance than Adam Smith.5 A significant 
element of Smith's intellectual project and its connection to a U.S. audience was his 
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praise of moderation.6 In what follows, the centrality of moderation is first shown in 
Smith's conception of political economy and the connection to the United States. Then, 
Smith's moderation can be seen as a linkage between political economy and rhetorical 
practice.    
 
Smith's Political Economy in the United States:  
Moderation through Self-Interest and Self-lessness 
Moderation permeated Smith's theory of political economy in his appreciation of 
both self-interest and self-lessness as legitimate motivations in governance. Smith is most 
widely known for his landmark work in economics, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (hereafter, Wealth of Nations). First published in 1776, 
the popular text had already been reprinted six times by 1791. In Wealth of Nations, 
Smith defined political economy as "the science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought 
to be governed by general principles which are always the same" (IV.ii.39). Although 
Smith's definition of political economy seemed to suggest a lack of moderation in the 
notion that the principles "are always the same," Smith's explanation of such "science" 
and "principles" shows his moderate disposition. For example, Smith proposed that social 
interests were best served when the sovereign (i.e., federal government) did not regulate 
"the industry of private people" (IV.ii.9); however, the sovereign did have a role in 
defense, justice, and unprofitable, but necessary, public works (IV. ix. 51).7 As Warren J. 
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Samuels points out, Smith attempted to offer a systematic handling "of freedom and 
control and continuity and change."8 Smith's brand of political economy sought a balance 
between private industry and the role of the nation-state in the accumulation of wealth.  
Smith's writings on political economy, and moral philosophy in general, 
connected with British North American colonists. Samuel Fleischacker describes Smith's 
economic treatise Wealth of Nations, as "a very 'American' book" on account of its 
relevance to public issues in British North America and its reception by the political 
elite.9 In Wealth of Nations, Smith suggested a union between Britain and the colonies in 
which the colonists gained full-voting rights in Parliament. Smith also praised 
agrarianism and, with Pennsylvania as a model, argued for the separation of church and 
state.10 Furthermore, Smith's appreciation of the value of freedom in an economic system 
aligned with America's war for independence. In progressing from a feudal economic 
system to capitalism, he wrote that the removal of the attributes of slavery will make 
individuals "really free in our present sense of the word Freedom" (III. iii. 5). Although 
one might interpret Smith's statement as anti-slavery, in the rhetorical context of the 
American Revolution his statement speaks more to the Patriot cause, and their rhetorical 
fashioning of colonists as slaves to the British government, than as a statement against 
chattel slavery.11 Through explicit references to the British North American colonies, as 
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well as appeals to colonial values such as agrarianism and freedom, Smith's political 
economy was consistent with the situation in the colonies in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century. 
 Smith's literary connection with the British North American situation gained 
traction with notable American political leaders. On June 14, 1807, Thomas Jefferson 
wrote that on the subjects of money and commerce, "Smith's Wealth of Nations is the best 
book to be read."12 Jefferson was not alone in his high praise of the text. Noah Webster 
wrote that he "devour[ed]" Wealth of Nations during the Spring of 1784."13 James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson both listed the book as a suggested reading, with 
Jefferson commenting that Wealth of Nations was "the best book extant" on political 
economy.14 David Lundberg and Henry May observe that from 1777 to 1790, Smith's 
economic treatise could be found in 28 percent of U.S. libraries, which exceeded the 
holdings of John Locke's Treatises and any of Jean Jacques Rousseau's works, except 
Émile.15 Smith's work was so widely known in the United States that even those who had 
not read the book could speak of it in general terms.16 Smithean thought permeated 
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Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd et. al., eds., 28 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 16: 448-
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learned society in the United States during the constitutional and early-national years, a 
time when people questioned how states would relate to a new, national government. In 
its efforts to balance the interests of the private with the public, Smith's work provided 
the politically active class of Americans with a way to negotiate the obstacles of early 
nationhood.  
 Smith's advocacy for both self-interest and self-lessness concerning political 
economy was part of his general appreciation of moderation. On matters of political 
economy, Smith was practical. He recognized that different motivations are justifiable 
depending on the situation. This moderation toward political economic matters helps 
explain his resonance in a country seeking to balance numerous state and national 
interests.  
 
Smith's Impartial Spectator and Rhetorical Practice:  
Judgment and Moderation 
Smith's moderation not only permeated his writings on political economy, but it 
was also central to how Smith believed people ought to communicate about matters 
important to a legislator. For Smith, rhetorical practice, like political economy, 
necessitated a balance of self-interest and self-lessness. Understanding Smith's 
formulation of moderate rhetorical practice is achieved by looking at his treatment of 
judgment and rhetorical style.  
 Like the study of political economy, Smith's conceptualization of moral judgment 
was based on a reasoned consideration of self-interest and self-lessness. In The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, Smith developed the concept of judgment through what he termed "the 
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impartial spectator." The central idea of the impartial spectator, as Smith wrote, held that 
"We examine it [our own conduct] as we imagine an impartial spectator would examine 
it" (III. 1. 2).17 To adjudicate an action from the perspective of an impartial spectator 
requires the individual to imagine oneself in the situation of another agent. If within this 
imagined situation the individual feels the same feeling as the agent, then the individual 
sympathizes with the agent. Such sympathy is expressed with approval toward the agent 
and the action of the agent is deemed appropriate. If, from the imagined position as the 
impartial spectator, the same feeling is not felt, then the individual does not sympathize 
with the agent and the actions of the agent are deemed inappropriate (I. i. 3. 1). The 
impartial spectator is self-interested insomuch as the self is imagined in the position of 
another agent and, ultimately, it is the self who will render judgment after such 
imagining. Yet, by imagining the self in the position of another agent and considering the 
possibility of sympathy, self-lessness is also an essential component to the judgment of 
the impartial spectator. By considering the self and the other, Smith's impartial spectator 
produced a judgment based upon a reasoned consideration of interests. 
 In addition to the reasoned process that an impartial spectator undertakes to render 
judgment, Smith also accounted for emotion in moral judgment. The purpose of the 
impartial spectator was, according to Smith, "To approve of the passions of another" (I. i. 
1. 10). His process for approving these passions would seem to sublimate emotion to the 
powers of reasoning. However, Smith saw a particular power in the judgment of the 
impartial spectator, a power that could cause the feelings of the spectator to surpass those 
                                                 
17 All references to Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments utilize the standardized citation format of Part, 
chapter, section, and paragraph. The reference text is Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, D. D. 
Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, 
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felt by an agent. To this point, Smith wrote, "We sometimes feel for another, a passion of 
which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his 
case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from 
the reality" (TMS, I. i. 1. 10). Although the judgment of the impartial spectator was 
reasonably constructed, that process did not exclude emotions from its final judgment. 
And, as Smith noted, the result of the impartial spectator could even generate more 
emotion than the emotion generated by the agent being judged. Although detachment, 
and thus a lack of emotion, seemed implicit in the concept of an impartial spectator, that 
was not the case for Smith. So long as the adjudicator took the proper steps to render 
judgment, there were no constraints to the level of emotion of the final judgment. 
Although not overtly expressed as a rhetorical concept in Smith's work, the 
process of rendering judgment as an impartial spectator is deeply rhetorical. In one sense, 
the impartial spectator must be a rhetorical concept in those moments in which a person 
is asked to explain their judgment of another agent. In another sense, the actions required 
of the impartial spectator could be seen as a performance and, thus, would be dependent 
on various rhetorical moves to convey one's impartiality. David Marshall argues that for 
Smith's impartial spectator, the process of imagining the feelings of another agent was 
theatrical. The adjudicator was to imagine the feeling of sympathy toward another as 
though one was in front of a spectator.18 Marshall's argument situates the impartial 
spectator in a social context and not in the mind. Thus, according to Marshall, the 
sympathy that the impartial spectator expresses plays an important role in social relations: 
                                                 
18 David Marshall, "Adam Smith and the Theatricality of Moral Sentiments," Critical Inquiry 10 (1984): 
596 (emphasis mine). 
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"it forces us to moderate our passions in order to create a 'harmony and concord with the 
emotions' of those who are watching us.'"19  
Although developed under the auspices of moral philosophy, Smith's impartial 
spectator necessitated rhetoric at the levels of both reason-giving and performance. Even 
more, the judgment of the impartial spectator necessitated a particular type of rhetor. The 
rhetor demonstrating the judgment of the impartial spectator would be a master of certain 
types of strategies. Those strategies provided an ethos of moderate rhetoric. Thus, the 
judgment of the impartial spectator manifested potential to shape the strategic character 
of discourse. Smith's writings suggest that the performance of moderation was best 
achieved through the plain style. In particular, Smith's works offer three rhetorical 
characteristics of the plain style consistent with the moderate disposition of an impartial 
spectator: the appeal to common sense, a lack of ornamentation, and the explicit 
management of emotions.   
Smith contextually defined common sense as principles, "which everyone assents 
to," that guide a person's understanding of criticism and morality (i. 133). 20 The idea that 
"everyone assents" to these principles made Smith's common sense more social (and 
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20 Most of Smith's thoughts on style were articulated in lectures on rhetoric given at Edinburgh and 
Glasgow variously between 1748 and 1763.The collection of Smith's writings on rhetoric, known as 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, has been assembled from a notebook of a student who listened to 
the lectures. The notebook was discovered by John M. Lothian in 1958, when Lothian purchased a number 
of books at a manor house in Aberdeenshire. There is no known version of the Lectures in Smith's own 
hand, likely due to his request in 1790 that his manuscripts be burned upon his death. Thus, the precision 
with which one can associate Smith with particular words and phrasings from his Lectures is questionable. 
All citations to Lectures will be parenthetical and refer to Adam Smith, Lecture on Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres Delievered in the University of Glasgow by Adam Smith Reported by a Student in 1762-63, John M. 
Lothian, ed. (London: T. Nelson, 1963). Howell provides some corroboration of Smith's general 
perspectives by coordinating the Lectures with various mentions in contemporary writings of Smith's 
lectures on rhetoric. See Wilbur Samuel Howell, "The New Rhetoric Comes of Age: Adam Smith's 
Lectures at Edinburgh and Glasgow," in Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1971), 537-46.  
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rhetorical) than psychological. Smith's common sense was not a faculty that only the 
intellectual elites could cultivate. Common sense was just that: common. Smith's melding 
of common sense and the plain style developed with his discussion of the "plain man." "A 
Plain man," Smith described, "is one who pays no regard to the common civilities and 
forms of good breeding . . . gives his opinion bluntly and affirms without condescending 
to give a reason for his doing so" (LRBL, i. 85-86; see also i. 87-88). In the plain man, 
"Compassion finds little[e] room in his breast" and "admiration does not at all suit his 
wisdom" (LRBL, i. 86). Smith's appreciation of common sense in the plain style 
emphasized the role of reason, particularly as a response to the unearned credibility that 
one might receive from social standing.  
In addition to common sense, the plain style was also expressed by a lack of 
unnecessary ornamentation. In particular, Smith took umbrage with the accounts of 
tropes and figures of speech offered by standard-bearers Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. 
Smith characterized the perspective of the ancients as overly ornate. Smith's sixth lecture 
built upon the premise that tropes and figures of speech "are what are generally 
conceived to give the chief beauty and elegance to language" (LRBL, i. v. 53). Cicero and 
Quintilian, Smith remarked, believed rhetorical figures ought to be introduced in 
speeches, as figures contained "all that is noble, grand, and sublime, all that is passionate, 
tender, and moving" (LRBL, i. v. 56). Smith did not see the intrinsic value of figures, 
stating,  
But the case is far otherwise. When the sentiment of the speaker is expressed in a  
neat, clear, plain, and clever manner, and the passion or affection he is  
poss[ess]ed of and intends, by sympathy, to communicate to his hearer, is plainly  
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and cleverly hit off, then and then only the expression has all the force and beauty  
that language can give it. It matters not the least whether the figures of speech are  
introduced or not. (LRBL, i. v. 56)    
In this passage, Smith connected the principles of the impartial spectator to rhetorical 
practice. He argued that tropes and figures were not a necessary condition for forceful or 
beautiful discourse. Smith held that beauty and force could also be found in "neat, clear, 
plain, and clever" expressions that were motivated by sympathy. Later, Smith reiterated 
his position on simplicity, claiming "the perfection of stile consists in the Express[ing] in 
the most concise, proper and precise manner the thought of the author, and that in the 
manner which best conveys the sentiment, passion or affection with which it affects or 
pretends it does affect him and which he designs to communicate to his reader" (LRBL, i. 
133). Smith's ten lectures on communication reflected a belief "that the only acceptable 
modern style committed to communication is the plain."21 
 Smith's plain style was rooted in common sense and plainness, but that did not 
exclude the expression of emotion in discourse. By stripping away the requirement of 
excesses (i.e., tropes and schemes), Smith was not advocating unemotional reasoning. 
Rather, by conveying a message in the simplest manner, the rhetor was better able to 
express the passions that "affected the author" (LRBL, i. 136). If tropes and figures of 
speech were natural and germane to the subject matter, then, Smith argued, their usage 
was not excessive. In fact, Smith criticized the character of men who lacked the "strong 
passions" to be "carried away in the ordinary matter" (LRBL, i. 139). Passions were 
natural and, even more, varied in different situations.  
                                                 
21 Howell, "The New Rhetoric Comes of Age," 549. 
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 Smith perceived the rhetorical theorists of his time as being too concerned with 
developing an ideal style. The ideal style privileged a particular affective quality in 
speech, regardless of situation or circumstance. Smith criticized those who created their 
own ideal style tailored to their own lack of natural abilities and passions. In one 
example, Smith aimed his criticism at Lord Shafstbury, noting that the latter's "weakly 
state of body . . . prevented the violence of his passions" and "did not incline him greatly 
to be of any particular temper to any great height." This was a negative trait in Smith's 
estimation, as Shaftsbury "was not led to have any particular Stile" and as a result, 
invented an ideal style that was not grounded in the times and circumstances (LRBL, i. 
144). Smith's plain style regarded the natural and situated expression of emotions as a 
necessary condition for a rhetor to communicate a message to a person or audience. 
 Political economy derived its ethos from governing. Rhetors participating in 
political economic discourse were expected to represent the needs of the people. In a 
democracy like the United States, representing others, or "the people," was an inherent 
process in building the nation-state. The cogency of Smith's moderate rhetoric captures 
the essence of democratic governance. The democratic character of Smith's moderate 
rhetoric of political economy, thus, held the potential to negotiate divisive political issues 
such as slavery. At the level of judgment and rhetorical style, moderate rhetoric was 
grounded in understanding others and understanding what motivated others. Smith's 
conception of moderate rhetoric saw value in the instrumental and pathetic dimensions of 
rhetoric, so long as a rhetor demonstrated that such rhetoric was derived from sound 
judgment and conveyed through the appropriate style. Smith's moderate rhetoric had the 
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potential to generate broad identification with the audiences of security and morality 
discourses.  
Supporters of colonization believed their project could bridge the divide between 
security and morality discourses. Even more, colonizationists were appealing to the 
legislative branch to support their efforts, seeing colonization as a project worthy of 
congressional support. The situation facing colonization supporters was not easy, as 
tensions were only growing more intense and intransigent. However, the moderate 
dimension of rhetoric expounded by Smith provided the speakers at the colonization 
meeting with the resources to bring together divergent interests and motivate a national 
colonization movement.  
 
The Need for Moderate Rhetoric in Early Political Economic Discourse on Slavery:  
Debates on Representation and Taxation in the Articles of Confederation 
Moderate rhetoric had tremendous potential to manage the various and intense 
discursive tensions concerning slavery. However, this potential was not immediately 
realized in U.S. political economic discourse. The debates concerning slavery and the 
Articles demonstrated the need for moderate rhetoric if the states were going to unite as 
one federal government. The relationship between the federal government and slavery in 
the Articles was hotly debated. The two questions that pervaded these debates concerned 
how representation to the Continental Congress would be apportioned and how taxes 
would be calculated.22 These debates on representation and taxation in relation to the 
Articles of Confederation displayed the absence of moderate rhetoric in the loose national 
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upon ratification. 
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association created by the Articles. The lack of moderation contributed to a flawed 
governing document that would be revisited less than a decade after its ratification. In 
this section, then, the need for moderate rhetoric is illustrated by briefly considering how 
the discursive tensions of slavery continued in the debates on representation and taxation 
in the Articles. 
The question of representation in the Articles was an early struggle over slave 
power in the United States. Delegates to the Second Continental Congress were not yet 
thinking of the colonies as the United States; rather most in attendance conceived of the 
gathering as an attempt to force the hand of the British government. As such, attendees 
were content with the previous schemes of representation (i.e., one vote per colony) 
established at the First Continental Congress. At the Second Continental Congress 
Benjamin Franklin proposed otherwise, suggesting a system of representation based upon 
population. Philadelphia physician Benjamin Rush took Franklin's proposal a step 
further, suggesting that representation be decided based upon "free inhabitants."23 Yet, 
Rush's suggestion proved only a minor obstacle to what Donald L. Robinson refers to as 
the "inertia" of previous representation schemes.24 The lack of debate on Franklin's and 
Rush's representation schemes was not due to a lack of controversy; it was quite the 
opposite. To reconsider representation was to reconsider the status of slaves. If slaves 
were counted for representation, then they must be humans (and not chattel) and must be 
counted toward taxes (or freed). If slaves were not counted, then slave states would have 
a smaller population and thus, fewer representatives to Congress. In these debates, the 
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arguments to avoid change helped to set aside the confusing subject and avoid touching 
any nerves about the status of slavery. By maintaining the status quo, however, the 
division fostered by the security and morality discourses remained.  
 Unlike the topic of representation, the debates concerning taxation and slavery at 
the Second Continental Congress generated increased tensions. Although taxes would 
only be levied by the Confederation for a "common Treasury" to provide "common 
defense," the subject of how taxes would be apportioned was a contentious one. In 
Dickinson's draft, Article eleven suggested that taxation would be "in Proportion to the 
Number of Inhabitants of every Age, Sex, and Quality, except Indians not paying taxes, 
in each Colony."25 The ensuing debate reflected the competing rhetorical approaches 
cultivated within security and morality discourses. Many Southerners used instrumental 
rhetorical strategies to argue against what they saw as the attempts by Northerners to 
equate whites and blacks. Samuel Chase, a member of the Maryland delegation, argued, 
"The negroes are wealth. . . [they are] a species of property, personal estate." As a 
consequence of this claim, then, Chase argued that all types of wealth would have to be 
taxed, including "Massachusetts fisheries."26 The arguments of Chase and others aimed to 
suppress any discussion that connected slavery and humanity. As a "species of property," 
slaves were easier to rhetorically control.  
 The calmness sought by Southerners and their use of instrumental rhetoric was 
quickly challenged by Northerners. James Wilson of Pennsylvania argued that slaves 
should be taxed, because "Slaves prevent freemen from cultivating a country." Although 
Wilson's argument was racist in its own right, his claim invited more emotion into the 
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26 This account comes from Thomas Jefferson and was published in the JCC, 6: 1079-80. 
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debates on taxation and slavery than most Southerners would have liked. To wit, Thomas 
Lynch heatedly replied that if the debate was going to be about whether slaves ought to 
be considered property or not, then the proceedings should cease. Even more, Lynch 
proclaimed that if slaves were taxed because they could produce wealth, then so too 
should livestock be taxed. Benjamin Franklin stoked the pathetic fire started by Wilson, 
responding that the difference between slaves and livestock was that "sheep will never 
make any insurrections."27 On the issue of taxation and the Articles, the lack of 
moderation was evident in the rhetorical sparring between instrumental and pathetic 
approaches to slavery. The divisiveness of such discursive tensions extended into the vote 
on Chase's amendment to only count white inhabitants. The vote divided on sectional 
lines, and Georgia split its vote in half. It was a tie vote and Chase's amendment failed.   
The Articles of Confederation passed the Congress and were eventually ratified 
by the states despite the debates on representation, taxation, and slavery. However, these 
debates show that the rhetorical approaches that drove the security-morality tension 
would continue in U.S. political economic discourse unless an alternative rhetorical 
approach could overcome the tension. Additionally, the need for moderate rhetoric would 
intensify at the Federal Convention. The Articles created an affiliation of states, the 
Constitution would create the United States. As Howard H. Peckham argues, the Articles 
of Confederation did not add powers to the Continental Congress; it merely "described" 
the confederation of states.28 Alexander Hamilton similarly intimated that the Articles of 
Confederation failed to create a government, writing in The Federalist, number 85, "A 
                                                 
27 JCC, 6: 1080. 
 
28 Howard H. Peckham, The War for Independence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 84, 
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nation, without a national government, is . . . an awful spectacle."29 However, when a 
stronger national government was created—as was the case with the Federal Convention 
and the Constitution—the desire to protect state interests would increase. To function as 
the United States and attempt to overcome the discursive tensions of slavery, an 
alternative rhetorical approach would be necessary.  
 
Moderate Rhetoric at the Federal Convention: 
The Creation of the Constitution 
 In an attempt to move beyond the flaws of the Articles, the Congress of the 
Confederation passed a resolution on February 21, 1787, calling for a "convention of 
delegates. . . appointed by the several states" to convene on the second Monday of May 
(the fourteenth) in Philadelphia.30 The purpose of the Federal Convention was to 
"consider the state of the [A]merican Union."31 In their deliberations at the Federal 
Convention, delegates were again faced with the issues of representation and taxation, 
and again, slavery was a key factor in how each state's delegates wanted to define 
representation and taxation in the United States. Yet, the debate at the Federal 
Convention was different than previous efforts. The failures of the Articles required 
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delegates to the Federal Convention to consider alternatives. Little would change if the 
same instrumental and pathetic rhetorical approaches went unaddressed. As such, 
moderate rhetoric gained footing in the Federal Convention debates on slavery, 
specifically on the matters of the three-fifths rule and the power of the federal 
government over slavery.  
 
The Three-Fifths Rule and Moderate Rhetoric at the Federal Convention, 1787: 
Representation, Taxation, and Slavery   
Unlike the Second Continental Congress—where the issue of representation was 
sublimated—concerns about representation were made apparent early in the Convention 
proceedings. On May 29, Edmund Randolph offered fifteen resolutions concerning the 
new federal government. The second resolution stated, "[T]he rights of suffrage in the 
National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution or to the 
number of free inhabitants, as one or the other rule may seem best in different cases."32 
By early July, a new proposal set forth a scheme of representation. Generated by 
Massachusetts delegate Elbridge Gerry and his "grand committee," the proposal stated 
that representation in one branch would be based upon inhabitants (one member for every 
40,000 inhabitants, minimum of one representative for each state), and in the second 
branch, "each state shall have an equal vote."33 With representation (and, eventually, 
taxation) tied to state population, slavery become an inevitable source of debate.  
In support of Gerry's proposal, James Madison appealed to common sense and 
made his judgment as an impartial spectator rhetorically evident. One source of conflict 
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derived from concern for the provision that spending bills would originate from the 
"lower branch" (i.e., the House of Representatives). Smaller states worried that having 
fewer in numbers in the House would negatively impact their ability to introduce 
spending bills. Madison's reply found support in common sense reasoning: "If seven 
States in the upper branch wished a bill to be originated, they might surely find some 
member from some of the same States in the lower branch who would originate it."34 
Madison's reasoning was simple: if a bill was important, someone from the lower branch 
would see such significance just as much as a person in the upper branch. Madison went 
further to emphasize the "common" in common sense by exposing the false choice 
foisted upon delegates. Madison "conceived that the Convention was reduced to the 
alternative of either departing from justice in order to conciliate the smaller States, and 
the minority of the people of the U. S. or of displeasing these by justly gratifying the 
larger States and majority of the people." Madison intimated that if legislators worked 
from the principles of common sense, they would see that Gerry's bill provided a 
reasonable method of representation. 
Madison also called upon legislators to manage their emotions in their 
deliberations. Madison argued, "The Convention ought to pursue a plan which would 
bear the test of examination, which would be espoused & supported by the enlightened 
and impartial part of America, & which they could themselves vindicate and urge."35 
Madison demonstrated the management of emotions himself as he considered the goals of 
the Convention: "Harmony in the Convention was not doubt much to be desired. 
Satisfaction to all the States, in the first instance still more so. But if the principal States 
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comprehending the majority of the people of the U. S. should concur in a just & judicious 
plan, he had the firmest hopes that all the other States would by degrees accede to it" 
[emphasis added].36 Harmony and satisfaction were desirable outcomes, yet they were 
idealistic. Madison proposed justice and judiciousness as more practical criteria for the 
Convention. Throughout his support for the committee's representation report, Madison's 
moderate rhetoric crafted a middle ground, rooted in common sense and supported 
without high emotion.  
 There was disagreement on Gerry's proposal and Madison's argument; yet even in 
disagreement speakers employed moderate rhetoric in the debates. Specifically, rhetors 
used the concept of Union to balance emotion and reason in the service of a moderate 
approach to the subject of representation. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania offered the 
first reply to Madison. Morris thought the "form and matter of the Report objectionable" 
because it seemed as though delegates were only representing their states and not trying 
to create a strong union.37 Morris's use of Union provided him with a symbol that, in the 
moment, could appear both emotional and practical. Initially, Morris defined himself as a 
person concerned with unity, stating that he saw himself as "a Representative of 
America" and "to some degree as a Representative of the whole human race."38 Such an 
expansive appeal was inflected with the heightened emotion.39 The two sides must unite, 
argued Gerry, for, "If we do not come to some agreement among ourselves some foreign 
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sword will probably do the work for us."40 Although Morris and Gerry disagreed with 
Madison's perspective on representation, both could agree that a resolution was necessary 
to create a viable union. Delegates' use of moderate rhetoric helped to avoid the 
divisiveness fostered by security and morality discourses. 
   The mutual appreciation of moderate rhetoric fostered agreement on 
representation in the form of the three-fifths rule. Although both sides fought against the 
three-fifths ratio, it remained in the conversations. North Carolinian Hugh Williamson 
noted the middle-ground provided by the three-fifths ratio, which allowed him to 
associate with neither extreme.41 The breakthrough argument that seemed to suffice for 
both sides of the representation question was best articulated by Wilson, who noted that 
"less umbrage would perhaps be taken agst. an admission of the slaves into the Rule of 
representation, if it should be so expressed as to make them indirectly only an ingredient 
in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule of taxation: and as representation 
was to be according to taxation, the end would be equally attained."42 The debate on the 
three-fifths rule demonstrated the possibility for agreement that might emerge from 
moderate rhetoric. Reason was ever-present in the discourse, even when coupled with 
well-balanced emotional appeals. If political economy was the science of the legislator, 
as Smith posited, it would be fitting that moderation could be found in a mathematical 
ratio. There was little debate on the exact ratio, indicating that the presence of some 
middle ground (and not the correctness of the ratio) was the important characteristic to 
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delegates. The amendment passed, tying representation to taxation, with slaves counting 
as three-fifths of a person. 
 Moderate rhetoric carried the vote, but the limitations of moderation did not go 
unnoticed. After the ratio passed, Morris tried to characterize the ratio as a failed attempt 
to mute the sectional divide on slavery. He stated, "A distinction [slavery] had been set 
up & urged, between the Nn. & Southn. States . . . either this distinction is fictitious or 
real: if fictitious, let it be dismissed & let us proceed with due confidence. If it be real, 
instead of attempting to blend incompatible things, let us at once take a friendly leave of 
each other."43 Morris's observation pointed to the efficacy of the three-fifths rule in 
addressing the tensions lurking beyond the walls of government. Although many 
delegates agreed to such a compromise, the compromise did not address whether or not 
moderate rhetoric could help to transcend the security-morality tension throughout the 
United States, or whether it only quelled deeper rhetorical energies that would eventually 
resurface. The answer to this question could not be discerned at the Federal Convention 
and would be confronted by colonizationists in 1816.  
 
The Power of the Federal Government over Slavery:  
Moderate Rhetoric and the Slave Trade at the Federal Convention 
 Like the debates on representation, the subject of slavery greatly impacted the 
debates on the powers of the federal government. After voting on the representation 
issue, a Committee of Detail was charged to address the subject of federal powers. On 
August 6, a Southern-dominated committee produced a thoroughly Southern report, 
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insulating slavery from governmental interference. The report offered an article to 
prohibit the federal government from taxing exports from states, taxing the importation of 
slaves, and passing "navigation acts" (any act dealing with foreign trade) without a two-
thirds majority in each House.44 As the debate on this report proceeded, more so than in 
the debates on representation and taxation, the practice of slavery in the Union seemed to 
hang in the balance. Tensions ran high, with many rhetors returning to rhetorical 
strategies from the security and morality discourses to contest how slavery and federal 
powers would relate in the Constitution. 
Initially, the debate fostered division through the familiar instrumental and 
pathetic rhetorical strategies. Northern delegates thought the South was attempting to 
gain the advantages of slavery without paying for them, while Southern delegates took 
any measure regarding slavery as an affront to their way of life. Luther Martin, a delegate 
from Maryland, offered a bold critique of the report. He observed that because of the 
three-fifths rule, the South would be encouraged to import more slaves to gain power. 
Even beyond his appeal to a sense of union, Martin invoked the moral to declare the 
encouragement of the slave trade as "inconsistent with the principles of the revolution 
and dishonorable to the American character to have such a feature in the Constitution."45 
There were a few adherents to Martin's perspective, including George Mason, who 
referred to slavery as "this infernal traffic" and claimed that "Every master of slaves is 
born a petty tyrant."46 John Langdon of New Hampshire, "[could] not with a good 
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conscience leave it with the States who could then go on with the traffic."47 Similarly, 
pro-slavery advocates were obstinately opposed to any bar to the slave trade in the 
Constitution. Staving off an infringement on the social order of slave states, Charles 
Pinckney was clear: "South Carolina can never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave 
trade."48 Divisive arguments from both sides of the slavery issue fostered discursive 
tension within the Convention's deliberations. To produce a Constitution, some common 
ground would need to be secured.  
But within this renewed tension, some voices called upon moderate rhetoric to 
narrow the focus of the debate and craft common ground. Responses to the pathetic 
rhetoric of anti-slavery argued that the occasion—distinctively political—should confine 
the topics to be discussed. John Rutledge of South Carolina focused the attention of 
delegates on political matters, arguing, "Religion & humanity had nothing to do with this 
question—Interest alone is the governing principles with Nations." Connecticut's Oliver 
Ellsworth concurred: "The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to 
the States themselves."49 New York's Rufus King believed "the subject should be 
considered in political light only."50 These delegates actively sought to remove the debate 
from the contentious realm of security and morality. Labeling the subject as a "political" 
question invited delegates to discuss the issue using the appropriate rhetorical strategies 
for a political issue, namely moderate rhetoric. 
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As a question of principles and politics, the appeal to common sense encouraged 
an emphasis on shared principles. Ellsworth argued that from the principles of common 
sense, the Northern states should "not oppose the increase of Slaves which will increase 
the commodities of which they will become carriers."51 Ellsworth added, "What enriches 
a part enriches the whole."52 Gerry urged that the Convention "ought to be careful not to 
give any sanction to slavery," but he saw that the Convention could not control the 
conduct of the states concerning slavery.53 Ellsworth captured the necessity of moderate 
rhetoric on political economic matters, lamenting, "If we do not agree on this middle & 
moderate ground, [I am] afraid we should lose two States."54 Framing the debate on 
federal power and slavery through moderate rhetoric—while sublimating security and 
morality concerns—offered delegates the most politically expedient option to create a 
compromise.  
Ending the slave trade, once a topic that would have been met with acid-tongued 
opposition from the South, profited from the moderate rhetoric that had calmed the 
debate on federal powers. A report from the "Committee of Eleven" had offered 1800 as 
the first year that the federal government could limit the importation of slaves. General 
Pinckney of South Carolina quickly moved to amend this provision to 1808. It was 
seconded and passed. Much like the debate on the three-fifths rule, moderate rhetoric 
provided an appropriate manner in which to discuss the practical details of limiting the 
slave trade.  
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The spirit of moderation led not only to a deferred date at which time slave 
importation could be limited, but it also led to the linguistic exclusion of "slavery" in the 
Constitution. On August 25, the Convention debated a clause concerning "The 
importation of slaves," yet agreed to the more euphemistically worded clause on "The 
migration or importation of such persons as the several States now existing shall think 
proper to admit. . . ."55 The change helped to avoid debating the propriety of slavery and 
invoking the intense emotions that threatened compromise. Additionally, Northerners and 
Southerners could claim victory in the outcome. Removing explicit reference to "slaves" 
or "slavery" accommodated Southern delegates who firmly believed that any mention of 
slavery went too far in interfering with the rights of the states. Yet, the allusions to 
slavery still afforded many Northern delegates the comfort that within the governmental 
structure established by the document, slavery had the potential to be limited.  
 At the close of the Federal Convention, Franklin and George Washington framed 
past and future deliberations on the Constitution in moderate rhetorical terms. Franklin, 
the elder statesman of the proceedings, recognized that the Constitution was practical in 
his view of the Constitution, stating that it provided "a general Government necessary for 
us."56 He also considered the argument that another convention could create a better 
document, responding, "I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain may be 
able to make a better Constitution."57 Franklin also warned that the use of divisive 
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rhetoric in the ratification process would invite foreign nations to look down upon the 
United States.58  
 Like Franklin, Washington provided an interpretation of the Convention 
proceedings and the Constitution that emphasized the practical considerations involved. 
In a letter to the president of the Confederation Congress, Washington connected the 
behavior of the Convention to notions of compromise and union.59 Washington's letter 
openly recognized a key problem in unification of the states: "It is obviously 
impracticable in the federal government of these States, to secure all rights of 
independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide the safety of all." Such a problem could 
not be resolved by drawing "with precision the line between those rights which may be 
surrendered, and those which may be reserved"; instead, the level of sacrifice would be 
based upon "situation and circumstance."60 Washington's letter presumed the practical 
judgment of the impartial spectator, assuring its reader, "In all our deliberations on this 
subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of 
every true America, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, 
felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence."61 Through "a spirit of amity and . . . of 
mutual deference" the Convention had arrived at a governing document for the Union.62 
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 The moderate rhetorical character of the proceedings, which, according to Peter 
B. Knupfer, "sought the development of concurring majorities over time while also 
attempting to defuse extremist, emotional, and dogmatic criticisms of the Constitution," 
proved successful to gaining ratification.63 Still, the Constitution only provided the 
ground rules for U.S. governance. Moving forward, the question would be to what extent 
the moderate rhetoric from the Convention and Constitution would impact the rough-and-
tumble deliberations of future debates on slavery.  
 
Moderate Rhetoric in Full Voice:  
Debating the End of the International Slave Trade 
 The ratification of the Constitution created a symbolic and legal authority for 
discourse concerning slavery. Still, the security-morality tension persisted in the 
discourse of slavery and quickly permeated the congressional chamber. The examples of 
the Federal Convention and the ratified Constitution provided one of the few "ready 
means" to advance the sentiment of union.64 The ongoing divisions between states help 
explain, in part, why such means were limited. However, unlike previous legislative 
debates about slavery, legislators turned to the Constitution as a new, uniquely American, 
symbol of moderation. The moderation of the Constitution was challenged almost 
immediately by an anti-slavery petition by the Quaker Yearly Meeting of Pennsylvania in 
1790. The Constitution also invited debate about slavery by setting 1808 as the earliest 
year that the international slave trade could be ended. In those two debates, the security-
morality tension challenged the moderate rhetoric of political economy. However, armed 
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with the symbolic resources of the Constitution, moderate rhetoric helped maintain the 
union despite the divisiveness of slavery.  
 
Testing the Constitutional Union: Moderate Rhetoric and the Challenge of the 
Security-Morality Tension in the First Congress 
 The tenuous compromise that moderate rhetoric helped to create was immediately 
tested within the First Congress of the United States of America. On February 11, 1790, 
Pennsylvania Representative Thomas Fitzsimons brought a petition before the Senate and 
House of Representatives. Drafted by the Quaker Yearly Meeting of 1789, the petition 
challenged the moderate rhetoric of political economy with renewed pathos. The petition 
stated that the Quakers, "Firmly believ[ed] that unfeigned righteousness in public as well 
as private stations, is the only sure ground for hope for Divine blessing." Furthermore, 
anything short of "the ennobling principle of universal good-will to men" would be 
"fallacious and illusive."65 The Quakers audaciously opined that the Congress should 
"exert upright endeavors, to the full extent of your power [and] to remove every 
obstruction to public righteousness," which "must produce the abolition of the slave 
trade."66 The next day Benjamin Franklin's support was added to the Quaker's cause. A 
memorial was read from the "Pennsylvania Society for promoting the Abolition of 
Slavery, the relief of free negroes unlawfully held in bondage, and the improvement of 
the condition of the African race," signed by Franklin, the Society president.67 The 
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Quaker petition from the previous day was also read. Both the petition and Franklin's 
support pushed the pathetic dimension of rhetoric into the legislative arena, and made 
bold claims against the practice of slavery. 
 The combination of the petition and memorial excited the passions of many 
Southern delegates. Their rhetorical response represented a reversion to the 
instrumentalism of security discourse. Thomas Tucker of South Carolina "feared the 
commitment of it [the petition] would be a very alarming circumstance to the Southern 
States," going on to characterize the petition as a "mischievous attempt" by Northerners 
to raise false hopes within the slave population.68 The debate that ensued made many 
Southerners uncomfortable, with William L. Smith of South Carolina threatening to 
"[call] the yeas and nays, if gentlemen persisted in pressing the question."69 In a prophetic 
statement, Tucker rebuked the prospect of slave emancipation by arguing, "This would 
never be submitted to by the Southern States without a civil war."70 Joshua Seney of 
Maryland and Aedanus Burke of South Carolina both referred to the petition as 
unconstitutional.71 The security-morality tension that had been negotiated during the 
Federal Convention was now being threatened by its potential divisiveness during the 
republic's first legislative session as the United States.  
 The response to this resurgence of the security-morality tension was a more fully 
developed deployment of moderate rhetoric. With the experience of the Federal 
Convention debate and the unifying symbol of the Constitution to aid their efforts, rhetors 
                                                 
68 Annals, 1st Cong., 2nd sess., February 12, 1790, 1240. 
 
69 Annals, 1st Cong., 2nd sess., February 11, 1790, 1233. 
 
70 Annals, 1st Cong., 2nd sess., February 12, 1790, 1240. 
 
71 Annals, 1st Cong., 2nd sess., February 12, 1790, 1241. 
109 
used multiple dimensions of moderate rhetoric to quell the tensions arising from the 
Quaker anti-slavery petition. The fullness of the moderate rhetoric was expressed in three 
responses in congressional debates on the anti-slavery petition, most notably in the 
speech made by William L. Smith from South Carolina. One response focused on the 
process required to consider the anti-slavery petition. Another response emphasized the 
importance of propriety in the deliberations. Lastly, a variety of arguments were made 
about the practicality of the petition.  
 Many rhetors emphasized the process needed to consider the petition, a move 
which harkened back to Adam Smith's conceptualization of the impartial spectator. 
Immediate debate on the petition was out of the question, for it was "contrary to our 
[Congress's] usual mode of procedure."72 This response, offered by Smith of South 
Carolina, used the legislative process as a way to quell the intense emotions that might 
arise if the debate were allowed to occur immediately. Thus, in the debate that ensued on 
February 11, the focus was not on the abolition of the slave trade, but on how the House 
would proceed. It had been moved and seconded that the petition should be referred to 
committee. Explicit appeals to moderation helped to define the process, as illustrated in 
the comments of Georgian Abraham Baldwin, who "hoped the business would be 
conducted with temper and moderation, and that gentlemen would concede and pass the 
subject over for a day at least." Adhering to process and procedure meant that the petition 
would be sent to committee. As James Madison noted, sending the petition to committee 
would be "the usual way" and would consider the petition as "a matter of course."73 The 
House agreed with Madison and voted to send the petition to committee as they had done 
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previously. Through the norms of process, a reasonable judgment could be rendered and 
the discursive tensions could be temporarily assuaged.  
When the debate moved to the Committee of the Whole (meaning the entire 
House), the propriety of the petition was considered. Smith of South Carolina offered the 
most lengthy and substantive response to the anti-slavery memorials for the pro-slavery 
cause. His speech on March 17 refrained from lambasting the Quakers, Franklin, or anti-
slavery representatives from the North. Instead, Smith "lamented much of the subject" of 
the memorials, as he believed it would lead to a "very unpleasant discussion" and "excite 
the alarms of the Southern members."74 Smith inferred that he would not even be 
discussing the memorials, but for the Committee of the Whole voting to do so. As a 
member of the House, then, it was properly his duty to offer some comments on the 
memorials. Throughout his speech Smith returned to the impropriety of the petitions 
being considered in the House, referring to the "improper language" of the memorialists, 
the abdication of  "the common rules of proceeding" to even consider the memorials, and 
the need for "[a] proper consideration" of emancipation (in contrast to the improper 
consideration offered by the petitioners).75 The concept of propriety afforded Smith the 
ability to balance the reasonability of not discussing the petition with the potential 
emotions attached to discussions of slavery. Both could be implicated without violating 
the propriety of the legislative process. 
Some rhetors that were more sympathetic to the anti-slavery cause who, like the 
pro-slavery Smith, held propriety as a necessity for any legislative action on slavery. On 
March 22, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey agreed with many of Smith's points, but also 
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offered alternative moderate interpretation of the anti-slavery memorials. Boudinot 
quoted the ringing endorsement for equality in the Declaration—"We hold these truths to 
be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator, 
with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness"—but he saw the Constitution as the "instrument" that Congress must uphold. 
Boudinot cited the Declaration, a rhetorical resource within morality discourse. Yet, such 
usage was moderated by the process set forth in the Constitution. The respect for the 
Constitution and propriety allowed Smith and Boudinot to agree on the Quaker anti-
slavery petition, despite different perspectives on slavery.  
 Within political economic discourse, the business of governing rendered 
practicality a stock issue. As such, Smith considered the "impracticability" of extending 
freedom to all.76 Smith's arguments about the practicality of emancipation employed 
multiple arguments to support his claim that the substance of the memorials was 
erroneous. Smith's arguments were three. Smith's first argument departed from his 
previous use of moderate rhetoric, as he argued that emancipation was impractical 
because free blacks would wreak havoc upon the ruling class whites. As part of this line 
of argument, Smith drew attention to worries about the mixing of white and black 
bloodlines and even read from Thomas Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia as 
support for claims of black inferiority.77 Smith's pathos was tempered by the appeal to 
common sense, as he offered the following observation: "It was well known that they 
[black slaves] were an indolent people, improvident, averse to labor; when emancipated, 
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they would either starve or plunder."78 Smith's argument would seem common to a 
particular audience of Southern whites, but such an argument, rooted in a commonplace 
within security discourse, would likely be rejected by other audiences (e.g., anti-slavery 
whites in the North) in favor of claims to natural rights.  
 Although Smith's argument about white security and practicability was not cast in 
a moderate fashion, Boudinot agreed with Smith and provided a moral justification. 
Boudinot stated, "It would be inhumanity itself to turn these unhappy people loose to 
murder each other, or to perish for the want of the necessaries of life."79 If the entirety of 
the debate on the Quaker petition had focused on this issue, it seems likely that agreement 
would not have been achieved. However, this argument was tempered by its position in 
the overall debate—it came in the middle of Smith's speech and played a minor role in 
Boudinot's.  
 The thrust of the argument was also limited. Boudinot's argument illustrated a rare 
instance where moderate rhetoric functioned to mix warrants and claims from both 
discourses, rather than to build an entire argument acceptable to both sides. In Boudinot's 
case, the claim was that slaves should not be set free. Such a claim was self-evident 
within security discourse but contestable in morality discourse. However, the warrant for 
this claim expressed concern for the physical well-being of the enslaved. The well-being 
of the enslaved was not often expressed within security discourse, but was a significant 
concern within morality discourses. The result of using similar warrants to support 
opposing claims could, potentially, create identification with rhetors from security and 
morality discourses. Just as easily, the mixing of security and morality appeals within the 
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structure of an argument provided a point of contention for the opposing discourses. 
Insomuch as moderate rhetoric attempted to overcome conflict, this dimension of 
moderation was not often used in speeches about slavery. 
 Practicability was also connected to the unique role of slaves in the economic 
system of the South. Framed in economic terms, the use of moderate rhetoric was a 
fitting rhetorical strategy. Smith offered his analysis by first, asking a question: "[W]ill 
the abolition of slavery strengthen South Carolina?" His answer addressed the crop-based 
economy of the South. Smith stated, "It [South Carolina] can only be cultivated by 
slaves; the climate, the nature of the soil, ancient habits, forbid the whites from 
performing the labor."80 Smith analyzed the connection between the South Carolina 
economy and the rest of the country, eventually concluding, "If you injure the Southern 
States, the injury would reach our Northern and Eastern brethren; for the States are links 
of one chain: if we break one, the whole must fall to pieces."81 If slaves were 
emancipated, as the petition suggested, then the entire Union would be economically 
impacted in a negative fashion. Smith offered a practical version in his appeal to union, 
rooted in potential financial loss. 
 The practicability of emancipation was also argued through appeals to tradition. 
For instance, Smith discussed the increased vagrancy in Britain after slaves were 
emancipated.82 Smith also pointed to France and the premium put upon imported blacks 
in that country. He asked, "Is that nation more debased than others? Are they not a 
polished people, sensible of the rights of mankind, and actuated by the proper sentiments 
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of humanity?"83 Smith added another contemporary example (Spain), as well as the 
historical examples of the Greeks and Romans to illustrate that slaveholding did not 
debase the mind of the owner.84 Through such examples, Smith demonstrated not only 
that slavery was practical, but that it did not impact the judgment of slaveholders, 
allowing him to demonstrate the sound judgment expected of a representative in 
Congress. 
In 1790, appealing to the Constitution and to process allowed competing interests 
in Congress to find some agreement on the issue of slavery. The agreement in no way 
settled the problems of slavery; but it represented the potential thrust of moderate rhetoric 
while it also delayed more substantial debates until 1808. Moderate rhetoric was also 
used to find solutions to the problems of slavery beyond the halls of Congress. Written on 
March 6, 1790, and published in December of that year, Virginia landowner Ferdinand 
Fairfax opined that the way to alleviate the tensions of slavery was to gradually 
emancipate and colonize free blacks. Fairfax's article used many of the moderate 
rhetorical appeals previously employed by Smith and Boudinot, but took the step to make 
African colonization the logical, policy outcome of moderate rhetoric. Fairfax asserted 
that emancipation "must be gradual" in order to do justice to the slaves as well as to the 
slave owners (the latter being too substantially harmed by the significant loss of property 
in immediate emancipation).85 Fairfax contended that the tension between North and 
South on the issue of slavery "suggests the propriety" of colonization.86 Throughout the 
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essay Fairfax demonstrated how colonization was in the best interests of both black and 
white. Such balancing was crucial to his moderate appeal. Although Fairfax's article is 
one of the earliest suggestions of a national plan to colonize blacks to Africa, it did not 
ignite a national colonization movement. Perhaps many were content with delaying the 
question of the slave trade until 1808. Legislators could more easily endorse the deferral 
suggested in the Constitution than engage in a debate to create a new scheme of such 
grand proportions. Still, Fairfax's essay demonstrates the potential congruence of 
moderate rhetoric and African colonization. Such a connection would not be realized in 
political economic discourse until the issue of the slave trade could re-emerge in 1808. 
 
Fulfilling the Moderate Promise:  
The End of the International Slave Trade 
 The Constitution would not allow the slave trade to be restricted until 1808. This 
delay provided a Constitutional argument on which both pro- and anti-slavery advocates 
could find agreement. Yet, the designation of a specific date meant that when that date 
arrived, the question would most certainly be raised. Consideration of ending the slave 
trade began well before 1808, with the annual message of President Jefferson, dated 
December 2, 1806. In that message, Jefferson wrote:  
I congratulate you, fellow-citizens, on the approach of the period which you may 
interpose your authority, constitutionally, to withdraw the citizens of the United 
States from all further participation in those violations of human rights which 
have so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the 
morality, the reputation, and the best interests of our country have long been eager 
                                                                                                                                                 
86 Fairfax, "Plan," 286 (emphasis mine). 
116 
to proscribe. Although no law you may pass can take prohibiting effect till the 
first day of the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, yet the intervening 
period is not too long to prevent, by timely notice, expeditions which cannot be 
completed before that day.  
Jefferson's annual message recognized the constitutionally-influenced exigency, as it 
urged Congress to "interpose your authority, constitutionally" to consider the end of the 
slave trade. The Constitution initiated the debate, but that did not preclude the 
proceedings from inciting discursive wrangling for power. Southern states had long been 
uneasy with any mention of slavery in Congress, a sentiment evident in the exclusion of 
the term slavery or slaves from the Constitution. When Congress did debate the abolition 
of one aspect of slavery (i.e., the slave trade), the debate grew more contentious. 
Moderate rhetoric helped to create agreement on the Slave Trade Act, but such agreement 
became harder to achieve due to the increasing influence of instrumental and pathetic 
rhetorical strategies.  
 In the remarks of the chair of the House Committee on the Slave Trade, 
Representative Peter Early of Georgia illustrated the layering of emotion that impartial 
judgment could warrant. Early asked his fellow representatives, "Do not gentleman from 
every quarter of the Union prove, on the discussion of every question that has ever arisen 
in the House, having the most remote bearing on the giving freedom to the Africans in 
the bosom of our country, that it has excited the deepest sensibility in the breasts of those 
where slavery exists? And why is this so?" Early answered his own question, continuing, 
"It is, because those who, from experience, know the extent of the evil, believe that the 
most formidable aspect in which it can present itself, is by making these people free 
117 
among them." The emotion was justified by the common sense of the claim. Or, as Early 
stated, "[P]roof is useless; no fact can be more notorious."  
 Early did not slip fully into a defense of slavery, reverting back to the more calm 
character that an impartial spectator ought to demonstrate. Early asked his audience to 
"reflect and say whether such a law, opposed to the ideas, the passions, the views, and the 
affections of the people of the Southern States, can be executed."  Early's appeal was that 
such reflection would lead to an appropriate judgment. By asking for reflection, Early 
distanced himself from the "passions" of the subject. Such an appeal created a veneer for 
Early's security concerns and emotional appeals. Regarding the efficacy of the slave trade 
bill, Early surmised that if the slave trade act required that forfeited slaves were to 
become free persons, then no Southerner would inform the federal government of illegal 
slave traders. To do so, Early claimed, would be to "turn loose, in the bosom of our 
country, firebrands that would consume them."87 Early concluded his speech by 
apologizing for his views expressed in "plain language," but asked the audience to 
consider the lives of the white population as well as the lives of the slaves.88 For Early, a 
Southerner, the rather predictable result of careful reflection was a return to the 
commonplace argument about white security. 
 The pressures of the security-morality tension were laid bare in Early's use of 
moderate rhetoric concerning the slave trade. His speech asked the audience to be 
reflective and to consider the Union when deliberating. Nonetheless, such moderation 
included a layer of traditional arguments about the rejection of federal intervention and 
fear of slave rebellion. His appeals to experience, reflection, and efficacy, constructed the 
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speaker as a man interested in rendering sound judgment; but that judgment that was 
skewed to the interests of slaveholders and the concerns expressed within security 
discourse. 
 The anti-slavery response to Early's judgment magnified the security-morality 
tension in the moderate rhetoric of political economy. Representative Barnabus Bidwell 
of Massachusetts challenged Early's assumption that slaves were property, arguing, 
"They are not, by any law, human or divine, the slaves of any master."89 Bidwell offered 
an amendment that would eliminate forfeiture from the slave trade bill and made free the 
slaves who were illegally transported to the United States. The anti-slavery sentiment of 
Bidwell and other Northerners exhibited features of the morality discourse, exacerbating 
tensions in Congress.  
 Yet, moderate rhetoric continued to provide members with the resources to avoid 
division on the question of slavery. Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts reasserted the 
primacy of moderate rhetoric into the debate by emphasizing agreement, balance, and 
practicality in his attempt to move the slave trade bill toward passage. Quincy opened his 
speech by noting that both sides agreed upon the end (that the international slave trade 
should be abolished), wishing "it were possible we could unite more perfectly as to the 
means."90 The titling of illegally imported Africans as slaves was, according to Quincy, 
the primary objection of Bidwell and other opponents of forfeiture. Opponents had 
argued that forfeiture implied that slave importers had a right to own the slaves, a right 
that was not theirs according to the laws of nature.91 Quincy agreed and stated that all in 
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the House agreed to this principle, but noted that in reality, slaves would still be sold by 
"African Princes." The principles against slavery were "unquestionable," but, "To all 
practical purposes," slavery would continue in Africa and the United States. By noting 
the practical impossibility of abolishing slavery in the United States, Quincy stated, 
"Now this is that real, practical state of things to which I invite gentlemen to look, and on 
which they ought to legislate."92 Quincy recognized and appreciated Bidwell's argument, 
but concluded that in the legislative forum, practicality and not principles needed to take 
precedence.  
 Having diverted from the subject of slavery and morality, Quincy reframed the 
question in political economic terms. He asked the House, "[H]ow ought we to reason? 
What is our duty?" Quincy's answer was two-fold. First, and quite simply, "Do all you 
can to prohibit." Second, if importation of slaves occurred, "place yourselves in such a 
situation as may enable you best to meliorate the condition of this unhappy class of men, 
consistent with self-preservation, and with the deep stake which an important section of 
the country has in the policy in which you adopt." Quincy's response reflected an 
appreciation of principles and circumstances. He advocated helping slaves as best one 
could, but not so much as to disrupt national unity. Quincy advised, "Reason and legislate 
according to the actual state of this description of persons. Place yourselves so as to do 
the best possible for their good." Quincy's speech reformulated forfeiture in moderate 
terms. Quincy sought the least offensive manner of interpretation; even arguing explicitly 
that the term forfeiture was "the appropriate commercial term—perhaps the only term we 
can use effectual to this purpose, and which does not interfere with the rights of the 
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States."93 Quincy's speech employed a host of arguments and appeals illustrative of 
moderate rhetoric. In doing so, Quincy aided in reframing the debate as a legislative (that 
is, political economic) matter and thus, separate from the realm of morality. 
 The passage of the Slave Trade Act was not simple by any means. The Slave 
Trade Act passed both the House and Senate in late February of 1807. The bill became 
law with President Jefferson's signature on March 3. Despite the bill's passage, the 
security-morality tension heightened anxieties among legislators. Unlike the prevalence 
of the security-morality tension before the act, this moment was shaped by the influence 
of the security-morality tension on moderate rhetoric. Rhetors like Quincy employed 
moderate rhetoric to return the debate to the isolation of political economic discourses, 
but the energy of the security-morality tension could not be matched by moderate 
rhetoric.  
 The slave trade debates did not lead to the end of slavery, but these debates did 
help solidify moderate rhetoric as a way to avoid the security-morality tension in slavery 
discourse. Nearly a decade after the Slave Trade Act was passed, colonization would be 
offered as a practical solution amenable to pro- and anti-slavery advocates alike. The 
development of moderate rhetoric within the realm of political economic discourse 
provided a plausible rhetorical resource for colonizationists whose scheme was crafted as 
a solution to the tensions manifested by the practice of slavery in the United States. The 
fit between colonization and moderate rhetoric was even foreshadowed in the Slave 
Trade debates. Many members posited the return to Africa of forfeited slaves. One such 
proponent, John Smilie of Pennsylvania, stated he had "no objection to be at the expense 
of sending them back to their own country, if this shall be deemed proper, or to pursuing 
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any other mode which may be deemed advisable."94 At the time, little came of this 
suggestion. Yet, as the United States grew and established its belongingness amongst 
powerful nations, the possibility of the United States extending beyond its shores also 
increased.  
 
The Spread of Moderate Rhetoric:  
The Rise of Benevolence and Colonization  
The use of moderate rhetoric in Congress helped to create and maintain the union; 
however, that union was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain due to the pressures 
exerted by security and morality discourses. Although moderate rhetoric was best suited 
for the legislative sphere, the motivational thrust of such rhetoric was incorporated into 
other, non-congressional forums. One indication of the spread of moderate rhetoric can 
be seen in the concordance of political economy and the increase in benevolent societies 
in the early 1800s. Another indication of the spread of moderate rhetoric was the attempt 
to address slavery through political economic means that originated outside of Congress, 
specifically efforts at African colonization. The grounding of moderation in U.S. 
legislative history and the expansion of moderate rhetoric in the immediate context of the 
colonization meeting provided colonizationists with a rhetorical approach to that was 





                                                 
94 Annals, 9th Cong., 2nd sess., December 17, 1806, 170. 
122 
Taking Moderate Rhetoric beyond Congress: 
The Concordance of Moderate Rhetoric and Benevolence  
 Rhetorically, benevolence connoted how one person was to act toward another. 
There was an implicit power dynamic in benevolence, as the "haves" were to act 
benevolently and help the "have-nots." In the usage of the time, one would not read of a 
slave acting benevolently toward a master, as such an expression would subvert the 
implied power dynamic of benevolence. Used together, natural rights and benevolence 
suggested that because everyone possesses natural rights, all efforts should be taken to 
assure those rights. However, benevolence alone could provide a conciliatory gesture 
toward natural rights. A white slaveholder could act benevolently toward a slave, which 
could be defined as providing shelter and food for the slaves (and maybe religion) while 
the slaves remained in bondage. Although natural rights dominated morality discourse 
during the Revolution, the existence of a more reserved moral appeal provided whites 
with a language to appear moral while attempting to restore the social order.95 
The rhetorical conditions of the post-Revolutionary United States fostered the 
rhetoric of benevolence. During that time Americans coalesced and organized for the 
common social good.96 This was nowhere more evident than in the proliferation of 
national societies in the newly-forming United States. Anti-slavery organizations in 
particular emerged during and after the Revolution, with the creation of the Pennsylvania 
Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery for the Relief of Free Negroes Held in 
Bondage and for Improving the Condition of the African Race (1784) and the Society for 
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Promoting the Manumission of Slaves in New York City (1785).97 Religious 
denominations moved beyond organized groups focused on specific moral improvements, 
such as the American Education Society, American Home Missionary Society, American 
Bible Society, American Tract Society, and the American Society for the Promotion of 
Temperance. As organizations, benevolent societies were modeled similar to a legislative 
body like Congress. They possessed leadership, members, constitutions, and goals. In this 
sense, appeals to benevolence developed within a unique political economic context. 
 Beyond the halls of Congress, the appeals to benevolence could serve similar 
aims as moderate rhetoric. John R. Bodo argues that benevolent societies used two 
strategies, both of which demonstrated a significant connection to political economic 
discourse. One strategy was that benevolent societies created friendly rivalries with their 
British counterparts. Through a second strategy, many societies desired to rise from 
sectional to national representation and influence.98 Benevolence appealed to different 
motivations because of its generally positive meaning. The rise of benevolence in the 
early nineteenth century demonstrates the prominence of political economic principles 
within groups that seemed to align with the motivations of the morality discourse.  
 
U.S. Internationalism, Political Economy,  
and an Early Attempt at African Colonization 
The exuberance of Americans after the War was turned inward, and manifested in 
attempts to address domestic problems with a new sense of power. The post-war 
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environment also reminded Americans that slavery was still a pressing issue, as 
attempted slave insurrections had increased. These forces converged in the colonization 
efforts of Paul Cuffe, a sea captain born of an American Indian mother and an African 
father. In Cuffe's early effort, one can see the potential for colonization to connect to 
political economic discourse, the presence of moderate rhetoric in that scheme, as well as 
the scheme's potential to resolve the ever-present problem of slavery in the United States.    
Cuffe discussed colonization in distinctively moderate terms. Through his friend 
James Pemberton, Cuffe became aware of the British group, the African Institution, and 
their work to establish a colony of free blacks in Sierra Leone. Pemberton's letter to Cuffe 
in September of 1808 reflected the growing importance of political economy in the 
slavery issue. Pemberton wrote,  
 I perceive they are earnestly attentive to pursue the laudable object of promoting  
 the civilization of the Blacks in their own country with a view to draw them off 
 from the wild habits of like to which they have been accustomed, by instructing 
 them in the arts of agricultures, mechanic labor, and domestic industry, by which 
 means they hope to be instrumental in preparing the minds of those uninstructed 
 people gradually to become qualified to receive religious instruction.99  
In 1810, Cuffe set sail for Sierra Leone and the colony supported by the African 
Institution. The experience proved positive for Cuffe, who wrote in 1814, "The most 
advantageous means of encouragement to be rendered towards civilization of Africa is 
that the popularity of the colony be encouraged. . . families of good character should be 
encouraged to remove from the United States and settle at Sierra Leone in order to 
                                                 
99 James Pemberton to Paul Cuffe, September, 1808, quoted in Henry Noble Sherwood, "Paul Cuffe: The 
Redemption of Africa," Journal of Negro History 8 (1923): 169.  
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become farmers; and to lend them aid in such useful utilities as they are capable of; and 
in order for this accommodation it appears to me there should be an intercourse kept 
between America and Sierra Leone."100 Cuffe became a spokesperson for African 
colonization and during the blockade of trade with Britain during the War of 1812, Cuffe 
asked Congress for permission to continue sailing to Sierra Leone.101 Cuffe's frustration 
was indicative of the significance of political economic discourse to colonization: 
"Nothing: Nothing of much amount can be affected by an individual or private bodies 
until the government removes the obstruction in the way."102 The obstruction for Cuffe 
was the blockade during the war. However, Cuffe's statement applied to the subject of 
slavery more generally. The philanthropy of individuals and groups could not change the 
significant problems of slavery. The strength of the federal government was needed. It 
was in this light that African colonizationists organized a national movement in 1816.  
 
Conclusion  
 The moderate dimension of rhetoric highlighted the demonstration of reason and 
process in slavery discourse. Smith's rhetorical theory articulated the centrality of 
moderation in rhetorical practice, which U.S. legislators developed in deliberative 
proceedings.  Moderate rhetoric was absent in the debates on the Articles of 
Confederation, leading to a deeply flawed association of states. The use of moderate 
rhetoric in the Federal Convention helped to create a union out of many, where the 
Articles had failed. Moderate rhetoric helped maintain the Union, but the challenges from 
                                                 
100 Paul Cuffe as quoted in Sherwood, "Paul Cuffe," 194. 
 
101 Annals, 13th Cong., 2nd sess., 1195, 1265.  
 
102 Paul Cuffe to T. Brine, January 16, 1817, quoted in Sherwood, "Paul Cuffe," 202. 
126 
security and morality discourses in later congressional debates suggested that moderation 
might not be enough to overcome the anxiety of slavery. 
 Importantly, the preceding analysis demonstrates that the moderate dimension of 
rhetoric was dynamic and fragile. Moderation was not simply a status of middle-ness or 
calm temperament. To be an effective response to the discursive tensions of the time, 
moderate rhetorical strategies needed to address the terms of the conflict in order to 
overcome the tension. As Smith argued, simply claiming moderation was not enough. 
Rhetors needed to demonstrate their role as an impartial spectator. Such demonstration 
required deft rhetorical sensibilities and a great deal of work on the part of the rhetor. If 
done well, the response was dynamic. However, because of the amount of work that 
could go into demonstrating moderation, this dimension of rhetoric was fragile. Missing 
links in one's reasoning could turn an attempt at moderation into a thinly veiled effort at 
instrumental or pathetic rhetoric. Thus, the moderate dimension of rhetoric had 
tremendous potential, but required a rhetor to work to achieve its full potential.  
 Recognizing the failure of past congressional actions to solve the problems of 
slavery, but still convinced that Congress needed to solve the problem, supporters of 
colonization seized the moment. The rise of benevolent societies empowered non-
governmental social organizations to address the social problems of the time. The efforts 
of the African Institution in England and Paul Cuffe in the United States made 
colonization a provocative option that would still avoid the divisiveness of security and 
morality discourses. Colonizationists met in December of 1816, faced with a significant 
problem and a potential solution which needed significant rhetorical efforts to overcome 
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the problem of slavery in the United States. How did they do? This question will be the 








On December 21, 1816, the first meeting of the Colonization Society convened. 
Attendees gathered to support colonization and to have that support galvanized by the 
selected speakers at the meeting. The task of articulating the aims of colonization and 
motivating support for the endeavor fell to Henry Clay of Kentucky and Elias B. 
Caldwell of the District of Columbia.  
 Clay and Caldwell faced the difficult task of negotiating the discursive tensions of 
slavery discourse. To elevate colonization to a national level, the speakers would need to 
adopt a rhetorical tact that could overcome the discursive tensions of slavery. The 
moderate dimension of rhetoric that developed within political discourse provided some 
hope for colonizationists, particularly given their appeal to Congress for support. 
 Part II analyzes the speeches of Clay (Chapter Three) and Caldwell (Chapter 
Four) and assesses how the speakers motivated the colonization project within the context 
of discursive tension and rhetorical possibility. Chapter Five turns to the Counter 
Memorial of the Free People of Colour of the District of Columbia—a response to Clay's 
and Caldwell's motivations—and discerns the layers of critique against Clay, Caldwell, 




HENRY CLAY'S OPENING REMARKS AT THE COLONIZATION MEETING:  
NATIONALISTIC APPEALS AND THE FAILURE TO TRANSFORM 
In 1816, when the Colonization Society entered the national discourse on slavery, 
Henry Clay stood at the forefront of U.S. politics. The "old triumvirate" of republican 
leaders—Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Albert Gallatin—were still alive, but 
growing old. New leaders emerged in their wake and Clay was prominent among them.1 
Clay earned political cache through his commanding oratory. Of Clay's first appearance 
in the Senate in 1805, John Quincy Adams wrote, "Mr. Clay, the new member from 
Kentucky . . . is quite a young man—an orator—and a republican of first fire."2 By the 
time of the germinal colonization meeting eleven years later—where Clay would serve as 
Chair—the Kentuckian had ascended to the role of Speaker of the House where he put his 
stamp on nearly every important issue of the time.3  
As Speaker, Clay became well-practiced in political economic discourse, an 
important skill given the national purpose of the colonization movement. Even more, the 
moderate rhetoric that developed through political economic discourse helped overcome 
divisions concerning slavery and, colonizationists hoped, would help to define 
colonization as a moderate solution to the problems of slavery. Clay's name, political 
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power, and rhetorical prowess could significantly aid the meeting's purpose. The 
participation of Clay was a boon for the national colonization movement. 
The colonization meeting had the potential of benefiting Clay, too. Prior to the 
meeting, Clay had an unclear public position on slavery. Clay said virtually nothing about 
slavery in legislative contexts.4 A pair of public letters written in 1798 by "Scaevola"—
believed to be Clay—denounced slavery. Such audacity was, however, delivered under 
the cover of anonymity. When not writing under a pseudonym, Clay's position on slavery 
was more tenuous. As Robert Remini explains, it was well-known that Speaker Clay 
"regarded slavery as an evil, despite the fact that he was a slaveowner."5 For a man who 
was known to denounce the institution of slavery (though not publicly) while actively 
participating in it, colonization provided a fitting alternative to the extreme positions of 
immediately emancipating slaves or maintaining slavery in the status quo.  
Colonization would not be a politically risky project for Clay to support. The 
national focus of the colonization effort fit with the tenor of Clay's nationalistic support 
of improving U.S. infrastructure. In terms of local politics, a colonization society already 
operated within his home state of Kentucky and had petitioned the federal government 
for material support.6 In both national and local politics, Clay had little to lose if he 
supported colonization and much to gain if his support of colonization led to the 
resolution of the problem of slavery in the United States. 
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As Clay took the chair at the colonization meeting on December 21, 1816, 
opportunities abounded. Clay had the political standing and rhetorical powers that could 
bring colonization the national support it needed. Supporting colonization could bring 
resolution to Clay's rhetorical uncertainty on slavery, remain consistent with his political 
aspirations, and help resolve the festering problem of slavery. Clay offered support of 
colonization through his presence at the meeting, but more significantly, he delivered 
brief opening remarks to motivate backing for the project. In turning to those opening 
remarks, the question remained: In a moment of tremendous opportunity, how well did 
Clay apply his rhetorical abilities to motivate support for colonization? 
 To answer this question, the following analysis juxtaposes Clay's rhetorical 
abilities, his previous rhetorical efforts in Congress, and his opening remarks at the 
colonization meeting. In doing so, this chapter argues that Clay's remarks at the 
colonization meeting failed to transform the project into an issue of national significance. 
Clay's nationalistic appeal—crafted in previous deliberative speeches using moderate 
rhetorical strategies—was not transferred to colonization. Instead, Clay's speech reverted 
to the strategies from security and morality discourses, and in so doing, positioned 
colonization at the center of tensions of slavery instead of beyond them.  
 The Colonization Society had lofty aims to create a national movement and solve 
the problem of slavery in the United States. As a notable rhetor, political leader, and chair 
of the meeting, Clay played a significant role in offering motivation for these aims. To 
understand the full potential of what Clay could offer to the colonization movement the 
analysis turns first, to Clay's rhetorical training and the development of his ethos. Moving 
temporally closer to the colonization meeting, Clay's skill at rhetorically transforming 
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difficult issues through nationalistic appeals is detailed. Clay's opening remarks at the 
colonization meeting are then juxtaposed with his previous appeals, demonstrating Clay's 
failure to bring the same transformative rhetoric to bear on the subject of colonization. 
The failure of Clay's colonization remarks is then explored more thoroughly in terms of 
Clay's own performative anxiety on the subject of slavery. The sum of this analysis 
demonstrates that despite Clay's strength as a rhetor and his ability to transform complex 
issues through moderate rhetorical strategies, his choices failed to elevate colonization to 
the same level as other important public matters.  
 
Clay's Ethos:  
Rhetorical Training and Political Power before the Colonization Meeting 
Nationally-supported colonization would be a grand effort, one that would require 
deft arguments made by exalted statesmen to move the plan into legislative consideration. 
The ethos of colonization rhetors could greatly help in that effort. Clay's ethos fit well 
with the needs of the national colonization plan. The Clay name had become one 
associated with political maneuvering and rhetorical ability. Such characterizations 
resulted from Clay's development as a speaker. Clay's rhetorical training exposed him to 
a variety of different situations that shaped him into an astute rhetor. Exploring Clay's 
rhetorical training shows his ethos, both in terms of the range of experiences that he could 
use at the colonization meeting and the symbolic power that his name had cultivated over 
time. In what follows, Clay's rhetorical training is treated chronologically to demonstrate 
the growth of Clay's ethos leading up to the colonization meeting. 
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Clay's ethos was greatly aided by his natural talents. Physically, Clay was a 
striking man, "tall, thin, sandy-haired, with an expressive face," all of which made him 
look distinctive.7 Clay's appearance may have brought visual interest, but he did not 
disappoint once he began speaking. A contemporary of Clay remarked that his "most 
unique and admirable" talent was his voice, which "filled the room as the organ fills a 
great cathedral."8   
When Clay decided to apply his oratorical abilities to the legal profession, he 
gained insight into the sensibilities of elite society. Early in his twenties Clay studied the 
law with Thomas Jefferson's mentor, Chancellor George Wythe of Richmond. On legal 
argument, Clay believed that no person exceeded Wythe's "thorough preparation, 
clearness, and force"—qualities which the aspiring lawyer sought to imitate.9 Clay further 
cultivated his elite sensibilities by joining the Richmond rhetorical society. Clay was 
admitted despite his youth and modest upbringing. The rhetorical society provided Clay 
with the context to associate and converse with such leaders of the time as John Marshall, 
Bushrod Washington, and Edmund Pendleton. 10 As one of Clay's biographers notes, 
"Long before he entered a courtroom as a licensed attorney-at-law, young Henry had 
honed his considerable natural talents as a persuasive speaker to a high level of 
excellence."11 Clay's time in Richmond refined his intellect, speaking, wit, and manners.  
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Clay also developed the rhetorical abilities of the less refined, more ungenteel 
western frontier. In 1797, Clay took his legal practice to Kentucky. Upon moving to the 
West, refinement was of less utility to Clay in a land where men commonly drank, 
gambled, swore, and fought. But the resourceful and quick Clay adjusted using his wit 
and powerful speaking style, characteristics which also earned him more than a few 
enemies.12 Clay quickly made his mark at the local rhetorical society.13 In 1798, Clay 
delivered an invective-filled impromptu oration against the Alien and Sedition Acts 
passed by the Federalist government in Washington. Just as he had learned manners in 
Richmond, Clay honed his ungenteel style of speaking in the West.  
Indicative of Clay's identification with Kentuckians was his rise to elected office. 
Clay served in the Kentucky general assembly from 1803 until 1810, with a one-year 
stint in the U.S. Senate in 1806.14 In 1811, Clay filled another term of a Kentucky senator 
created by the resignation of Senator Buckner Thruston. After two short terms in 
Washington—during which Clay made his presence known through his characteristic 
eloquence, sarcasm, and criticism—Clay was elected to the House of Representatives for 
the term beginning in 1811.15 By the end of 1810, Clay had officially arrived on the 
national political scene, a place where he would remain until his death in 1852.  
 Clay's elevated status in politics owed much to his rhetorical skills. In his election 
as Speaker of the House in 1811, Democratic-Republican "War Hawks" sought "a man 
                                                 
12 Remini, Henry Clay, 17-19. 
 
13 Clay's reputation was overstated, as he lost his first capital murder case and his client was hanged. 
Remini, Henry Clay, 22. 
 
14 Clay was elected by the Kentucky legislature to fill the remaining term of John Adair. Adair, who was 
already serving out the term of newly appointed Attorney General John Breckinridge, resigned in a tiff 
because he failed in his bid for re-election of a six-year term against John Pope. 
 
15 Remini, Henry Clay, 47-51. 
135 
who can meet John Randolph [a fellow Democratic-Republican candidate for Speaker] 
on the floor or field, for he may have to do both."16 Jonathan Roberts, a representative 
from Pennsylvania, claimed that "Young Henry Clay . . . is the very man to do it." Those 
assembled in the room agreed, knowing Clay to have "manly" characteristics, which 
would serve as a foil to Randolph, who had "a high, shrill, feminine voice" with a sharp 
tongue.17 Clay was elected on the first day on the first ballot. Clay reacquainted himself 
with the congeniality of high society that he had previously known during his time in 
Richmond. Yet, Clay never completely abandoned the frontier mentality molded in 
Kentucky.18  
Clay's dealings during his four-decade long career in national politics earned him 
the title, "the Great Compromiser," which has traveled with Clay's name through history. 
Clay's approach to compromise, notes James Jasinski, was to seek moderation, or 
prudence, between the idioms of accommodation and audacity .19 When these two idioms 
are negotiated in ways that are appropriate for the situation, the resulting discourse seems 
to resolve the acute problems of a given controversy. In Clay's case, the positive side of 
moderation can be understood in a report printed by the Boston Courier, which stated 
that Clay "combines and directs the greatness of others, and thus, with whatever direction 
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he takes he moves with resistless might."20 Clay's adoring biographer from the 1850s, 
Calvin Colton, notes that "Clear and lucid reasoning claims great consideration, as a 
controlling attribute of his eloquence . . . Sentiment, with him, is always under discipline, 
and is often suppressed, to give more effect to the reasoning."21 Clay's reasoned and 
unsentimental approach to politics had the rhetorical impact of appreciating unity, an 
appeal with expansive reach in the growing U.S. republic.  
Yet, Clay's rhetorical tact of compromise invited claims of political opportunism 
or a lack of conviction on important issues.22 Some suggested that Clay was more of a 
"Great Pacificator" than a compromiser, as his rhetoric sublimated tensions and anxieties 
rather than uniting competing positions in enduring ways.23 For Clay's compromising to 
exude the aura of prudence, arguments could not smell of the politics of self-interest. As 
Eugene Garver rightly cautions, the problem with attempting compromise and acting 
prudently "is precisely to make it into something more than cleverness and 
opportunism."24 Clay was aware of the problems of shifty political positions, stating in a 
1842 speech in Lexington, "I think it is very perilous to the usefulness of any public man 
to make frequent changes of opinion . . . It draws around him distrust, impairs the public 
confidence, and lessens his capacity to serve his country."25 Although christened the 
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Great Compromiser, Clay recognized that compromise was not viable if seen in public as 
instability in opinion.   
Clay's development as a politician and orator depended upon his ability to adapt 
to situations and make the appropriate rhetorical gesture to achieve his desired political 
ends.26 Clay had quickly earned a reputation for his speaking abilities and his 
compromising approach to political affairs. The moderate rhetoric of political economy 
was not only well-known to Clay, but a strategy he mastered. Clay could adapt to 
situations, knew how to compromise, and had experience in political economic discourse. 
These talents helped Clay become Speaker of the House. As such, Clay's ethos suited the 
needs of the national colonization movement.  
 
Protectionism and Expansionism in Political Economic Discourse: 
Clay's Rhetorical Transformations  
Clay's political economic discourse highlighted his ability to navigate difficult 
rhetorical terrain. On national and international matters, Clay's speeches in Congress 
negotiated the politics of state, national, and international power. On issues of internal 
improvements and international engagement in particular, the debate was often divided 
between those who believed that U.S. interests were better served through protectionist 
policies and those who advocated that expansionist policies were the better option. A 
central feature of Clay's advocacy in Congress was his ability to rhetorically transform 
the tension between protectionism and expansionism within the confines of a speech. 
Clay's rhetorical transformations were not demonstrations of raw emotion, nor were his 
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appeals coldly rational. Rather, Clay harnessed the rhetorical potential of moderate 
rhetoric to build arguments from impartial judgment, common sense, and the plain style, 
while also imparting his rhetoric with an appropriate level of emotion.  
Colonization was a subject that would require Clay's abilities of rhetorical 
transformation. Clay's negotiation of protectionism and expansionism would help him 
tend to another clash of rhetorical movement: the security-morality tension. Clay's skill at 
rhetorical transformation before and after the colonization meeting suggests that such 
transformation could be achieved on the subject of colonization, particularly through his 
nationalistic appeal. In domestic and international affairs, Clay built and deployed 
nationalistic appeals through moderate rhetoric and, in so doing, transformed the tension 
between expansionism and protectionism. The nationalist appeal is first explored in its 
relationship to national affairs, specifically internal improvements. Then, the nationalistic 
appeal is seen in relation to the subject of international engagement. The nationalistic 
appeal is then briefly explored in time immediately following the colonization meeting.    
 
Rhetorical Transformation and Clay's Nationalistic Appeal in  
Domestic Affairs: Debating Internal Improvements  
Internal improvements (projects to create roads, build canals and railroads, 
improve ports) garnered congressional attention, but did not necessarily invite 
nationalistic appeals.27 State interests were the primary concern of elected 
representatives, with the benefits to the Union being a secondary consideration. To be 
                                                 
27 I am broadly defining internal improvements in this section as including issues of domestic 
manufacturing and trade. One reason to do so is that the issues were related inasmuch as better roads helped 
domestic industries, according to Clay. A second reason is that Clay's signature speeches on internal 
improvements were delivered after the colonization meeting. His early speaking had not yet coalesced 
around his bill for internal improvements.  
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sure, Clay's support of internal improvements had his state's interest in mind. He 
supported those projects because his constituents in Kentucky would benefit.  
 However, the manner in which Clay motivated support for internal improvements 
was not so provincial. Clay transformed internal improvements from a local to a national 
issue by forcing his audience to see the issue from the standpoint of others. In a speech on 
domestic manufactures, Clay made the issue less about policies and tariffs, and more 
about the people affected by government action. Clay posited manufacturing not as a 
faceless enterprise, but as a business run by American families. He stated, "There is a 
pleasure—a pride (if I may be allowed the expression, and I pity those who can not feel 
the sentiment), in being clad in the productions of our own families."28 Clay's familial 
metaphor made the subject of domestic manufactures resonate with the common social 
bond of family. From that common experience, then, Clay criticized the powers of 
judgment of those who could not feel that basic sense of pride in the productions of a 
family.   
The transformative move came when Clay extended his reasonable assessment 
about domestic manufactures and families to unite the country. Domestic manufactures 
was not just about families who produced clothing, but was about the preservation of 
American character. Clay "trust[ed] that the yeomanry of the country, the true and 
genuine landlords of this tenement, called the United States, disregarding her freaks, will 
persevere in reform, until the whole national family is furnished by itself with clothing 
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necessary for its own use."29 To get to this emotional flourish about "the whole national 
family," Clay transformed domestic manufacturing from an issue involving families 
(literally defined) to an issue involving larger, symbolic American family. By the end of 
the speech, Clay's reasoning moved domestic manufacturing from a protectionist policy 
and a state issue to a question of national unity.  
Clay's nationalistic appeal was also built upon the principles of common sense. 
Specifically, Clay used gendered and militaristic language to imbue his nationalistic 
appeal with prevailing ideologies. In one speech, Clay compared opponents of the 
domestic manufactures bill to a "flirting, flippant, noisy jade" woman. If "fantasies" of 
"dame Commerce" governed the reasoning of the Senate, he argued, "we shall never put 
off the muslins of India and the cloths of Europe."30 Women typically did not participate 
in the public sphere as many argued that women lacked the intellectual capabilities to 
govern. From the prevailing gender norms, Clay could easily relay the benefits of his 
masculine plan. Clay did as much, observing, "We have before us a proposition to afford 
a manly protection to the rights of commerce, and how it has been treated? Rejected!"31 
At the time, common sense dictated that in matters of state, a manly proposition was 
superior to a womanly one. The common sense of gender norms helped naturalize Clay's 
nationalistic appeal. 
Clay advocated protectionist policies that benefited manufacturing states. 
However, his appeal was not to the interest of individuals, but to the interest of the 
nation. The nationalistic appeal was built from impartial judgment and common sense 
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31 "Speech on Domestic Manufactures," March 26, 1810, in Clay, Papers, I: 463. 
141 
principles, and once solidly grounded, given a flourish of emotion to push the appeal 
beyond the previous terms of the debate. 
  
International Engagement Discourse before the Colonization Meeting:  
Clay's Moderate Balancing of Protection and Engagement 
In economic matters, Clay sought to insulate the United States from foreign 
influences in order to enhance U.S. strength. He argued that the United States could 
compete by focusing energies and monies inward. In international matters, however, 
Clay's nationalistic appeal was cast in a different light. If challenged by an international 
power, U.S. nationalism demanded engagement and not retreat. The use of the 
nationalistic appeal for expansion and not protection demonstrated the ability of Clay to 
elevate a variety of policies to the level of national concern. 
Demonstrating his position on international matters, before the war of 1812, Clay 
delivered a number of speeches in favor of increasing military forces. In one such speech, 
on December 31, 1811, Clay argued for an increased military force because, "The 
American character has been much abused by the Europeans, whose tourists, whether on 
horse on foot, in verse and prose, have united in deprecating it."32 Clay held fast to the 
belief that Americans should not fear their European antagonists and that the United 
States should respond to such abuse. Early in 1812, Clay advocated a response to the 
representatives who believed that an increase in the navy would lead to war. Clay stated,   
But the source of alarm is in ourselves. Gentlemen fear that if we provide a 
marine it will produce collisions with foreign nations; plunge us into war, and 
                                                 
32 "Amendment to, and Speech on, the Bill to Raise an Additional Military Force, December 31, 1811," in 
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ultimately overturn the Constitution of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid 
foreign collision you had better abandon the ocean surrender all your commerce; 
give up all your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of 
protection that involves you in war.33 
Clay offered a motive for international engagement rooted in Americanness. The "thing 
protected" that Clay referenced was the national character of the United States.   
Clay swiftly adapted old premises to new ends, as was the case when the 
"common sense" of gendered language was employed to motivate engagement, and not 
protection. With the United States fighting against the British, Clay again descended from 
the Speaker's chair, and spoke on a bill to raise an additional military force. Here again 
Clay compared the United States to other nations to boil the blood of American 
nationalists:   
We are told that England is a proud and lofty nation, which, disdaining to wait for 
danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once triumphed over her, and, if 
we do not listen to the counsels of timidity and despair, we shall again prevail. In 
such a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success 
but if we fail, let us fail like men, lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire 
together in one common struggle, fighting for seamen's rights and free trade.34 
Clay's scenario for entering the war exhibited the gendered and militarized language also 
used in his advocacy for internal improvements. Americans would fight "with the aid of 
Providence," and either "come out crowned with success" or "expire together in one 
common struggle." Claiming unity of purpose, masculine character, and the defense of 
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rights as on his side, Clay transcended the potential negative circumstances, leaving little 
room for opposition to the war. 
Clay advanced his nationalistic appeal, even in post-war discourse. At one of 
many dinners held in honor of U.S. commissioners, Clay responded to a toast in his honor 
by reflecting, "The immediate effects of the war were highly satisfactory. Abroad, our 
character, which at the time of its declaration was in the lowest state of degradation, is 
raised to the highest point of elevation . . . Government has thus acquired strength and 
confidence."35 Perception of the United States abroad vindicated the war and entrenched 
the conception of American character that had been used to rally support. Importantly, 
Clay's rehearsal of the nationalistic appeal demonstrated that its utility for international 
issues was not confined to wartime contexts. 
During January of 1816, Clay gave a number of speeches defending domestic 
issues that related to the second war with Britain. On the subject of a direct tax, 
opponents claimed that the war did nothing but leave the country with an enormous debt. 
Clay refuted the claim through the nationalistic appeal, stating, "A nation's character is 
the sum of its splendid deeds. They constitute one common patrimony—the nation's 
inheritance."36 In a debate concerning government payment for wartime losses, Clay 
provided a more philosophical argument appealing to the character of a nation. "Society," 
Clay argued, "was a compact between those who compose it, by which they agree that 
contributions for the common defence, shall be equal; and there ought to exist an 
obligation, by which those losses should be equally apportioned, to which individuals 
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were for a common object exposed."37 Although the debate had shifted from international 
engagement to the financial impact of the war, the nationalistic appeal could link the 
domestic and international, supporting protection or expansion.  
Clay's discourse on international matters depended upon a unified and elevated 
notion of American character similar to that found in his advocacy of internal 
improvements. Clay was Hawkish on international affairs and protectionist on domestic 
matters. Nonetheless, Clay could use the strategies of moderate rhetoric to make 
expansion or protection speak to national character. After the colonization meeting, Clay 
continued to refine his skill at rhetorical transformation and nationalistic appeals. 
 
Clay's Nationalistic Appeal after the Colonization Meeting 
Clay's nationalistic appeal reached a new height with his ability to transform the 
notion of "union" in his speeches. Clay recast union as a term relating to the business 
partnership of the states, while also drawing upon some of the emotive meanings of the 
term. On February 4, 1817—when Speaker of the House Clay stepped down from the 
chair to speak on his pending internal improvements bill—he surrounded the term union 
with the concerns of political economic discourse. Clay affirmed,  
With regard to the general importance of the proposition—the effect of internal 
 improvements in cementing the Union, in facilitating internal trade, in 
 augmenting the wealth and the population of the country, [I] would not consume 
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 the time of the committee [of the whole] in discussing those interesting 
 topics.38 
Although cementing the Union required taking-up arms, one could cement the Union 
through facilitating trade and thus, supporting internal improvements. 
 Responding to critics who believed internal improvements should be left to the 
states, Clay made the very practical argument in favor of a strong Union: "[I]f there were 
not various objects in which many states were interested, and which, requiring therefore 
their joint cooperation, would, it not taken by the general government, be neglected, 
either, for the want of resources, or from the difficulty of regulating their respective 
contributions?"39 Clay's response avoided unbridled appeals to union; rather, Clay made 
the relationship between internal improvements and union seem nearly self-evident, 
requiring little fiery rhetoric to make his case.  
 Even when playing upon the emotional meanings attached to union, Clay 
reminded the audience of the more moderate sense of the term. In an 1818 speech, Clay 
asked, "What was the object of the convention . . . in framing the constitution? The 
leading object was UNION." 40  Going forward, however, Clay posited a definition of 
union that was defined by the plain language of economic transactions and the more mild 
emotion of "prosperity." Clay opined,  
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Considering, as I do, the existence of the power as of the first importance, not 
merely as the preservation of the union of the states, paramount as that 
consideration ever should be over all others, but to the prosperity of every great 
interest of the country, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, in peace and in war, 
it becomes us solemnly, and deliberately, and anxiously, to examine the 
constitution and not to surrender it, if fairly to be collected from a just 
interpretation of that instrument.41  
Clay recognized the emotive potential of the term union, and yet he restrained that 
emotion by defining union in the moderate terms of political economy. 
 Clay's use of the nationalistic appeal before and after the colonization meeting 
revealed his ability to transform the tension of expansionism and protectionism. Such 
transformation was fashioned through the strategies of moderate rhetoric. The movement 
toward and achievement of a nationalistic appeal was constituted by Clay's performance 
of sound judgment, common sense, and an appropriate level of emotion. The moderate 
rhetoric that helped transform internal improvements into a significant national issue 
would serve the colonization project well, were such a rhetoric used at the meeting. 
 
Clay's Nationalistic Appeal at the Colonization Meeting: 
The Failure to Transform 
 Clay's deployment of the nationalistic appeal at the colonization meeting did not 
transform the issue of slavery beyond state-level considerations. Rather than developing 
the nationalistic appeal, Clay's speech implied that colonization was nationalistic, but did 
not rhetorically transform colonization within the speech. The claims he offered were 
                                                 
41 "Speech on Internal Improvements," March 13, 1818, in Clay, Papers, II: 468. 
147 
political economic in subject, but lacked the stability that moderate rhetoric could 
provide. Without the stable basis for his nationalistic claims, Clay could not establish the 
layer of appropriate emotion that his previous nationalistic appeals had warranted. 
Ultimately, colonization was defined as a national issue, but it was not transformed into a 
national issue.  
 
The Nationalistic Appeal and the Failure to  
Transform Colonization into a National Issue 
 In one attempt to define the national significance of colonization, Clay 
coordinated the language of morality discourse with the language of security discourse. 
Clay began: "There was a peculiar, a moral fitness in restoring them [African slaves] to 
the land of their fathers" (25). Acting in accordance with moral fitness, then, 
congressional support for colonization would "extinguish a great portion of that moral 
debt which she has contracted" with the continent of Africa (29). Describing the United 
States' "moral debt" with Africa brought together the notion of "morality"—a symbol 
associated with pathetic rhetoric of the time—and the overarching assumption that slaves 
were chattel and not human—conveyed through the concept of "debt," invoking the 
instrumental dimension of rhetoric. The combination of pathetic and instrumental rhetoric 
would, it seemed, suggest that colonization could be supported by the national purse. 
 Yet, Clay's appeal lacked the transformative quality of his nationalistic appeals 
for internal improvements. To begin, the language of debt and contract failed to move the 
issue of colonization from the realm of an individual issue to a national issue. As a "debt" 
to Africa, only those who had acquired "property" were participants in the transaction. To 
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repay this debt, then, would not be a concern of those who did not hold slaves. The 
incorporation of the term "moral" only further confused the economic metaphor. The 
concept of a moral debt expanded beyond colonization and, for many advocates 
associated with morality discourse, its repayment would only be made in full through 
immediate emancipation of all slaves, not just free blacks. Participants in security 
discourse could similarly find fault in Clay's logic, as it seemed to place a debtor's burden 
upon those who held slaves. Bringing together the morality and security discourses as he 
did, Clay cobbled together a claim for the national support of colonization that did not 
transform the issue. Instead, it stayed true to the commitments of security and morality 
discourses of the time. 
Clay also attempted to claim the nationalistic appeal of colonization through a 
historical comparison with other nations. In his opening remarks, Clay described the 
colonization of fugitive slaves from Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone in the post-American 
Revolution years. Given Clay's nationalistic claims in defense of the American 
character—his speech on domestic manufactures being one such example—one would 
expect Clay to rally Americans to prove their worth against known international powers, 
such as Great Britain. Instead, Sierra Leone (a British colony) was an example of the 
nobility of the cause of colonization, a cause that would both rid the country of a 
"dangerous" population and bring redemption from ignorance to those colonized (40). 
Clay seemed to address the security-morality tension, recognizing that colonization 
would both remove a dangerous population and enlighten a degraded class of people.  
However, in the example of Sierra Leone, Clay's nationalistic appeal assembled 
pieces of security and morality discourses, but not in a manner that transformed the issue 
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for the audience. To begin, the premise for his argument was a contestable one and not 
based upon impartial judgment or common sense. The "dangerous" free black population 
was solidly an issue for slaveholders, whose primary concern was with the maintenance 
of the slave system and the containment of any hostilities that the system invited. 
Furthermore, contributors to morality discourse would argue that the resolution of such a 
danger could be easily and cheaply solved through the abolition of slavery. Noting that 
another nation state had embarked on colonization, Clay attempted to transfer the 
credibility of one project into a U.S. national context. The reasoning that supported this 
move was, however, not transformative. Colonization had been accomplished by another 
nation, but that did not give colonization the feel of nationalism.  
 
The Nationalistic Appeal and the Failure to  
Transform Colonization into an International Issue 
Just as Clay failed to make colonization seem like an internal program to better 
the nation, he also failed to make a case for colonization as a matter of international 
significance for the United States. Clay's international expansionism was about the 
protection of the American character. Clay argued that by colonizing free blacks to 
Africa, "[A]mple provision might be made for the colony itself, and it might be rendered 
instrumental to the introduction, into that extensive quarter of the globe, of the arts, 
civilization, and Christianity" (23-25). Clay's claim aligned with the pathetic rhetoric of 
morality discourse, but lacked the nationalistic appeal that motivated previous efforts in 
favor of international expansion. As such, the claim skewed toward the motivations of 
morality discourse. Even more, the pathetic appeals of the time argued for the same 
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advantages, except they applied to all blacks and would be immediate. Although Clay's 
claim exuded a degree of benevolence, it did not move beyond the terms of the security-
morality tension.  
Consider a previous Clay speech in which he invoked Christian values to motivate 
international action. Regarding the second war with Great Britain, Clay argued, "In such 
a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success but if we 
fail, let us fail like men, lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one 
common struggle, fighting for seamen's rights and free trade."42 Clay used the power of 
divine Providence as an argument for Americans to unequivocally support the war. No 
such divine thrust was conveyed by Clay in his opening remarks. Instead, Clay simply 
asserted a Christian purpose.  
 Clay also failed to curry the emotions of Americans by comparing the lack of U.S. 
colonization efforts with attempts by other nations. At the meeting, Clay observed, "We 
should derive much encouragement in the prosecution of the object which had assembled 
us together, by the success which had attended the colony of Sierra Leone" (30-32). 
Then, Clay set forth a brief explanation of how the British colony of Sierra Leone was 
established. Clay described,  
 That establishment had commenced about 20 or 25 years ago, under the patronage 
 of private individuals in Great Britain. The basis of the population of the colony 
 consisted of the fugitive slaves from the southern states during the Revolutionary 
 war, who had been first carried to Nova Scotia, and who afterwards, about the 
 year 1792, upon their own application, almost in mass, had been transported to the 
 western coast of Africa (32-37). 
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Curiously absent from this description was a sense of how Americans should feel toward 
these efforts. Clay seemed neither praiseworthy nor admonitory toward the United States' 
former antagonist. Should Americans also look to colonization to not be outdone by their 
former foe? Or, should Americans be motivated because the results of the Sierra Leone 
colony were overwhelmingly positive?  
 In his answer to the last question, Clay seemed only to further muddle the 
potential emotional level of his message. Clay described Sierra Leone as "struggling with 
the most unheard of difficulties—difficulties resulting from the ignorance, barbarity and 
prejudices of the natives; from the climate (which were, however, found not at all 
insurmountable;—from wars, African as well as European; and such as are incidental to 
all new settlements)" (37-41; parentheses in original). This description was perhaps 
Clay's most vivid in all of his opening remarks, which demonstrated the lack of balance 
in Clay's attempt to motivate colonization as a moderate endeavor. Given the significance 
of the problems faced by Sierra Leone colonists that Clay described, one would expect 
him to offer a powerful rationale to legitimize such struggle. Instead, Clay went on to 
state that Sierra Leone "has made a gradual and steady progress, until it has acquired a 
strength and stability which promises to crown the efforts of its founders with complete 
success" (41-43) To put a dull point to it, Clay concludes this line of reason by stating, 
"We have their experience before us" (43).  
 Considering Clay's previous arguments for international engagement, his 
discussion of Sierra Leone failed to use moderate rhetoric to establish a sound basis, 
which also limited any emotional appeals to his support of colonization. Clay's less-than-
ideal description of the Sierra Leone colony was not redeemed or overcome by a more 
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powerful appeal, such as the recent victory over the very nation (Great Britain) that 
established the Sierra Leone colony. Ultimately, Clay's move to use Sierra Leone as a 
way to motivate support for colonization was marred by a lack of emotion to balance the 
reason-based description he provided. 
 Concerning colonization and international engagement, Clay had many 
opportunities to develop an appropriate emotional appeal to work in concert with his 
appeals to reason. On the religious aspects of colonization, Clay avoided the use of 
powerful religious language to add pathos to his logos. On the comparison to colonization 
efforts to Sierra Leone, Clay provided little definition of how the United States should 
see the British efforts on a similar project. On matters related to the character of the 
meeting, Clay deferred the authority of the meeting to the audience rather than asserting 
his own substantial credibility on matters of international significance. As a matter of 
international engagement, then, Clay provided little that would match his previous 
rhetorical efforts on such subjects.  
Situating Clay's colonization meeting remarks within the context of his 
nationalistic appeals for internal improvements and international engagement, Clay's 
performance demonstrated his failure to transform the debate on colonization. Clay did 
not transform colonization from a state issue, where colonization efforts had previously 
been based, into a national issue. Clay could make the arguments for colonization that 
connected with security or morality discourses; yet, in doing so, he relied upon the 
limiting rhetorical strategies based within security and morality discourses. Absent 
rhetorical transformation, Clay's nationalistic appeal was nothing more than a patchwork 
of competing motivations.  
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Understanding Clay's Failed Nationalistic Appeal: 
The Letters of "Scaevola" and the Transformational Struggle 
Part of Clay's failure to transform colonization can be associated with his unclear 
rhetorical approach to slavery prior to the meeting. The colonization meeting provided 
him with an opportunity to offer clarity to the issue. In terms of his ability to transform 
other issues through his nationalistic appeal, the speech was a failure. To fully understand 
Clay's motivational efforts toward colonization requires as look into Clay's "pseudo-
public" discourse on the issue of slavery. The letters written by "Scaevola," a pseudonym 
of Clay's, reveal that even with identity masked, Clay struggled with the rhetorical 
motivations of slavery. Ultimately, in public and in private, the great statesman and orator 
Henry Clay could not find a way to reconcile nation and slavery, for or against. The 
subject confounded his rhetorical abilities.  
 
Clay's Pseudonymous Critique of Slavery: 
The Public Letters of Scaevola   
Prior to the colonization meeting, Clay's rhetorical approach to slavery was 
mixed. In his personal life, Clay emancipated some of his slaves as early as 1808, and 
continued to emancipate and colonize slaves until his death in 1852.43 From his arrival on 
the national political scene to the colonization meeting, however, Clay had said very little 
in public affairs about the issue of slavery. In fact, Clay became most associated with 
slavery as a result of his role in the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the Compromise of 
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1850, and to a lesser extent, as co-counsel with Daniel Webster in the Supreme Court 
case Groves v. Slaughter (1841).44 Colonization and his work on legislative compromises 
defined Clay as a mediator concerned with balancing the needs of the nation to maintain 
a union. Despite his later work on the issue, Clay's pre-1816 congressional discourse on 
slavery was virtually non-existent. 
Two of Clay's public letters, written pseudonymously as "Scaevola," were Clay's 
most substantial discourses on slavery.45 Both letters—published in the Lexington 
Kentucky Gazette—addressed the subject of revising the Kentucky constitution. The first 
letter (published April 25, 1798) established the need for Kentucky to call a convention to 
revise the state constitution and argued that gradual emancipation ought to be included in 
the new document. The other letter (published on February 28, 1799) responded to critics 
and defended the need for gradual emancipation to be included in the new constitution.  
The letters of Scaevola demonstrate Clay's deep uncertainty about slavery. At the 
policy level, the letters argued for gradual emancipation. At the colonization meeting, 
Clay outrightly rejected that emancipation would be a part of the discussion. Even more 
interesting, however, was Clay's inability to create a cogent appeal appropriate to his 
moderate aims. In the letters, Clay struggled with finding a way to bring together the 
moderation of "gradual" with the more radical "emancipation. Thus, even with the 
relative security of anonymity, Clay struggled to motivate a policy on slavery.  
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Clay's insecurity was generated, in part, because of the conflict between the vivid 
description of slavery's evils and his advocacy for gradual, and not immediate, 
emancipation. In the first letter Clay provided a visceral account of the inhumanity of 
slavery, the full text of which read: 
Can any humane man be happy and contented when he sees near thirty thousand 
of his fellow beings around him, deprived of all the rights which makes life 
desireable, transferred like cattle from the possession of one to another; when he 
sees the trembling slave, under the hammer, surrounded by a number of eager 
purchasers, and feeling all the emotions which arise when one is uncertain into 
whose tyrannic hands he must next fall; when he beholds the anguish and hears 
the piercing cries of husbands separated from wives and children from parents; 
when, in a word, all the tender and endearing ties of nature are broken asunder 
and disregarded; and when he reflects that no gradual mode of emancipation is 
adopted either for these slaves of their posterity, doubling their number every 
twenty-five years. To suppose the people of Kentucky, enthusiasts as they are in 
the cause of liberty, could be contented and happy under circumstances like these, 
would be insulting their good sense.46 
The rich detail of Clay's description was startling, as it was sentimentally definitive—
meaning Clay left no room to negotiate the humanity of slavery. The descriptions were 
also unique because they were not consistent with Clay's rhetorical corpus prior to or 
immediately after the letters were published. With such a powerful indictment of slavery, 
the only answer would seem to be immediate emancipation. 
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 Yet, Clay failed to make the ultimate claim for immediate emancipation. Instead, 
Clay's solution in both the 1798 and 1799 public letters was gradual emancipation. In the 
February 1799 letter, Clay wrote, "Justice and policy both recommend a gradual 
emancipation," an approach which did not necessarily address the inexplicable ills of 
slavery. 47 Clay's second letter demanded that "a constitution which ought to embrace 
fundamental eternal principles, should be confined to the enumeration and distribution of 
power."48 Yet, his adherence to such principles was clearly mediated by practical 
considerations. "[A]lthough rights are immutable," wrote Clay, "cases may be conceived 
in which the enjoyment of them is improper." Such cases, for Clay, were endemic in 
proposals for immediate emancipation, where "[t]hirty thousand slaves, without property, 
without principle, let loose upon the society would be wretched themselves and render 
others miserable."49 In a moment of twisted logic, then, Clay concluded, "that a man may 
advocate a gradual and oppose an immediate emancipation (as is actually the case,) upon 
principle."50 The principle of which Clay wrote was the protection of white security in 
Kentucky, not the universal principles of freedom, liberty, or justice. Nevertheless, Clay's 
proclamation of limiting rights as principles attempted to maintain moral rightness. 
Reading the two public letters of Clay qua Scaevola illustrates Clay's insecurity 
and inconsistency on the issue of slavery. On the one hand, the mask of Scaevola 
afforded Clay the necessary cover to make bold public statements about the horrors of 
slavery. Even in Kentucky—a state where slavery did not have the deep historical roots 
                                                 
47 [Scaevola], "To the Citizens of Fayette," February, 1799, in Clay, Papers, II: 12. 
 
48 [Scaevola], "To the Citizens of Fayette," February, 1799, in Clay, Papers, II: 13. 
 
49 [Scaevola], "To the Citizens of Fayette," February, 1799, in Clay, Papers, II: 14. 
 
50 [Scaevola], "To the Citizens of Fayette," February, 1799, in Clay, Papers, II: 14. 
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as in Virginia or South Carolina—Clay's description of slavery would have met strong 
opposition from the elite, white, voting public. The benefit of anonymity for Clay was 
evident in the absence of such sweeping, emotional claims about the humanity of slavery 
in Clay's public discourse. On the other hand, Clay's public letters fit well within his 
developing persona as a compromiser. Even with authorship concealed Clay failed to 
argue for immediate emancipation. One could explain Clay's inconsistency on slavery 
differently and argue that Clay's prudence, his balancing of situational factors with 
enduring principles, would not allow for such an audacious approach despite his own 
depiction of the inhumanity slavery. Yet, if that were the case, then there would be no 
reason for his relative silence on the issue. A survey of Clay's public remarks from the 
turn of the nineteenth century until the colonization meeting reveals few mentions of 
slavery, let alone descriptions of the institution in such vivid terms.51 
 
Scaevola at the Colonization Meeting 
 Clay's inconsistent rhetorical approach to slavery gained expression through 
statements that asserted the strange social position of free blacks in the United States. 
"That class, of the mixt population of our country, was peculiarly situated," Clay noted, 
"They neither enjoyed the immunities of freemen, nor were they subject to the 
incapacities of slaves, but partook in some degree of the qualities of both" (14-17).52 
                                                 
51 Clay's discourse continued to embody inconsistency on the subject of slavery, at one moment defending 
in court eight blacks who were unjustly kept in slavery after being promised freedom upon their master's 
death; and at another moment proposing that a Kentucky bill include provisions that would limit to two 
years the time in which blacks could bring suit for their freedom. See "Motion Relating to Freedom Claims 
of Certain Slaves," December 29, 1807, in Clay, Papers, I: 312. 
 
52 The minutes of the meeting on colonization have been transcribed and appear in Appendix I of this 
project. All references to Clay's introductory remarks refer to line numbers of in Appendix I. 
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Clay's description of free blacks as neither free nor slaves reflected Clay's own insecurity 
about the subject of slavery.  
 Writing as Scaevola, Clay described the horrors of slavery, but then only 
suggested gradual emancipation as the cure. Clay's reasoning in support of gradual 
emancipation was the same as his reasoning for colonization: both were grounded in 
reason at the expense of emotion. Motivated by the dilemma created by the social 
position of the free black in the United States, Clay offered the following assessment: 
"From their condition, and the unconquerable prejudices resulting from their color, they 
never could amalgamate with the free whites of this country. It was desirable, therefore, 
both as it respected them, and the residue of the population of the country, to drain them 
off" (17-20). Clay's logic was consistent with his writings as Scaevola, for in neither 
context was Clay willing to let the practical considerations of the social elites be 
overcome by emotional claims against slavery.  
 In the brief instance in which Clay did allow a vivid description to creep into his 
opening remarks, it worked in the service of a reasonable point. In one such instance, 
Clay described slavery as "the evils and sufferings which we had been the innocent cause 
of inflicting upon the inhabitants of Africa" (26-28). Although Clay recognized that 
slavery was evil and created suffering, the claim was curtailed by the assertion that "we" 
(white political elites) were innocent inflictors of that suffering. Another use of vivid 
description that might invite emotional appeal was through another description of the free 
black population. Unlike before, where Clay described free blacks as "peculiarly 
situated," Clay went on to depict free blacks in far more hostile terms. Clay asked the 
assemblage, "[C]an there be a nobler cause than that which whilst it proposes to rid our 
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own country of a useless and pernicious, if not dangerous portion of its population, 
contemplates the spreading of the arts of civilized life and possible redemption from 
ignorance and barbarism of a benighted quarter of the globe[?]" (43-47). Without the 
mask of anonymity that "Scaevola" provided, Clay offered less critical observations on 
the practice of slavery. Yet, the struggle to find a means to motivate colonization 
remained the same. 
 In Clay's writings as Scaevola, there was at least the hint of the evils of slavery 
and the possibility of emancipation. Such potential was eliminated in his colonization 
meeting remarks, most explicitly when Clay clarified, "It was not proposed to deliberate 
upon, or consider at all, any question of emancipation, or that was connected with the 
abolition of slavery. It was upon that condition alone, [Clay] was sure, that many 
gentlemen from the south and the west, whom he saw present, had attended, or could be 
expected to co-operate" (50-54). On the subject of slavery, Clay avoided the emotional 
aspects of his previous writings that worked to criticize the conditions of slavery. Even 
more, when emotion did enter his speech, it only reinforced the assumptions within 
security discourses on slavery. Clay did little more than reinforce the security arguments 
against free blacks and in doing so, failed to find a way to broaden the appeal of 
colonization  to make it a program that Congress would need to support. 
 
Conclusion 
In 1816, one could hardly imagine a more fitting and capable speaker to open the 
colonization meeting. The discourse on slavery had been becoming increasingly tense, 
but Clay had previously demonstrated that he could manage difficult rhetorical situations. 
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Even more, Clay seemed to manage those situations with the attention to reasoning and 
process that had helped assuage the tensions of slavery in political economic discourse. 
At the colonization meeting, however, Clay faltered. His speech failed to transform the 
clashing instrumental and pathetic strategies into a unifying rhetorical appeal that could 
motivate a national movement for colonization. 
Internal improvements, international engagement, and slavery were different 
issues replete with unique circumstances to consider. In this sense, Clay could not deliver 
the same speech on each issue. Still, Clay's rhetorical approaches to all three issues do 
reveal some similarities in how he chose to make the argument for a given policy's 
inclusion in the congressional arena. One similarity that runs throughout these arguments 
was Clay's creation of unity through transformative appeals. On domestic and 
international issues, Clay framed the issue in relation to nationalism. Although Clay used 
the American character to reach seemingly opposite conclusions (i.e., protectionist trade 
policies and military engagement), the impact of the discourse was the same: to unite his 
audience through an appreciation of shared American values and experiences. 
Transformative appeals were even evident in his "Scaevola" letters, in his appeals to 
humanity as a reason to gradually emancipate. Even in moments where Clay attempted to 
mitigate the scope of his transformative appeals—as when he argued that one could both 
support gradual emancipation and oppose immediate emancipation on principle—he 
sought the affirmation of enduring principles.  
A second similarity in Clay's rhetorical approach to national issues is found in 
what he did not attempt to argue. Specifically, Clay's rhetorical approach did not 
explicitly rely on divisive or dissociative tactics. Clay's nationalistic appeal went 
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unqualified by the speaker. Despite the veneer of unity, other parts of Clay's speaking 
suggested that American character was constituted by masculine white men. When 
dissociation was used by Clay—as was the case when he argued against immediate 
emancipation—he validated the claim by calling it principled. Exclusion was certainly 
part of the context of Clay's speaking, with some unstated premises likely circulating 
amongst Clay's congressional audience. That said, Clay generally did not make such 
limitations clear, instead, he allowed claims about national character, unity, and 
principles to resonate without restriction. 
Thirdly, throughout the discourse on many different issues Clay created 
permeable boundaries, relating domestic issues to international, and vice versa. Fighting 
Great Britain was an act to protect the United States' manufacturing and export industries. 
Better canals and roads would lead to a stronger defense of U.S. lands. Immediate 
emancipation was unwise because freed slaves would not have land or property and thus, 
they would be miserable. Clay's fluid connection of issues was illustrative of his broader 
approach to national issues leading up to the colonization meetings  
 Clay's coalescence of rhetorical strategies on national issues prior to the 
colonization meeting would seem to suggest he would employ a similar approach in order 
to argue for colonization. In his remarks, Clay advanced common arguments for 
colonization, such as the inability of free blacks to assimilate and the benefits for free 
blacks as well as elite whites. In making these arguments Clay did nothing more than 
provide reasons that had previously been used to support colonization. Moreover, Clay's 
remarks were not guided by transcendent values, such as national pride, unity, or 
principles. Rather than appealing "up" to values or ideas that transcend time and 
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circumstance, Clay's remarks portray colonization as a moderate endeavor justified 
through individualistic appeals. As such, Clay did not call upon the rhetorical strategies 
used in his advocacy for other issues for which he sought national attention. 
 By 1816, Clay was a well known speaker and politician whose talents were called 
upon to help make colonization a national reality. Within the context of Clay's abilities 
and his political discourses prior to the colonization meeting, the flow of his appeals were 
not channeled into the colonization meeting. Although Clay has long been called the 
Great Compromiser, his discourse at the time of the colonization reveals an unapologetic 
unionist orator who made nearly every issue about the good of the nation. Clay's remarks 
at the colonization meeting failed to make such connections, delivering instead a speech 
of typical arguments concerning colonization. If Clay was to bring something more to the 
colonization meeting, such a rhetorical character above and beyond his good name, he 
failed to do so in his speech. Thus, at the conclusion of his remarks, the rhetorical 





ELIAS B. CALDWELL'S FEATURED ADDRESS AT THE  
COLONIZATION MEETING:  
BENEVOLENCE AND THE FAILURE TO TRANSCEND  
 On January 2, 1817, the Maryland Gazette reported that a meeting of "numerous 
and respectable" participants had assembled in Georgetown to consider the creation of a 
colony of free blacks. The Gazette noted that the meeting's "proceedings [were] fraught 
with interest." The newspaper promised that complete proceedings of the meeting would 
be published at a later date, but saw it fit to convey that "the hon. Henry Clay" served as 
chair and that "Elias B. Caldwell, Esq., in a speech of considerable length, developed the 
views of the friends of the project."1 Indeed, the Gazette's observation of Caldwell's 
speech being "of considerable length" was not surprising, as it was Caldwell who was 
assigned the task of articulating the weighty purpose of this new national organization.  
 Caldwell framed his speech with political economic ends in mind, as he conveyed 
the policy of colonization by addressing its expediency and practicability (69).2 Caldwell 
considered the expediency of colonization "in reference to its [colonization] influence on 
our civil institutions, on the morals and habits of the people, and on the future happiness 
of the free people of colour" (71-72). The topic of practicability was divided into three 
parts: " The territory—the expense—and the probability of obtaining their [free blacks'] 
                                                 
1 Maryland Gazette and Political Advertiser, January 2, 1817, n.p. 
 
2 The expedient and the practical, George Kennedy reminds us, were the basic policy topics in ancient 
formulations of deliberative oratory. George A. Kennedy, "Focusing of Arguments in Greek Deliberative 
Oratory," Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 90 (1959): 131. 
      All references to Caldwell's speech will be made parenthetically and refer to line numbers in the version 
of the speech found in Appendix I to the present project.  
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consent" (111-12). Dividing the expediency and practicability topics pointed to a few of 
the many issues that needed to be addressed before colonization could be reasonably 
elevated to a nationally-supported policy. 
 In addition to the array of colonization-specific topics Caldwell needed to cover, 
the overarching discursive pressures of security and morality also demanded attention. 
Security and morality discourses began to split along sectional lines, with pro-slavery 
Southerners employing the instrumental appeals of security discourse and Northerners 
using the pathetic appeals of morality discourse to oppose slavery. To frame colonization 
as a project worthy of legislative support, Caldwell needed to create an appeal that would 
connect with Northerners and Southerners, and that would address the topics of 
expediency and practicability. Political economic discourse, with its emphasis on the 
moderate dimensions of rhetoric, offered many advantages to Caldwell. But, as we saw 
with Henry Clay's opening remarks, the use of moderate rhetoric placed tremendous 
pressure on the rhetor to demonstrate sound reasoning to overcome the discursive tension 
and motivate colonization at the national level. If Clay could not overcome the security-
morality tension, one was left to wonder how Caldwell, a man with less political and 
rhetorical experience, could fair better. Thus, turning the attention to the featured address 
at the meeting, the question that looms large is this:  Within the context of Caldwell's 
deliberative purpose and the discursive tensions of slavery, how did Caldwell motivate 
support for colonization?  
 Caldwell's featured address at the colonization meeting attempted to overcome the 
security-morality tension and motivate support for colonization through the use of 
moderate rhetorical appeals. Caldwell attempted to offer arguments relating to 
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expediency and practicability that spoke to both Northern and Southern audiences. On its 
face, Caldwell's speech seemed to overcome the discursive tension of slavery by using 
both the instrumental and pathetic dimensions of rhetoric that had become increasingly 
antagonistic in regards to slavery. Specifically, Caldwell's moderate rhetoric found voice 
in his use of the concept of benevolence, a notion that was generally understood in 
positive terms, but was sufficiently flexible in meaning to offer a broad appeal. Caldwell 
exploited the rhetorical flexibility of benevolence in order to show that colonization was 
a program amenable to various (and often conflicting) discourses and audiences.  
Although Caldwell's use of benevolence seemed to highlight the moderate 
dimension of rhetoric to motivate colonization, this chapter ultimately argues that 
Caldwell's use of benevolence failed to offer a wide-reaching motivation for colonization. 
Caldwell's use of benevolence failed to transcend the discursive tensions of the time, 
connecting with the two competing discourses, but not providing a rhetorical strategy that 
could overcome the force of either the instrumental or pathetic dimensions of rhetoric. 
 To that end, the first section of this chapter shows how Caldwell used 
benevolence as an attempt to unite the security and morality discourses in favor of 
colonization. The second section engages in a deeper rhetorical understanding of 
Caldwell's use of benevolence, explicating how his use of benevolence falls short of the 
transcendent possibility of moderate rhetoric. The conclusion reflects upon Caldwell's 
successes and shortcomings as they relate to motivating colonization as a national 




Attempting Discursive Reconciliation through Benevolence:  
Caldwell's Featured Address 
 Caldwell's use of benevolence to support colonization was a fitting choice in the 
context of nineteenth century U.S. political culture. Benevolence was a laudable trait that 
received attention within different rhetorical traditions. As this section will discuss, the 
concept of benevolence gained authority from both secular and religious rhetorical 
traditions in U.S. society. After briefly discussing both rhetorical traditions, Caldwell's 
featured address is understood in terms of its use of the multifaceted concept of 
benevolence to overcome the discursive tension of the time. 
   
The Rhetorical Power of Benevolence:  
Secular and Religious Traditions 
Benevolence was important in two different rhetorical traditions impacting early-
nineteenth century U.S. public discourse: the Scottish Enlightenment and the Great 
Awakening. These distinct intellectual traditions help to explain how benevolence might 
connect with slaveholders from the South (with their instrumental concerns of white 
security) as well as with anti-slavery advocates from the North (with their pathetic 
concerns of the morality of slavery).   
In the Scottish Enlightenment tradition, benevolence was defined by the field of 
moral philosophy and driven by the science of faculty psychology. Faculty psychologists 
believed that the brain was comprised of certain regions, each containing a certain faculty 
or appetite. Thomas Reid, a Scottish moral philosopher, argued that there were three 
classifications of human faculties: the mechanical (involuntary reflexes), the animal 
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(instinctive desires, which included "affections," or emotions), and the rational 
(conscience and self interest).3 The most intellectually capable humans possessed and 
cultivated the highest order of the faculties, the rational. The rational faculty was defined 
in terms of humans' place in the great chain of beings. As Daniel Walker Howe elegantly 
described, "Mankind lived in a middle state, part of nature yet above it—both body and 
spirit, animal and divine, neither all good nor all evil."4 Maintaining one's position of 
middleness, or moderation, was important to demonstrating that one was neither beast nor 
god. When a person allowed certain faculties to get out of control—particularly those 
faculties defined as "passions" or "affections"—then the person violated the harmony of 
human nature.  
The Enlightenment conceptualization of benevolence reflected the tradition's 
overall emphasis on moderation. At its core, benevolence required an individual to 
recognize the suffering of another. David Hume defined benevolence as "the appetite, 
which attends love, is a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd and an aversion to 
his misery."5 Benevolence was complicated by the question of how the person came to 
recognize the suffering. Using Hume as an example, his A Treatise of Human Nature 
posited benevolence as arising in two ways. First, benevolence may arise from the feeling 
of sympathy. In this scenario a person practices disinterested benevolence because their 
own benefit is not considered. Second, benevolence may be the outcome of self-concern. 
In this scenario a person's own feeling of pleasure or pain will lead to the same feeling for 
                                                 
3 Thomas Reid, "Essays on the Active Powers of Man," in William Hamilton, ed., The Works of Thomas 
Reid: Volume II, 6th ed. (Edinburgh: Maclachlen and Stewart, 1863), 543, 551, 572, 579. 
 
4 Daniel Walker Howe, Making the American Self: Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 64. 
 
5 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975), 382. 
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another.6 The ability for benevolence to arise out of selflessness or self-interest allowed a 
broad range of circumstances in which a person might reasonably claim an action as an 
act of benevolence. 
The concept of benevolence was also significant in British North American 
religious traditions. In the 1740s, the Great Awakening preachers and specifically, 
Jonathan Edwards, emphasized the notion of "disinterested benevolence" as the key to 
salvation. For Edwards, disinterested benevolence was a sentiment displayed by the 
chosen people. Almost forty years later, Samuel Hopkins refashioned benevolence as the 
creation of the greatest good for the greatest number of people.7 Another strand of 
religious benevolence came from the Quaker tradition. Quakers were the first religious 
sect to denounce slavery. Their benevolent actions spread beyond the Church. Sydney 
James, writing of Quaker benevolence in the eighteenth century, states, "Benevolence, for 
Friends, was, after all, an attitude toward outsiders."8  
Selflessness was a far more important motivation in religious conceptions of 
benevolence rather than self-interest.; however, strands of self-interest ran throughout 
religious discourses. In a sermon on providence, Hopkins preached, "This is a doctrine of 
divine revelation, and most agreeable to reason, to wisdom, and benevolence; and they 
who exercise these, in any good degree, must be pleased with it."9 Hopkins' grouping of 
                                                 
6 Hume, Treatise, 385-88, 384. See also, Rico Vitz, "Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume's Moral 
Psychology," Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (2004): 261-275. 
 
7 William Warren Sweet, Religion in the Development of American Culture, 1765-1840 (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Son's, 1952), 236n2. 
 
8 Sydney V. James, A People Among Peoples: Quaker Benevolence in Eighteenth-Century America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), x. 
 
9 Samuel Hopkins, Twenty-One Sermons on a Variety of Interesting Subjects, Sentimental and Practical 
(Salem, RI: Printed by Joshua Cushing, 1803), 287. 
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reason, wisdom, and benevolence suggested that benevolence was a rational faculty (like 
reason and wisdom) and that a person who exercised benevolence could find pleasure—a 
self-interested feeling—in the doctrine Hopkins advanced. Thus, religious benevolence 
focused more intently on the good of others, but self-interest still found some expression 
within this tradition. 
The Enlightenment and religious formulations of benevolence illustrate the 
rhetorical potential that this concept provided a rhetor in Caldwell's situation. 
Benevolence was understood in both traditions to be a positive concept; therefore, 
arguments that appealed to benevolence would not be dismissed because of the concept's 
negative connotations. Yet, benevolence provided multiple motivational dimensions, 
meaning that an appeal to benevolence could be reasonably employed by a speaker 
whose self-interest was served by the act of benevolence.   
In the discourses on slavery, benevolence provided a locus of moderate rhetorical 
action beyond the legislative arena. Like the concept of impartial judgment that 
developed within the moderate rhetoric of political economy, the disinterested or selfless 
dimensions of benevolence demonstrated the rationality of a rhetor. Both the 
Enlightenment and religious traditions preferred the selfless orientation of benevolence, 
but both also provided grounds for a benevolent person to act with some semblance of 
self-interest. Importantly, the balancing of self-interest and selflessness coincided with 
the basic positions within security and morality discourse. Generally, security discourses 
focused on the interests of slaveholders and elite whites. Morality discourses more 
frequently expressed concern for the life and humanity of slaves. The potential for 
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benevolence to bridge the security and morality discourses would validate its usage at the 
colonization meeting.  
 
Benevolence in Caldwell's Argument for Colonization: 
Balancing Self-Interest and Selflessness through Moderate Rhetoric 
 Taking the floor, Caldwell offered the perfunctory introduction that expressed 
humility and reluctance that was the norm for men of elite standing (Clay made a similar 
overture). Demurring, Caldwell stated that "he had hoped that the task of bringing 
forward the business of this day would have devolved on some person better qualified 
than himself for this purpose, and with greater claims to the public attention" (60-63). 
Caldwell's humility did not stop him from describing the advantages of colonization. To 
that end, Caldwell's use of benevolence highlighted the moderate dimension of rhetoric to 
motivate support for colonization. Throughout his speech, Caldwell defined colonization 
as a benevolent act by appealing to the moderating feature of selflessness. At key 
moments, however, Caldwell inflected his benevolent claims about expediency and 
practicability with self-interest in order to attend to potential conflicts between security or 
morality discourses.  
 
The Expediency of Colonization,  
Benevolence, and Moderate Rhetoric  
 Caldwell addressed the expediency of colonization in two moves. The first move 
demonstrated the selfless motivations that compelled colonizationists to act. Caldwell 
founded the selflessness of whites in history. The presence of free people of color, 
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Caldwell opined, "[H]as been a subject of unceasing regret, and anxious solicitude, 
among many of our best patriots and wisest statesman from the first establishment of our 
independence" (72-74). The problem being long pondered by "our best patriots and 
wisest statesmen" placed colonizationists in esteemed company. The duration of the 
struggle—since American independence—demonstrated the long-standing battle in 
which colonizationists were selflessly engaged. Caldwell elevated the selflessness of 
colonizationists by openly recognizing the natural rights appeal of morality discourse. 
Caldwell observed, "We say, in the Declaration of Independence, 'that all men are created 
equal,' and have certain 'inalienable rights'" (76-77). Caldwell framed the problem of free 
blacks in the United States in terms that expressed the selfless commitment of 
colonizationists. 
 If Caldwell pursued this line of argument (i.e., the pathetic rhetoric of equality 
and rights), it would place the motivation for colonization squarely within the anti-
slavery leaning morality discourse. To restore a connection with the security discourse, 
Caldwell's second move used an appeal to common sense to curtail the pathetic rhetoric 
while maintaining the benevolence of colonization. Specifically, Caldwell defined the 
situation using the logic of separate-but-equal, stating, "Yet, it is considered impossible, 
consistent with the safety of the state, and certainly is impossible, with the present 
feelings towards these people, that they cane [sic] ever be placed upon this equality, or 
admitted to the enjoyment of these 'inalienable rights,' whilst they remain mixed with us" 
(77-81). Unapologetically, Caldwell went on to state, "Some persons may declaim, and 
call it prejudice. No matter—prejudice is as powerful a motive." If reason was the 
deciding factor, argued Caldwell, then supporters should continue to demonstrate the 
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reasonability of colonization through "public acts." Common sense dictated that free 
blacks and whites could not mix. Such a claim was self evident in security discourse. The 
development of this claim in reference to protecting the inalienable rights of free blacks 
made the claim more palatable within morality discourse.  
 The combination of selflessness and common sense concerning the expediency 
enhanced the appeal of colonization to a diverse audience. Caldwell's strategic mentions 
of "inalienable rights," "equality," and "the Declaration of Independence" suggested an 
appreciation for moral rhetoric concerning colonization. Yet, such pathetic appeals were 
curtailed by the common sense observations about security. Caldwell's benevolence 
connected both security and morality discourses in support of the expediency of 
colonization. 
 
Practicability, Benevolence, and Moderate Rhetoric  
Addressing the practicability of colonization, Caldwell's moderate rhetoric 
described the destination of the colonized in selfless terms. The choice of Africa, instead 
of within the United States, for a colony of free blacks was initially posited in security 
terms, as Caldwell posited: "Many apprehend that they [freed blacks] might hereafter join 
the Indians, or the nations bordering on our frontiers in case of war, if they were placed 
near us" (116-18). Caldwell would go on to note that there were more noble motives 
behind African colonization, however, Caldwell's brief mention of American Indians and 
security served a purpose.10 This argument employed the rhetorical figure paralipsis, 
                                                 
10 My use of "American Indian" is consistent with contemporary scholars who prefer this phrasing over 
"Native American" to refer to Native populations in North America known as American Indian, 
Indigenous, and Natives. See Eva Marie Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native 
America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Devon Mihesuah, ed., Natives and Academics: 
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whereby a rhetor draws attention to a subject by claiming to not bring attention to it. 
Mentioning the security problems with a free black colony in the western frontier called 
attention to such an argument while claiming to move beyond it. Caldwell was able to 
then discuss the selfless reasons for supporting a colony in Africa, while also recognizing 
the self-interest of slaveholders in the matter.  
Caldwell offered a selfless reason for colonizing free blacks to Africa, using the 
opportunity to layer emotion onto the seemingly mundane topic of practicability. 
Caldwell had "a greater and nobler object in view in desiring them to be placed in 
Africa." He then offered the selfless reasons why African colonization was a benevolent 
policy: 
It is the belief that, through them, civilization and the Christian religion would be 
introduced into that benighted quarter of the world. It is the hope of redeeming 
fifty millions of people from the lowest state of ignorance and superstition, and 
restoring them to the knowledge and worship of the true god. (130-35) 
Caldwell's claim drew its authority from the religious tradition of benevolence. He 
recognized the motivational force of a higher power, noting, "Great and powerful as are 
the other motives to this measure . . . all other motives are small and trifling compared 
with the hope of spreading among them a knowledge of the gospel" (135-39). Caldwell's 
argument suggested that land was not simply a self-interested economic concern; rather, 
it was needed to spread the word of God to the ignorant.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Writing About American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Russell Thornton, ed., 
Studying Native America: Problems and Prospects, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998); and 
Jason Edward Black, "Words True to Both Hearts": Merging Native-U.S. Rhetoric in the Removal and 
Allotment of American Indians (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, forthcoming). 
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 Caldwell offered two different reasons for colonizing free blacks to Africa. One 
was motivated by the self-interest of whites. The security reason was deftly offered to 
assuage security interests. Then, by suggesting the Christianizing of Africa, Caldwell 
retained the sense of selflessness of colonization efforts. The arguments about territory 
demonstrated Caldwell was thinking rationally about white security, but also that he was 
concerned for the moral well-being of the free blacks and native Africans who lacked 
"civilization and Christian religion." 
 As he had argued with regard to territory, Caldwell used the religious dimensions 
of benevolence to argue for the more practical subject of the expense of colonization. 
Caldwell asserted that colonization was a "great national object, & ought to be supported 
by the national purse" (162-63). Based on this premise, Caldwell proffered, "there ought 
to be a national atonement for the wrongs and injuries which Africa has suffered" (164-
65). Demanding atonement for slavery, Caldwell would seem to have offended 
colonization supporters who supported slavery. Yet, Caldwell's bold connection of the 
sins of slavery to the national government relied on the multiple rhetorical resources of 
benevolence to navigate a tense subject. Realize, Caldwell's call for atonement was not to 
be carried out by emancipating slaves; rather, he wanted the government to pay for 
colonization. Caldwell's seemingly inflammatory statement actually offered a reasonable 
remedy to the slavery dilemma. Caldwell's claim connected elements of both the self-
interested and selfless motivations of benevolence. Those concerned with the well-being 
of the black population identified with the "atonement for the wrongs and injuries" and 
funding for colonization. Those concerned for the security of the white population and 
not so much with the rights of blacks get the desired effect of fewer free (and potentially 
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troublesome) blacks, funding for colonization, and the continuation of slavery. The 
strength of the U.S. government was called upon to fund such an endeavor, an appeal that 
resonated with the nationalistic discourse of the time.  
 Having developed the benevolence of colonization throughout the speech, 
Caldwell could then address the extent to which free blacks were willing to be colonized 
by calling upon the selfless ethos of colonizationists. Caldwell presumed that the 
benevolence shown by whites would be accepted by free blacks and as such, offered little 
that was new to his claims of benevolence. Instead of new claims, Caldwell posed a 
series of questions to reinforce that colonization was a benevolent endeavor. Colonization 
supporters assumed that if they could find the territory and the finances, the free black 
population would flock to Africa. Puzzled over such an idea, Caldwell stated, "Among 
the objections which have been made, I must confess that I am most suprized at one 
which seems to have prevailed to wit: that these people will be unwilling to be colonized" 
(176-78).  He queried, "What, sir, are they not men? Will they not be actuated by the 
same motives of interest and ambition, which influence other men? Or will they prefer 
remaining in a hopeless state of degradation for themselves and their children, to the 
prospect of the full enjoyment of civil rights and a state of equality? . . . It has been 
satisfactorily ascertained, that numbers will gladly accept of the invitation" (178-95). 
Given the lengths that white colonizationists were willing to go, Caldwell could not 
fathom that free blacks would resist the opportunity. Thus, with no conceivable resistance 
from free blacks, there would be no resistance to the benevolent act of colonization.  
 On the subjects of expediency and practicability, Caldwell used benevolence in an 
attempt to unite the audience in support of colonization. The ways in which the 
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intellectual traditions of benevolence (secular and religious) aligned with the dominant 
discourses on slavery (security and morality) made benevolence appear an appropriate 
rhetorical choice. Using the moderate rhetoric provided by benevolence, Caldwell 
seemed to have found a strategy that could unite Northerners and Southerners. In its 
appeal to whites of all regions and all discursive commitments, Caldwell's featured 
address seemed to make colonization an object of national significance and benefit.  
 
Dialectical and Ultimate Order in Caldwell's Featured Address: 
The Lack of a Transcendent Appeal 
 In the above section, Caldwell's featured address at the colonization meeting was 
understood as a speech fitting of its time. Benevolence, it seemed, could unite the 
discourses (and audiences) of security and morality for the purpose of supporting 
colonization. To that end, Caldwell's benevolence drew from the secular and religious 
traditions of benevolence. The presence of arguments from both traditions demonstrated 
that colonization was a plan that was needed and compatible with the perspectives of a 
wide array of Americans. Thus, colonization would be a plan worthy of federal support. 
 Despite Caldwell's attempt to incorporate aspects of both security and morality 
discourses through the concept of benevolence, a closer reading reveals that such a 
strategy failed to overcome the discursive tensions relating to slavery. The discord in 
Caldwell's speech emanated from his construction of order. In deliberative matters—
which Caldwell argued colonization to be—rhetors often face the task of incorporating 
multiple views to build support for an issue. Kenneth Burke conceptualizes this task as a 
matter of order. One way to order a variety of perspectives is what Burke refers to as 
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"dialectical" order. This order is achieved when a rhetor presents various reasons in favor 
of a proposition, where the relationship is loose, creating a "jangling relation with one 
another." 11 The other choice available to a rhetor would be to provide a line of reasoning 
that would place these reasons into a "hierarchy, or sequence, or evaluative series." Such 
an order would demonstrate the development of the arguments in relation to the other 
arguments creating an "ultimate" order. According to Burke, the difference between the 
dialectical and ultimate order is that in the ultimate order, a "guiding idea" or "unitary 
principle" brings together the different lines of argument.12  
 In the resolution of deliberative conflict, the dialectical order aims for 
compromise. By contrast, the ultimate order seeks to transcend the arguments involved in 
the conflict. To transcend, Burke notes, is to offer "superior" arguments to the arguments 
being contested.13 Transcendence moves beyond the original terms of the conflict, 
establishing a "new identity."14 Burke explains the process of transcendence in the 
following terms: "When approached from a certain point of view, A and B are 'opposites.' 
We mean by 'transcendence' the adoption of another point of view from which they cease 
to be opposites."15 The new point of view created through transcendence is not simply an 
additional point of view, but one that also eliminates the tension of the conflict. In 
compromise, agreement is reached by combining parts of "A" and "B," thereby reducing 
                                                 
11 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: Prentice Hall, 1950), 187. 
 
12 Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 187. 
 
13 Burke, Rhetoric of Motives, 10. 
 
14 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes toward History, (1937, repr. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 
336. 
 
15 Burke, Attitudes, 336. 
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conflict, although such conflict might still exist. In transcendence, a new position is 
created that eliminates the tension of the conflict altogether.  
 In Burkean terms, then, what was seemingly a virtue of Caldwell's benevolent 
strategy (i.e., the flexible motivation and varied intellectual traditions), represented a 
dialectical order. In the end, the dialectical order that Caldwell used to frame African 
colonization failed to provide the movement with a rhetorical motivation that could 
transcend the discursive tensions of slavery. 
 To understand how Caldwell created the problematic dialectical order in his 
arguments for colonization, it is necessary to return to Caldwell's uses of benevolence, 
which remained connected to the sources of conflict, namely the terms of the security-
morality tension. The dialectical order of Caldwell's speech was evident in relation to 
three dialectical relationships: deference and celebrity; self-interest and selflessness; and 
security and morality.  
 
Colonization and Character: The Dialectical Order of  
Deference and Celebrity in Caldwell's Featured Address 
  Caldwell made an argument concerning the character of colonizationists more so 
through enactment than through explicit appeal. Caldwell's division of the subject of 
colonization into the expedient and the practicable did not include specific references to 
character, yet, he was careful to perform the balanced character of an intellectual elite. 
Caldwell's use of benevolence aimed to elevate the colonization project and, as a 
consequence, demonstrate the superior character of the rhetor. However, if we consider 
Caldwell's character beyond the confines of this text with his performance of character 
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within the text, the issue of character becomes a hindrance to the colonization society's 
efforts. 
 Caldwell was neither the most nor least qualified person to deliver the featured 
address at the colonization meeting. Caldwell was a man of respected character. He was 
the youngest son of James Caldwell, a Presbyterian minister and Chaplain in George 
Washington's army. Elias's mother, Hannah, was shot and killed while protecting him 
from an advancing British soldier. James Caldwell was killed shortly thereafter by a 
group of outlaws loosely associated with the British army. Upon James Caldwell's death 
a member of his congregation, Elias Boudinot, administered James's small estate. 
Boudinot was a judge in New Jersey and a man of significant means, taking it upon 
himself to raise Elias Caldwell. Elias Caldwell studied the law under the Boudinot and 
became a lawyer.16 Notably, at the time of the colonization meeting, Caldwell served as 
the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court. Although this position offered Caldwell political 
caché, he had few opportunities to develop a reputation for his speaking. It must also be 
noted that Caldwell's position was not an elected one, thus he had little formal influence 
on deliberative issues. Unlike Clay, who was originally scheduled to enumerate the need 
and advantages of colonization, Caldwell did not bring with him the same level of 
political character.  
  Caldwell's performance of character within the speech was appropriate for the 
time. The introduction and conclusion to his speech expressed the reluctance to lead that 
harkens back to the ancient Roman story of Cincinnatus.17 Caldwell conveyed that he had 
                                                 
16 "Sketch of Elias Boudinot Caldwell; Reprint from American Monthly Magazine; By His Granddaughter," 
Records of the Columbia Historical Society, Washington, D.C. Volume 24, John B. Larner, ed. 
(Washington City: Published by the Society, 1922), 204-13. 
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hoped someone more qualified could have taken the duties of the featured speech and that 
he was "embarrassed" by the high character of those in attendance (60-65). At the 
conclusion of the speech, Caldwell referred to his own remarks as "crude observations" 
and "humble endeavors" (199; 202). Caldwell's performance of character conformed, at 
first glance, to the norms of the era. 
 However, Caldwell's character lacked transcendence that could elevate the plan 
for colonization. In the immediate moment, Caldwell was a sufficient selection for 
delivering the featured speech at the founding of the colonization meeting. Yet, Caldwell 
was not a man of public renown. He did not seek the prominence that Clay sought in 
public life. This reluctance can be explained by the way in which character was perceived 
in the early U.S. republic. On the one hand, a person was not to strive for fame and 
fortune too overtly, as that could be associated with an imbalanced (or deficient) 
character. Yet on the other hand, men of intellect and means were expected to strive for 
celebrity and fame. Writing about the concept of fame in the early republic, Douglass 
Adair notes that seeking fame was an Enlightenment virtue that men were supposed to 
seek praise and fame for doing virtuous deeds.18 George Washington, John Adams, 
Alexander Hamilton, and James Wilson, all believed that fame and celebrity were 
important achievements for the virtuous person.19 The problem for Caldwell, and thus, 
the problem for the colonization movement, was that his performed deference could be 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Garry Wills documents the Cincinnatus mythology in early-U.S. politics in his book Cincinnatus: 
George Washington and the Enlightenment (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984). 
 
18 See Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair, Trevor Coburn, ed. 
(New York: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Va. by 
Norton, 1974); and Douglass Adair, The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 
1805-1813 (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1966). 
 
19 See Wills, Cincinnatus, 100-02. 
181 
literally interpreted. Caldwell's statement that "a person better qualified than himself" 
should speak at the meeting was probably a fair assessment of his own abilities and social 
standing.  
 In terms of order, Caldwell's character did not provide a transcendent order to his 
remarks. He did not impart lofty political character upon the proceedings. Henry Clay 
and Bushrod Washington were men of exalted character. The mere association of their 
names with colonization gave the organization legitimacy. Caldwell's character aided the 
colonization society in the immediate moment and Caldwell's character did not hurt the 
organization. However, given the growing discursive tensions surrounding slavery at that 
moment, and the desire to make colonization a federally-supported plan, Caldwell's 
character failed to provide colonization with a transcendent motivation fitting of the 
circumstances. The character dimension of Caldwell's benevolence becomes one of many 
arguments for colonization jangling about in his dialectical order.  
 
For Whom is Colonization Expedient?:  
The Dialectical Order of Self-Interest and  
Selflessness in Caldwell's Featured Address  
 Caldwell's speech created a dialectical order amongst arguments for the 
expediency of colonization. The problem occurred in regards to the motivation for 
benevolence. Secular notions of benevolence allowed for benevolence to be self-
interested, meaning that the person acting benevolently could do so for one's own benefit 
so long as another person was aided. In religious benevolence, self-interest was largely 
decried as defeating the purpose of benevolence. In Caldwell's expediency arguments, 
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self-interested benevolence was offered as a powerful reason to support colonization. 
Addressing the subject of expediency, Caldwell had argued quite reasonably that 
colonization would have a positive impact on civil institutions in the United States. Yet, 
that reason-based justification was jettisoned when discussing the "morals and habits of 
the people." On this subject, Caldwell proclaimed,  
 This state of society, unquestionably tends, in various ways to injure the morals 
 and destroy the habits of industry among our people. This will be acknowledged 
 by every person who has paid any attention to the subject; and it seems to be so 
 generally admitted; that it would promote the happiness of the people, and the 
 interest of the country, to get rid of this population, that it is unnecessary to dwell 
 on this branch of the subject. (85-90) 
In this passage, benevolence was not explicitly announced. Yet, the self-interested 
dimension of benevolence functioned to constitute a particular audience for colonization, 
as the free black population was said to have negatively impacted "our people." Spoken 
by a white man in front of other white men, it was unlikely that free blacks were included 
in Caldwell's "people." Even more, that such a point could be so quickly dismissed as 
"unnecessary to dwell on" revealed the assumptions of the audience. Rather than using 
benevolence to overcome the security-morality tension, Caldwell's benevolence operated 
within a particular tradition of benevolence (the secular), which aligned with the security 
discourse at the expense of the morality discourse. Far from transcending the security-
morality tension, Caldwell's argument aided one side in his attempt to make morality 
speak to the practical issue of expediency. 
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 Caldwell's construction of dialectical order in relation to expediency was only 
made more apparent as he addressed the "happiness of the free people of colour" (273-
74). Caldwell argued that happiness (and rights and equality and achievement) could only 
be achieved through colonization. Continuing the argument about the impossibility of 
inalienable rights for free blacks, Caldwell advanced a detailed defense of separation for 
the sake of equality. As before, Caldwell's discussion of expediency concerning the 
happiness of free people of color utilized a veneer of benevolence to conceal a narrowly 
construed understanding of colonization's benefit. For example, Caldwell argued, "by 
collecting them together where they would enjoy equal rights and privileges with those 
around them" (92). "Equal rights and privileges" seemed to support natural rights, a 
concept embodied in the moral and political history of the United States; yet, such rights 
could only be found after "collecting them together." Upon constraining the expansive 
concept of equality, Caldwell described the plight of free blacks in the lofty language of 
morality. The current situation "cramps the energies of the soul," and "represses every 
vigorous effort towards moral or intellectual greatness" of free blacks (94-95). 
Colonization created an incentive, Caldwell told the audience, and the audience would 
not be exercising their own greatness if such incentives were not provided for the 
"brutes" (106). On the subject of free black happiness, the importance of distance and 
separation was maintained, a key claim in security discourses. Equal rights and privileges 
were important values in moral discourses, yet security was once again privileged over all 
others.  
   Caldwell's discussion of expediency sought to establish the exigency of 
colonization in the historic moment. Caldwell argued that colonization would help the 
184 
civic institutions, the morals and industry of Americans, and the happiness of free blacks. 
However, Caldwell's use of benevolence failed to unify the competing discourses or 
transcend the differences that existed among colonization supporters. Instead, 
benevolence was used atomically. Although falling under the umbrella of benevolence, 
isolated sentences or phrases could be thought to connect to either security or morality 
discourses. This illustrates the problem of Caldwell's dialectical order. Although both 
sides could relate to the argument, the security-morality tension was not transformed. As 
a result, Caldwell's arguments about expediency failed to craft colonization as a synthesis 
in slavery discourse.  
 
Discordant Motivations on Practicability: The Dialectical Order of  
Security and Morality in Caldwell's Featured Address 
 Caldwell's consideration of the practicability of colonization addressed the topics 
of the territory, the expense, and obtaining the consent of free blacks. Caldwell's 
argument for practicability reflected some overtures of benevolence, yet any 
transformational power that benevolent appeals might have had was negated by 
Caldwell's primary concern with white security. Caldwell also offered arguments that 
purported to care for the well-being of the free blacks. There was, however, no guiding 
principle that could transform or transcend the competing arguments of security and 
morality.   
 First, with respect to the territory, or where the free black colony would be 
located, Caldwell made clear that the priority of colonization was the security of the 
white population. Regarding territory, Caldwell swiftly argued against the colonization of 
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free blacks in frontier areas on the American continent. Caldwell averred that a free black 
colony in the frontier could lead to the collaboration of "Indians, or the nations bordering 
on our frontiers in case of war" (117). A free black colony on the frontier would also 
encourage slaves to run away to such colonies, a threat that made such a colony 
unappealing to many potential supporters of colonization. A hint of selflessness could be 
detected when Caldwell made the pseudo-scientific claim that free blacks would not 
thrive in a colony placed in the Pacific Northwest Territories, for "the climate is too cold 
for their constitutions" (124). The result of this analysis was that Africa, and not any 
territory near the United States, would be the appropriate territory for a colony of free 
blacks. The arrangement of Caldwell's claims regarding practicability and expense was 
appropriate for a specific section of his audience, specifically those slaveholders who 
were looking for a solution to increase the security of the ruling slaveholder class. Such a 
choice was heavily weighted on the side of self-interest and white security.   
 Caldwell's attempt to advance a balanced conception of benevolence also failed 
due to a preference for self-interestedness. Immediately following the argument about 
why Africa served as the best territory for colonization, Caldwell offered the following 
moral plea: 
 I have a greater and nobler object in view, in desiring them to be placed in Africa. 
It is the belief that through them civilization and the Christian religion would be 
introduced into that benighted quarter of the world. It is the hope of redeeming 
fifty millions of people from the lowest state of ignorance and superstition, and 
restoring them to the knowledge and worship of the true god. (130-35) 
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Colonizing free blacks to Africa would also provide a missionary benefit for the residents 
of the "benighted quarter of the world." Caldwell's most moving and passionate 
arguments for colonization came in his description of colonization as an act of Christian 
benevolence, as when Caldwell observed, "The great movements and mighty efforts in 
the moral and religious world, seem to indicate some great design of Providence on the 
eve of accomplishment" (145-47). Caldwell's description of the providential force of 
colonization brought to light both the selflessness of religious benevolence and the 
pathetic rhetoric of moral discourse. Caldwell's flourish was, however, limited in its 
ability to transcend the dialectical order of his speech. Caldwell himself revealed the lack 
of unity among potential supporters of colonization by stating, "They [the Christians in 
the North] will receive your proposal with joy and support it with zeal; and permit me to 
say, that it will be of no small consequence to gain the zealous support and co-operation 
of this portion of the community" (157-59; emphasis mine). Caldwell's emotional 
characterization of colonization as a Christian project inserted religion and emotion into 
the discussion of colonization, yet, it was only another independent reason to support 
colonization. Caldwell's dialectical order continued on the subject of territory, as he 
attempted to appeal to both secular and religious understandings of benevolence without 
providing a rhetorical connection between the two.  
 Interestingly, Caldwell's argument regarding practicability and expense served as 
an isolated example of the power of transformation in the creation of rhetorical order. 
The subjects of territory and funding were the defining practical reasons why 
colonizationists were appealing to Congress rather than taking action at the state level. To 
address the subject of funding, Caldwell claimed that colonization was too important not 
187 
to be funded. Caldwell's approach to the topic of expense was three-fold. First, Caldwell 
argued that colonization would get funded because it was "a great national object, & 
ought to be supported by the national purse" (162-63). Such an argument relied heavily 
on the assumption that colonization was self-evidently important and that everyone 
would recognize as much. Caldwell's second response further avoided answering the 
question directly. The expense mattered little, Caldwell believed, because colonization 
could provide "a national atonement for the wrongs and injuries which Africa has 
suffered" (163-65). Seemingly abolitionist in its language, Caldwell's statement was not 
nearly so audacious when one considers how he defined the "wrongs and injuries" against 
Africa. Caldwell was not denouncing slavery; he was denouncing the slave trade. 
Caldwell noted that the state and federal governments did as much as they were 
constitutionally allowed to restrict the slave trade (but, again, not slavery). Third, 
Caldwell asserted that if the "national purse" could not provide the necessary means for 
colonization to occur, then "the liberality and the humanity of our citizens will not suffer 
it to fail for want of pecuniary aid" (171-72). The benevolence of white colonization 
supporters would make such a worthy endeavor come to fruition.  
 All three parts of Caldwell's argument about expense cohere, supporting the 
notion that morally and practically, the expense of colonization should not matter. 
Caldwell's argument about the expense of colonization demonstrates the rhetorical 
possibility of rhetorical transcendence and transformation in colonization discourse, 
while also making clearer the lack of such rhetorical features throughout the entirety of 
the discourse.  
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Caldwell's creation of a dialectical order—and his failure to rhetorically transcend 
or transform the discursive tensions—was punctuated in his consideration of free blacks' 
willingness to be colonized. Caldwell can only muster questions and not argument when 
considering the possible objection that free blacks may not want to be colonized. He 
asked:   
What sir, are they not men? Will they not be actuated by the same motives of 
interests and ambition, which influence other men? Or will they prefer remaining 
in a hopeless state of degradation for themselves and their children, to the 
prospect of the full enjoyment of civil rights, and state of equality? What brought 
our ancestors to these shores? 
Caldwell assumed that all free blacks would flock to Africa if given the chance; yet, those 
best suited to answer the question (the free blacks) were not given a voice in the meeting. 
Even more, Caldwell did little in the speech to motivate free blacks. In Caldwell's series 
of questions one sees the latent appeals to the United States' exploratory heritage. 
Caldwell's inferential appeal to this heritage adds yet another argument to the cacophony 
of voices in the speech, the sum of which sing a discordant tune. When moved to speak 
on how free blacks would perceive this plan, Caldwell's speech had little to offer. 
Caldwell referred to free blacks as "them," emphasizing that Caldwell's benevolence was 
a white, self-interested benevolence. Caldwell's inability to empathize greatly limited any 
impact of his usage of benevolence beyond adherents to the security discourse. 
 Caldwell's use of benevolence shuttled back and forth between secular and 
religious usages, between arguments that were consistent with security discourse and 
arguments consistent with morality discourse. Caldwell failed to transcend or transform 
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the tensions of the moment, only offering arguments that appealed to each side at the 
expense of argumentative consistency.  
 
Conclusion 
 Caldwell's speech, and its use of benevolence as a moderate rhetorical strategy in 
support of colonization, played a significant role in the colonization movement. Caldwell 
was appointed, with John Randolph, Francis Scott Key, and others, to draft a memorial to 
Congress. In that memorial, presented to Congress on January 14, 1817, the theme of 
benevolence was extended. The memorial appealed to the congresspeople as "patriot[s]" 
and "enlightened, philanthropic, and practical statesman." Caldwell's address was a 
defining moment in the history of African colonization in the United States, as 
colonizationists for decades thereafter recalled the central role of Caldwell's address in 
defining the colonization project.20 Caldwell was revered as a founder of the colonization 
movement and in a manner befitting such a vaulted station, a city in the colony of Liberia 
was named Caldwell in his honor (to demonstrate the magnitude of this honor, another 
city was named Monrovia after President James Monroe, a colonization sympathizer). 
Caldwell's speech was widely referenced and reproduced, helping to solidify the 
prominence of his benevolent approach to colonization within public discourse.  
 Despite such prominence, the dialectical order created within the speech greatly 
hampered the ability of colonization to gain nationwide and federal support. Benevolence 
provided key words and appeals that connected to the discourses of security and morality; 
yet, those connections failed to transcend the tension that had developed between these 
                                                 
20 See The Eleventh Annual Report of the American Society for the Colonizing the Free People of Colour of 
the United States, with an Appendix (Washington: 1828). This was also reprinted in American Quarterly 
Review. December, 1828, 395-425. 
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two discourses on slavery. The flexibility of benevolence provided an overarching 
strategy by which such contradictions could be used to support the same goal. It was not 
long before the problem of order in Caldwell's speech was exposed.  
 In the first widely circulated and lengthy response to the efforts of the 
colonization society, William Lloyd Garrison does well to demonstrate the rhetorical 
problem created by Caldwell. In Thoughts on African Colonization, Garrison wrote, 
"Some of them were undoubtedly actuated by benevolent desire to promote the welfare of 
our coloured population and could never have intended to countenance oppression. . . . I 
am willing to concede, that Robert Finley and Elias B. Caldwell, were philanthropic 
individuals, and that a large number of their followers are men of piety, benevolence, and 
moral worth." He then queried, "Is the American Colonization Society a beneficial 
institution?"21 Admitting the benevolence of some colonizationists, Garrison 
demonstrated that Caldwell's benevolence failed to provide sufficient motivation for 
colonization. Caldwell failed to provide an ultimate rhetorical order that could transcend 
the security-morality tension and prove to men, like Garrison, that colonization was 
"beneficial."  
 Colonization sought to offer a solution to the problem of slavery in the United 
States. To achieve this aim, the movement required support from the public and 
Congress. To gain such support, colonizationists needed to find a way to get beyond the 
security-morality tension in slavery discourse. Rhetors throughout the nation were 
beginning to identify more rigidly with either the instrumental or pathetic dimensions of 
rhetoric offered in public discourse. To motivate colonization as something other than a 
                                                 
21 William Lloyd Garrison, Thoughts on African Colonization. 2 parts. (1832; repr. New York: Arno Press 
and the New York Times, 1968), I: 40. 
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cipher for pro- or anti-slavery advocates, colonizationists needed to employ a different 
rhetorical approach.  What colonization needed was rhetorical transcendence, a way of 
supporting the movement that did not rely heavily upon aspects of security or morality 
discourse. Benevolence served as a concept that connected the terms of the conflict, but 
did not move beyond them. Caldwell's performance at the colonization meeting was a 
fitting performance for its time. However, it was that groundedness that defined 
colonization in dialectical, rather than transcendent terms. Thus, at the moment in which 
a national colonization movement announced itself and defined itself within the 
discursive tension and rhetorical possibility, its rhetors failed to offer a rhetorical 










CHAPTER FIVE  
THE COUNTER MEMORIAL OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR: 
EXPOSING THE FLAWED MODERATE RHETORIC OF COLONIZATION  
The speeches of Henry Clay and Elias B. Caldwell, delivered at the colonization 
meeting of December 21, 1816, asserted that African colonization was an absolute 
necessity for both the white population and the "peculiarly situated" free blacks in the 
United States. By the early afternoon, the colonization meeting adjourned and the 
national colonization movement had been set into motion. It was not long until the 
proceedings of the meeting circulated beyond the walls of Davis Hotel, as the words of 
Clay and Caldwell were printed on December 24 in the National Intelligencer. Not only 
had Clay and Caldwell provided the rhetorical motivations of colonization to attendees of 
the meeting, their speeches, now publicly circulated, became the definitive articulation of 
the colonization plan.  
Once public, it was not long until the rhetorical motivations of the Colonization 
Society received a public rejoinder. On December 30, the Intelligencer published, "A 
Counter Memorial proposed, to be submitted to Congress in [sic] behalf of the free 
people of colour of the District of Columbia."1 Speaking on behalf of "free persons of 
colour, resident in the district [sic] of Columbia, born in the United States, and of parents 
born there also" (5-6), the memorialists presented themselves as spokespersons for the 
population that the Colonization Society sought to remove to Africa. The authors 
addressed arguments in favor of colonization by refuting the colonizationists' moderate 
                                                 
1 National Intelligencer, December 30, 1816, n.p. This "Counter Memorial" has been transcribed and 
reproduced as Appendix II to this project. All subsequent references to the Counter Memorial will be made 
parenthetically and refer to line numbers of the appended text. 
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rhetoric from the neglected perspective of free blacks. Where Clay's and Caldwell's 
speeches assumed the degraded condition of free blacks, the free people of colour argued 
"against the assumed right of any individuals whatever . . . to pass judgment on their [free 
blacks'] condition" (26-27). Also, the free people of colour challenged the benevolence of 
colonizationists. Noting that some free blacks might resist colonization, the memorialists 
suggested that the underlying, self-interested motives of colonizationists would surface 
and colonization would "easily pass from persuasion to force" (46; emphasis in original). 
Rather than arguing that colonization was mutually beneficial to whites and free blacks, 
the memorialists asserted that colonization could generate more tension. Furthermore, the 
free people of colour stated that they loved their homeland, defined in the first line as the 
United States and not Africa (5-6). The impassioned anti-colonization plea called upon 
"heaven and earth to witness that they would rather die than quit their native country; that 
they never will consent to go to Africa, or any other country; but that they will cling to 
this their native soul whilst they have breath, and be buried where their fathers before 
them are buried" (61-64). The free people of colour offered as many reasons to oppose 
colonization as Clay and Caldwell had offered in support of it. 
Approaching the conclusion of the Counter Memorial, the argument took an 
unexpected, and somewhat jarring, turn. The free people of colour claimed that 
colonization was not the answer; instead, the prejudices of color would be remedied "at 
once natural, easy and efficacious" by "amalgamation" (72; original emphasis). Did the 
free people of colour mean to suggest interracial sex and procreation as the solution? As 
if there was any doubt as to the term's usage, the free people of colour elaborated, 
"Among your memorialists are very many young men, of industrious and sober habits, of 
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ordinary school education, and of mechanic trades, who would not feel themselves 
degraded by intermarriages with whites" (75-76). As a consequence of intermarriage and 
procreation, then, "the distinction of color would pass away" (78). The arguments against 
colonization on the basis of rights, safety, and homeland, although bold, were connected 
to prevailing values in white American public discourse; suggesting amalgamation 
transgressed these values. If anything, the suggestion reminded pro-slavery whites of 
their fear of slave revolts and miscegenation. History had taught that when faced with a 
threat to their security, whites had taken drastic actions to contain the freedoms and 
liberties of blacks. By advocating amalgamation, the seemingly-sound appeals to rights, 
safety, and homeland in the Counter Memorial would likely be totally eclipsed in a white 
audience concerned for their own safety. 
The dissonance aroused by the Counter Memorial's reasonableness and audacity 
did not go unnoticed. Contained within brackets at the conclusion of the Counter 
Memorial, the editors of the Intelligencer—Joseph Gales and William Seaton—affixed 
the following subscription: 
The reader will not receive the arguments of the proceeding article as the serious 
opinion of the writer. His object, it is apparent, is to endeavor, by ridicule, to 
check the progress of the Colonization Plan, which has recently been started in 
Virginia and New Jersey, and taken up in this district—we have thought it proper 
to insert this note, lest any one might mistake for gravity the well-meant irony of 
our correspondent. (85-89) 
Despite the editors' attempt to manage the meaning and reception of the Counter 
Memorial, such symbols were not so easily controlled. Although the editors marked the 
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Counter Memorial as "well-meant irony," a reader could also assess the text as serious 
argument. Even as the editors attempted to discipline the meaning of the Counter 
Memorial, a number of questions remained. Was the Counter Memorial serious argument 
or was it ironic? In either case, was it written by free people of colour or was its author 
white?  
 As a response to the creation of the Colonization Society, the Counter Memorial 
was provocative. Unlike the speeches of Clay and Caldwell—where the use of moderate 
rhetoric portrayed colonization as the answer to the problems of slavery—the rhetorical 
impact of the Counter Memorial was that it questioned colonization on multiple levels. At 
the level of argument, the Counter Memorial questioned the necessity of colonization. 
The free people of colour in the District of Columbia challenged both the expediency and 
practicability of colonization, as well as challenging the exclusion of blacks from the 
deliberations on the matter. Yet, the suggestion of amalgamation and the subscription by 
the editors initiated questions of interpretation, leading the editors to assert that the text 
was ironic. At the level of irony, the legitimacy of colonization remains a possible 
interpretation, but such an interpretation becomes more difficult to render when 
confronted with the figurative meanings invited by the text and the editors. Serious or 
ironic, the Counter Memorial transgressed the social norms concerning race in the early 
nineteenth century United States by suggesting that interracial relationships would 
provide a better solution to the tensions of slavery than colonization. The polysemy, or 
multiple meanings, generated by the Counter Memorial introduced questions and 
complexity into the discourse on colonization, ultimately unmooring the rhetorical 
motivations of the Colonization Society from the supposed stability of moderate rhetoric.  
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 To comprehend the multiple meanings within the Counter Memorial and the 
destabilizing force of these meanings for the Colonization Society, this chapter 
investigates three rhetorically plausible interpretations of the text. First, the Counter 
Memorial is interpreted as dialectic argument. In this interpretation, the Counter 
Memorial is read as representing the "serious opinions" of the free people of colour in the 
District of Columbia. As dialectic argument, the Counter Memorial questions both the 
expediency and practicability of colonization by offering explicit claims and refutation. 
Second, taking a cue from the editors' subscription, the interpretation of the Counter 
Memorial as parodic argument is investigated (with white authorship assumed). As 
parodic argument, the Counter Memorial questions the efforts of colonizationists by 
covertly recalling the anxieties of security discourse. The dialectic and parodic 
interpretations represented individual meanings, both of which highlighted the failure of 
colonizationists to provide rhetorical motivations that moved beyond the contemporary 
tensions in slavery discourse. The third interpretation represents a coordination of the 
dialectic and parodic within the African American rhetorical tradition of 
Signifyin(g)argument. Individually, each interpretation introduced varying degrees of 
uncertainty into the discourse about colonization. Collectively, the polysemy of the 
Counter Memorial showed the vulnerability of the moderate rhetoric of colonization to 






The Serious Opinions against Colonization:  
The Counter Memorial as Dialectic Argument 
 In 1816, free blacks were, at best, newcomers to the white elite-dominated public 
sphere and, at worst, wildly unwelcome participants.2 To decrease the peculiarity of their 
participation, many free blacks adopted the conventions of the elite white public 
discourse. As historian J. G. A. Pocock observes, "[O]ne of the primary contexts in which 
an act of utterance is performed is that furnished by the institutionalized mode of 
speech."3 Crafting a response to the colonizationists in the form of a memorial to 
Congress provided one such form of "institutionalized" speech for free blacks. As a 
memorial to Congress, the free people of colour of the District of Columbia responded in 
the same mode that colonizationists were using to advance their federally-focused 
scheme. In this interpretation, the Counter Memorial is taken at face value, as an explicit 
argument whereby the reasoning of the free people of colour pointed to the hypocrisy of 
colonizationists. In the classical tradition, arguments that begin "from generally accepted 
opinions" and "reason to establish contradiction" were referred to as dialectic arguments.4 
The dialectic argument against colonization employed tropes such as metastasis (to deny 
and turn back on your adversaries the arguments used against you) and parrhesia (frank 
speech) to point out the contradictions within the moderate rhetoric of colonization. The 
dialectic interpretation of the Counter Memorial is developed by first, providing a brief 
                                                 
2 When referencing the purported authors of the Counter Memorial, I use "free people of colour." When 
speaking of the population beyond the text, I use the term "free blacks."  
 
3 J. G. A. Pocock, "The Concept of a Language and the Métier de' Historien: Some Considerations of 
Practice," in Anthony Pagden, ed., The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 20. 
 




history of dialectic arguments by African Americans against slavery and second, 
exploring the dialectic argumentation of the free people of colour. 
 
Petitions, Dialectic Arguments against Slavery, and the  
Black Presence in U.S. Public Discourse  
 The Counter Memorial would not be the first instance of blacks refuting slavery 
to a white audience. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, collective 
petitioning of Congress by blacks challenged slavery through institutional means.5 In 
British North America during the 1770s, collective petitioning by blacks was the most 
available resource for blacks to publicly challenge slavery.6 The Revolutionary War 
increased the public discourse about slavery. Blacks were empowered by the bold 
statements against slavery by American Patriots, who used the metaphor of slavery to 
describe the oppressive behavior of the British government. Additionally, blacks—
enslaved and free—gained political power as both the Americans and the British made 
appeals directed to blacks.7 The growing free black community in the North fostered a 
more public role for blacks to make public arguments about slavery. Coinciding with the 
opportunity for blacks to participate in public argument was the resistance of whites to 
such practices. As Dickson Bruce notes, an "exclusivist white national identity" emerged 
in the 1780s and 1790s in response to the empowerment of blacks during the age of 
                                                 
5 Existing evidence suggests that individual slaves petitioned for their own freedom as early as the 
seventeenth century. Those petitions tended to avoid decrying the system of slavery and instead focused on 
the particulate circumstances of the slave that warranted freedom. For examples, see Herbert Aptheker, ed., 
A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States. 3 vols. (New York: Citadel Press, 1951-
73), I: 1-4.  
 
6 Aptheker, Documentary History of the Negro People, I: 5-12.   
 
7 Dickson Bruce, The Origins of African American Literature (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2001), 38-40.  
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Revolution.8 With the increased presence of blacks in public discourse came an increase 
in attempts to reduce that presence. This contestation of public argument, race, and 
slavery helped shape the rhetorical practices of black rhetors of the time.  
 Managing the rhetorical opportunities and constraints shaped how blacks argued 
against slavery, most notably in petitions. In the political context of the early nineteenth 
century, petitions allowed the people to communicate with Congress and seek a redress of 
grievances. As Susan Zaeske points out, petitioners employed "flattering adjectives" and 
used language that reflected an awareness of petitioners' subordinate position.9 Contra 
Zaeske, Paul Bradley Stewart asserts that the expression of deference and humility was a 
formal characteristic of all petitions, not just petitions of blacks (or in Zaeske's study, 
petitions of women). For Stewart, the "persona of humility" exhibited the petitioners' 
knowledge of the form of petitioning, regardless of race, class, or gender.10 Elements of 
Zaeske's and Stewart's positions were evident in the petitions of blacks. Collective 
petitioning by blacks resembled previous efforts by white anti-slavery advocates to a 
degree, but blacks were constrained by the racial dynamics of the time. Jacqueline Bacon 
and Glen McClish argue that "although petitions of the last decades of the eighteenth 
century assume the form of requests, they were marshaled by African Americans in an 
effort to assert their rights."11 Bold assertions of equality by blacks, if perceived as 
hostile, could invite the overly restrictive responses that whites often used when 
                                                 
8 Bruce, Origins, 94. 
 
9 Susan Zaeske, Signatures of Citizenship: Petitioning, Antislavery, & Women's Political Identity (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 13. 
 
10 Paul Bradley Stewart, "Early American Petitioning (1789-1829), Public Life, and the Public Sphere," 
(PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2002), 180-82. 
 
11 Jacqueline Bacon and Glen McClish, "Descendents of Africa, Sons of '76: Exploring Early African-
American Rhetoric," Rhetoric Society Quarterly 36 (2006): 2. 
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threatened. The racial dynamics in security discourse, which helped escalate fears among 
whites, forced collective petitioners to manage their claims with an eye toward propriety.  
Although petitioners employed the language of deference, the act of petitioning was an 
act of citizenship, a bold step in their quest for equality. The act of petitioning the 
government helped blacks assert their voice into the realm of white politics. 
 A Counter Memorial "proposed, to be submitted to Congress on behalf of the free 
people of colour of the District of Columbia" would not be a radical departure from the 
norms of public argument (2-3). Blacks—free and enslaved—had been petitioning for 
decades by the time the Counter Memorial was authored. Although it might not have 
been well-received by many whites in power, the memorial form (a sibling of the 
petitioning form) would not have been a de facto signal of anything other than what the 
memorial stated. Figurative or representational meanings would not have been the logical 
interpretation. The Counter Memorial, then, offered a tradition that allowed the reader to 
receive the arguments as dialectic arguments.  
 
Dialectic Argument in the Counter Memorial: 
Questioning the Efficacy of Colonization 
 In the Counter Memorial, the flawed assumptions of the colonization project were 
exposed by asserting the rights of blacks to have a say in their future. To do so the free 
people of colour refuted claims that whites could decide their fate. Such a right was 
assumed at the colonization meeting, where black participants were notably absent. The 
dialectic argument was built inductively, starting in the opening paragraph of the Counter 
Memorial. A series of descriptions characterizing free blacks helped reverse the negative 
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portrayals on which colonization was based. The Counter Memorial stated that the "free 
persons of colour" have "good morals," are made "christian [sic] by the gospel," and " 
have at all times endeavored so to conduct themselves, as to merit the good will and 
friendship of their white brethren" (8-11). Additionally, the document described the 
intellectual potential of free blacks. When the Counter Memorial praised whites as "an 
enlightened and polished people" who enabled this potential, the characterization ran 
contrary to assumptions about the inability of white and black races to mix (9). The free 
people of colour toed the line by suggesting that blacks were more like whites than most 
whites were willing to admit. While refusing the stereotypes of the colonization 
movement, the Counter Memorial also acknowledged the variety of characterizations, 
stating, "That if, in particular instances, individuals have been found wanting in duty to 
God and to society, your memorialists trust that such instances have been regarded as 
exceptions to their general demeanor (11-13). By admitting that some small portion of the 
black population might behave poorly, but that most are upstanding individuals, this 
strategy retained the strength of argument against colonization while also gaining 
credibility by admitting reservations to their claim.  
 Having characterized free blacks as similar to whites—a feat achieved through a 
language noticeably void of confrontation—the free people of colour offered a clear 
statement about their rights. They stood resolved "against the assumed right of any 
individuals whatever . . . to pass judgment on their [blacks'] condition" (26-27). By 
building the argument inductively and providing opposing perspectives to those used by 
colonizationists to support their scheme, the free people of colour took the posture of 
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educating their interlocutor (i.e., Congress) on the disadvantages of removing blacks from 
the United States.  
 The non-threatening posture not only responded to and corrected characterizations 
of blacks; it authorized a cautionary note to colonizationists. Despite the prominent 
notion that whites must be secured from violent blacks, the memorialists' warned that 
colonization "will easily pass from persuasion to force" (46) causing "terror and anxiety" 
(54). The free people of colour used one of the colonizationists' assumptions to create an 
argument against colonization. Security concerns had motivated many whites to consider 
colonization as a solution to the problems of slave insurrections. In the Counter 
Memorial, the roles were reversed. This reversal of assumptions demonstrated the deft 
use of metastasis to construct a dialectic argument against colonization. Not only were 
the colonizationists' means contrary to their ends, but the free people of colour were able 
to employ colonizationists' arguments to oppose the scheme. Situated after the carefully 
crafted discussion of the character of blacks in the District of Columbia—and one could 
presume, throughout the United States—the potential for such a claim to be interpreted as 
confrontational was significantly reduced. 
 The reasonableness that permeated most of the Counter Memorial was called into 
question by the extraordinary claim that racial amalgamation would solve the problems of 
slavery. Regarding color being the source of racial tension, the Counter Memorial stated, 
"[P]hilosophers and statesmen would see in those prejudices a remedy, at once natural, 
easy and efficacious . . . the remedy of amalgamation" (71-72). The suggestion of 
amalgamation was presented in reasonable terms, with mention of "philosophers and 
statesmen," as well as the ease and efficacy of colonization. Despite the attempt to make 
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amalgamation seem like the logical solution, the audacity of the claim could not be 
hidden. Amalgamation of the races was a bold claim and out of character in the context 
of rhetorical practices of the time.12 The inclusion of such a claim overwhelmed all other 
claims in the Counter Memorial.   
Encouraging amalgamation was taboo, not because interracial relationships were 
uncommon but because publicity of such relationships would challenge the white-
controlled slave society. Some foreign observers perceived the mixing of races and 
bloodlines as a uniquely American characteristic. In 1782, French-born settler Hector St. 
John de Crèvecouer observed that Americans were of a "strange mixture of blood, which 
you will find in no other country." The mixing of blood was an idealistic trait for 
Crèvecouer, as it meant "individuals of all races are melted into a new race of men, 
whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world."13 
Unrepresented in Crèvecouer's statement was the deep-seated anxieties manifested in the 
security discourse. Although observable in public life, it is difficult to ascertain the full 
scope of interracial sexual relationships. Historian Kenneth Stampp claims that  
to measure the extent of miscegenation with precision is impossible . . . But the  
evidence nevertheless suggests that human behavior in the Old South was very  
human indeed, that sexual contacts between the races were not rare aberrations of  
a small group of depraved whites but a frequent occurrence involving whites of  
                                                 
12 Widespread public discussion about amalgamation of the races occurred in 1802 and concerned Thomas 
Jefferson's alleged relationship with Sally Hemmings, a slave. It was not until the mid to late 1820s that 
public discussion of amalgamation would become an acceptable topic in public discourse. Elise Virginia 
Lemire, "Miscegenation": Making Race in America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 
1-10. 
 
13 J. Hector St. John [Hector St. John de Crèvecouer], Letters from an American Farmer (London: Printed 
for Thomas Davies, 1782), 55. 
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all social and cultural levels.14  
The tension between the prevalence of interracial sex and the relative absence of 
discussion about these relationships functioned as, what historian Joshua D. Rothman 
calls, "open secrets," which were "only dangerously scandalous if widely publicized."15 
White society "tolerated" interracial sex, viewing such interactions with "a measure of 
forbearance."16 The priority was discretion; to harshly punish white sexual criminals 
would not only make miscegenation public, but it would also pass judgment on an act 
that, in most communities, was allowed to pass with silence.17  
  In light of the context—in which interracial relationships were already 
occurring—the suggestion of amalgamation could be seen as the climax of the Counter 
Memorial. Clothed in the demure language of reasonableness, supporting amalgamation 
could be interpreted as an instance of parrhesia, or frank speech. Despite the potential 
negative consequences, the Counter Memorial encouraged the unity of the races because 
it was preferable to the separation of the races. The reception of this claim would be 
helped by ethos constructed throughout the rest of the Counter Memorial. Still, there 
were few examples on which the Counter Memorial could rely as models for discussing 
amalgamation publicly, which only exacerbated the frankness of the argument. Looking 
ahead, colonization and racial amalgamation would be intricately linked in slavery 
                                                 
14 Kenneth Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-bellum South (New York: Knopf), 350-51. 
 
15 Joshua D. Rothman, Notorious in the Neighborhood: Sex and Families across the Color Line in Virginia, 
1787-1861 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 31. The social history of 
miscegenation in Virginia is detailed in James Hugo Johnston, Race Relations in Virginia & Miscegenation 
in the South, 1776-1860 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970). 
 
16 Martha Elizabeth Hodes, White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth Century (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 3. 
 
17 Rothman, Notorious in the Neighborhood, 5 
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discourse during the 1830s.18 In 1816, however, exposing amalgamation to public 
discussion would not help the rights of free blacks.  
 The argumentative choices of the Counter Memorial, highlighted by the editors' 
subscription, called into question the legitimacy of the Counter Memorial as dialectic 
argument. It is difficult to discern if the editors' remarks reflected specific knowledge 
about the author or if they were aware of authorial intent as rhetorical critics. The 
phrasing of the subscription suggested that the editors were responding as rhetorical 
critics. For example, where the subscription stated, "His object, it is apparent, is to 
endeavor, by ridicule" (86), the clause "it is apparent" suggested a response that one 
would have upon reading the memorial. There were no insinuations of personal 
knowledge or past history with a particular writer. The editors' subscription, then, 
provided a small glimpse into how the Counter Memorial failed to conform to the 
rhetorical norms at the time. 
 Although the Counter Memorial contained characteristics that made it seem 
impossible to be taken seriously, elements of the text threatened the legitimacy of 
colonization in dialectic terms. To begin, the presence of the editors' subscription 
suggested that the Counter Memorial could pass as dialectic argument. The editors 
claimed that the irony was "apparent," but if that was the case, then there was no reason 
to explain as much to the reader. Additionally, the arguments asserting the rights of 
blacks took shape in the memorial form, consistent with the practices of the time. Lastly, 
the suggestion that amalgamation could solve the problems of slavery was consistent with 
                                                 
18 See Bruce Dorsey, Reforming Men and Women: Gender in the Antebellum City (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 151-55. 
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social behavior, even if it was unusual to discuss such relationships within public 
discourse.   
 Comparing the dialectic argument of the Counter Memorial to the moderate 
rhetoric of colonizationists, the Counter Memorial raised many questions about 
expediency and practicability of colonization. Concerning expediency, the Counter 
Memorial explained that blacks were, like colonizationists, of good moral character and 
able to be educated. As such, it would be contradictory to colonize free people of colour 
and not whites. Furthermore, expediency was challenged when the claims about security 
were turned back on colonizationists and used as a reason to oppose the scheme. On 
practicability, amalgamation was suggested as a means to recognize the equal rights of 
blacks and whites and to avoid the problems and costs of colonization. Taken as a 
dialectic argument, the Counter Memorial informed its interlocutors of an alternate 
perspective on colonization in a manner that was both rhetorically deft and historically 
legitimate. Not all of the arguments were equally acceptable as straight-forward claims 
against colonization. Still, in part or in whole, the dialectic interpretation of the Counter 
Memorial posed significant challenges to the rhetorical motivations of colonizationists 
and more generally, to the authority of whites over blacks. 
 
Well-Meant Irony Against (or For?) Colonization: 
The Counter Memorial as Parodic Argument 
Although there was much about the Counter Memorial that suggested that the text 
was a dialectic argument against colonization, the editors' of the Intelligencer affixed a 
subscription suggesting subversive motives were at play. These motives, the editors 
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averred, were "to endeavor, by ridicule, to check the progress of the Colonization Plan" 
(86-87). The argument that the claims of the author(s) of the Counter Memorial were 
ridiculing colonization shifted the interpretive framework of the Counter Memorial into 
the realm of parody.19 As a parody, the Counter Memorial possessed meaning beyond 
those stated outright. As Ziva Ben-Porat explains, "[P]arodic representations expose the 
model's conventions and lay bare its devices through the coexistence of the two codes in 
the same message."20 In the case of the Counter Memorial, the model was the 
institutional appeal made by colonizationists to Congress (represented in this instance by 
a memorial to Congress). One code was the idea that colonization could solve the 
problems of slavery. The other code was that amalgamation can solve the problems. The 
coexistence of these two codes in the Counter Memorial suggested that the aims of 
colonization were just as improbable as amalgamation. Although the editors attempted to 
dismiss the Counter Memorial by shifting its meaning to the realm of parody, such a 
move could not fully contain the critique of colonization levied through parodic 
argument.  
The challenge posed by the parodic interpretation of the Counter Memorial is 
better understood by briefly exploring how the genre of parody and the trope of irony 
function in rhetorical discourse. With the relationship between parody and irony situated 
in American rhetorical theory and practice, the parodic treatment of colonization within 
the Counter Memorial can be illuminated.  
                                                 
19 Linda Hutcheon argues that the "range of intent" of parody "is from respectful admiration to biting 
ridicule." Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of Twentieth-Century Art Forms (New York: 
Methuen, 1985), 16. 
 
20 Ziva Ben-Porat, "Method in Madness: Notes on the Structure of Parody, Based on MAD TV Satires," 
Poetics Today 1 (1979): 247. 
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Parody, Irony, and Nineteenth-Century  
American Rhetorical Practice 
Shifting the Counter Memorial from the realm of dialectic argument to the realm 
of parody, the editors invited complexity, and not simplicity, into the interpretation of the 
text. Parody, by definition, requires multiple interpretations. From the Greek parodia, 
meaning counter-song, a parodic text functions in opposition to or alongside another 
text.21 In either origin of the term, there is some referent text that the parodic text relies 
upon for meaning. Parody imitates some aspects of the referent text, but also creates 
"critical difference, which marks difference rather than similarity."22 Despite the 
incorporation of formal or linguistic elements from the referent text, the function of 
parody "is one of separation and contrast."23 By negotiating imitation and difference, a 
parodic text has the potential to evaluate texts without engaging in dialectic argument or 
other explicit types of arguments.    
In parody, the trope of irony is used as a signal that the text might have figurative 
meanings. Hutcheon argues, "Irony appears to be the main rhetorical mechanism for 
activating the reader's awareness of this dramatization [of the difference between two 
texts]."24 The logical relationship between parody and irony emerges from the necessity 
of duality shared by both concepts. Irony, like parody, relies upon the interaction of 
interpretations to create meaning. As Kenneth Burke notes, "Irony arises when one tries, 
                                                 
21 Hutcheon, Theory of Parody, 32. 
 
22 Hutcheon, Theory of Parody, 6. 
 
23 Hutcheon, Theory of Parody, 34. 
 
24 Hutcheon, Theory of Parody, 31. 
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by the interaction of terms upon one another, to produce a development which uses all the 
terms."25 The interaction of many terms is important, for, as Burke warns, "[I]f you 
isolate any one agent in a drama, or any one advocate in a dialogue, and see the whole in 
terms of his position alone, you have the purely relativistic."26 There is a complexity to 
irony that moves beyond content-level meanings of the terms. To this point, James P. 
McDaniel explains that irony "demands fuller recognition of surplus signification for 
effect."27 The rhetorical impact of irony comes not from discerning the content-level 
meaning of the concept expressed; rather irony demands that an auditor discern another 
meaning from that which is explicitly signified. Or, as McDaniel notes, "Miss the surplus 
and miss the point."28 When one selects a meaning—as the editors of the Intelligencer 
did—the "drama" or "surplus" of irony becomes neutralized. The fullness of the irony 
and the critical distance of parody offers a range of interpretation—a  fullness, a surplus, 
a drama. 
The productive potential of irony is connected with the concept of audience. One 
understanding of irony holds that irony implicitly constructs two audiences: One 
audience that "gets it" (the audience for the parodic text) and one audience that does not 
(the audience for the referent text). Despite the division between audiences, irony has the 
power to create and unify an audience. As Wayne Booth observes, "Often the 
predominant emotion when reading stable ironists is that of joining, of finding and 
                                                 
25 Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (1945; reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 
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26 Burke, Grammar, 512. 
 
27 James P. McDaniel, "Liberal Irony: A Program for Rhetoric," Philosophy and Rhetoric 35 (2002): 306. 
 
28 McDaniel, "Liberal Irony," 306. 
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communing with kindred spirits."29  Irony might seem to rely on division to create 
meaning; however, as Burke contends, the fullest expression of irony relies upon a 
positive relationship between audiences. Burke states, "True irony, humble irony, is 
based upon a sense of fundamental kinship with the enemy, as one needs him, is indebted 
to him, is not merely outside him as an observer but contains him within, be 
consubstantial with him."30 Indeed, there is far more uniting than dividing in true irony. 
Booth reminds us that "those who grasp any irony" are "often a larger community, with 
fewer outsiders, than would have been built by non-ironic statements."31 Irony might 
seem divisive and exclusive. However, for irony to be an efficacious rhetorical strategy, 
the central purpose of gaining adherence within an audience must be maintained. 
Irony plays an essential role in mediating the relationship between the rhetor and 
the audience in parodic discourse. Irony affords rhetors a critical distance from their 
subject without sacrificing the message. In addition to providing the author with critical 
distance from the subject matter, irony brings an audience closer to decoding or 
recognizing the parodic structuring of a text. Irony signals the presence of parody, thus 
aiding an audience in adjusting its interpretation of discourse. The competing rhetorical 
movements of irony—creating critical distance while also bringing an audience closer to 
a meaning—demonstrates the importance and fragility of irony within parodic discourse.  
The play between critical distance and meaning was particularly suited for tense 
subjects like slavery. In an early example, Benjamin Franklin (writing as "Historicus") 
applied his scathing wit to the subject of slavery in a March 23, 1790, letter to the editor 
                                                 
29 Wayne Booth, A Rhetoric of Irony (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 28. 
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31 Booth, Rhetoric of Irony, 29. 
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of the Philadelphia Federal Gazette. Franklin was responding to an argument, made in 
Congress by Representative James Jackson of Georgia, that the federal government 
should not interfere with slavery. In response, Franklin related Jackson's argument to a 
(contrived) historical example, wherein Christians were enslaved by the "Divan of 
Algiers" for the purpose of engaging in hard labor. A sect called "Erika, or Purists" 
petitioned for the slaves' freedom, to which the Divan people responded, "The doctrine 
that plundering and enslaving the Christians is unjust, is at best problematical; but that it 
is the interest of this state to continue the practice, is clear; therefore let the petition be 
rejected."32 Cloaked as a history lesson, Franklin demonstrated the hypocrisy of those 
who would decry the enslavement of Christians by Africans, while engaging in the same 
condemnable action. Had Franklin offered his anti-slavery argument explicitly, he would 
risk stirring hostilities within the pro-slavery community. The ironic inversion of 
Christians from masters to slaves allowed Franklin to stay beyond the fray of political 
arguments about slavery, while still delivering a message about the hypocrisy of 
slaveholding.  
 Parodying slavery was even more pronounced in nineteenth-century American 
literature. Literature could be more audacious in its parody, as the potentially-
confrontational critique of real social problems could be explained away as merely 
fiction. In Hugh Henry Brackenridge's serially published book, Modern Chivalry, irony 
was used to parody the dominant conceptions of race and social status.33 Brackenridge's 
                                                 
32 Benjamin Franklin to the Federal Gazette, March 23, 1790, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 
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33 Brackenridge's Modern Chivalry is made more significant when considered within the relatively sparse 
production and circulation of literature at the time. From 1779 to 1829, around 200 works of fiction were 
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narrator, Captain John Farrago, reports on a lecture at the local philosophical society, 
delivered by (to his surprise) a slave. The slave, "Cuff," was sent by his master to argue 
"that men were all once black, and that by living in snowy countries, and being bleached 
by the weather, the skin had gradually become white."34 Farrago offered a different 
account of the development of race and complexion: "I am of the opinion that Adam was 
a tall, straight-limbed, red-haired man, with a fair complexion, blue eyes, and an aquiline 
nose; and that Eve was a Negro woman." Of their progeny Farrago concludes that some 
bore the likeness of Adam and some of Eve.35 Cuff's and Farrago's arguments about race 
in Modern Chivalry reinforced the interpretation of the Counter Memorial as ironic. The 
reader of Modern Chivalry was led to the conclusion that the work was ironic through 
numerous components that defied conventional judgment. The claim that all people were 
once black, the idea that whiteness occurred through the bleaching of skin from snow, the 
different racial identities of Adam and Eve, and the notion of a black slave speaking at a 
philosophical meeting, taken as a group, moved the reader to interpret the work as 
figurative, rather than explicit argument. 
 Parody, signaled by the trope of irony, had tremendous potential to create 
meaning and reshape understandings. The covertness of parody had already provided 
some American writers with the means to critique issues of slavery and race without 
incurring the hostility that explicit arguments about slavery often created. The Counter 
Memorial similarly found utility in parody as a means to unmask the problems with 
colonization. Such parodying was not new to slavery discourse. Nonetheless, the Counter 
                                                 
34 Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry (1792-1805; reprint ed. by Lewis Leary, New Haven, CT: 
College and University Press, 1965), 131. 
 
35 Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry, 132. 
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Memorial's ironic dimensions demonstrated the critical power and potential for instability 
that parody could create in slavery discourse.  
  
Parodic Argument in the Counter Memorial: 
Pro-Colonization or Anti-Colonization? 
 In their subscription, the editors of the Intelligencer interpreted the Counter 
Memorial as an "endeavor, by ridicule, to check the progress of the Colonization Plan, 
which has recently been started in Virginia and New Jersey, and taken up in this district" 
(86-88). By demarcating the text as "well-meant irony," the editors suggested that 
Counter Memorial was not "the serious opinions of the writer" (85-86). There was much 
in the text to support the editors' observations about the use of irony within the text. 
However, the assumption that the label of irony would protect the colonization movement 
from criticism greatly underestimated the rhetorical power wielded by parody. To the 
contrary, when interpreted as a parody, the Counter Memorial added more uncertainty to 
the moderate rhetoric of colonization.36 The parodic arguments of the Counter Memorial 
brought aspects of the dialectic arguments into conversation with latent ridicule and 
questionable authorship to add more uncertainty into the discourse on colonization.   
 In the Counter Memorial, the concept of color was ironically configured to parody 
the efforts of colonizationists. The first move to parody colonization was to ground the 
text within a model (which would ultimately be the focus of the parody). The model—in 
this case, an institutionalized response to the political efforts of colonizationists—was 
                                                 
36 In this section, I position the Counter Memorial as the rhetor. This choice is consistent viewing the text 
as a parody, since the identity of the author(s) is called into question by the signs of parody. That is to say, 
were the authors really the free people of colour of the District of Columbia, or was this stated authorship 
part of the parody. 
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stated in the title of the text: "A Counter Memorial proposed, to be submitted to Congress 
on behalf of the free people of colour of the District of Columbia" (2-3). The Counter 
Memorial further established its character as an institutionalized response throughout 
most of the Counter Memorial (lines 5-62), where the language signaled an engagement 
with the political discourse of the time. The Counter Memorial invoked Christianity (8-
9), "personal liberty" (21), "authority of law" (19), and "the [C]onstitution" (30) as 
reasons why free blacks should not be transported to Africa. Although not all 
colonizationists would agree with the appropriation of such appeals by free blacks, such 
arguments were germane to the conversation on colonization. Clay and Caldwell 
mentioned the Christian motive for colonization, and Caldwell added a lengthy 
discussion of liberty and law in his featured address.37 Using language that was similar to 
colonizationists', the Counter Memorial established its participation in the same mode of 
discourse as the Colonization Society.  
 The move from the stability of the referent text to the ridiculousness of the 
parodic text was achieved by representing the colonizationists' efforts as an attempt to 
solve the problems of color. The Counter Memorial stated that free blacks in the District 
of Columbia "have been represented, by some, nuisances in the society in which they 
live, and that they will continue to be so, so long as the prejudices exist against the color 
of your memorialists" (65-67). There were few colonizationists who would find fault in 
the statement that there was a prejudice of color (at the colonization meeting Clay stated, 
"From their condition, and the unconquerable prejudices resulting from their color, they 
never could amalgamate with the free whites of this country").38 The transition to the 
                                                 
37 See the transcript of the colonization meeting in Appendix I, lines 25; 69-75; 132; 141; and 155. 
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ironic code within this Counter Memorial took shape as the Counter Memorial, with color 
as the stated problem, established the warrants to an alternative solution to the problem of 
color.  
 For their color your memorialists do not conceive themselves answerable to man, 
 it being the gift of God—but they cannot dissemble their astonishment and 
 indignation that those  who profess to acknowledge them their equals in all things 
 should make a difference of  color the cause of their transportation and 
 banishment; they were inclined to cherish the belief, that philosopher and 
 statesmen would see in those prejudices a remedy, at once  natural, easy and 
 efficacious. (67-72; emphasis in original) 
The Counter Memorial was still functioning within the code of serious public argument, 
identifying its interlocutors as "philosophers and statesmen" who would be amenable to a 
remedy that was "at once natural, easy and efficacious." Thus, to this point, there was 
nothing stated in the Counter Memorial that greatly deviated from prior public discourse 
concerning slavery and colonization. 
Within the tradition of dialectic argument, the solution would likely have been 
phrased in terms of rights, equality, liberty, or freedom. In the Counter Memorial, "your 
memorialists mean the remedy of amalgamation" (72; emphasis in original). The 
justification for this solution proceeded with tongue firmly planted in cheek. The Counter 
Memorial asserted that it was "plain and obvious" that "the enlightened benefactors of the 
African race [colonization supporters] would not hesitate to set the example for bringing 
about a state of things, which, more than any other, would hasten the accomplishment of 
their grand designs" (72-75). The "grand designs," as the Counter Memorial had framed 
                                                                                                                                                 
38 Appendix I, lines 17-19. 
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them, were the plans to eliminate the prejudice of color. The amalgamation of colors 
through intermarriage would help this goal. The Counter Memorial continued on to 
address the plausibility of amalgamation (memorialists "would not feel themselves 
degraded by intermarriages with whites"); the timeframe ("In a few generations the 
odious distinction of color would pass away"); and the advantages of amalgamation over 
colonization ("amalgamation may speedily take the place of the detestable one of 
transportation and banishment") (77-83). The logical support of amalgamation replicated 
the form taken by colonizationists at the colonization meeting; yet, that such logic was in 
support of the audacious claim of amalgamation represented the development of a claim 
against colonization through the interaction of colonization and amalgamation. 
Labeling the Counter Memorial as "well-meant irony" asserted that a single 
meaning could be derived from the text and that this meaning was not formed of "serious 
opinions." These assumptions were flawed on both accounts. To begin, the use of irony in 
the Counter Memorial could be interpreted as anti-colonization or pro-colonization. As an 
anti-colonization argument the Counter Memorial parodied the claims that colonization 
was expedient and practicable. Suggesting amalgamation as a solution (and that black 
men would not feel "degraded" by taking-up with white women) was an ironic inversion 
of social roles that was meant to mirror the ridiculous proposition that was colonization. 
As an anti-colonization argument, the Counter Memorial questioned the stability of the 
rhetorical foundations of colonization by revealing the lack of strength driving the 
colonizationists' scheme.  
Ignoring the interpretation offered by the editors (i.e., that the irony was meant to 
"check" the progress of colonization), the Counter Memorial could also function as a pro-
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colonization argument. As a pro-colonization argument, the Counter Memorial offered a 
parody of morality discourse and not of colonizationists. The key to a pro-colonization 
interpretation was the use of amalgamation to activate the concerns of white security. 
Beyond seeming ridiculous, the Counter Memorial provided a cautionary note of what 
might occur if colonization of free blacks was not supported. Far from stymieing 
colonization, suggesting amalgamation provided exigency for removing free blacks. 
Although such an argument supported colonization in general, it did so by elevating the 
concerns of the security discourse above the motivations of morality discourse. The types 
of claims that would resonate within morality discourse were offered in the early lines of 
the Counter Memorial, but only as a referent text from which the parodic text would 
eventually depart. The pro-slavery interpretation of parody in the Counter Memorial 
questioned the inclusion of morality concerns that were part of the moderate rhetoric of 
Clay and Caldwell. 
Perhaps most unsettling to the moderate rhetoric of the colonizationists was the 
general sense of uncertainty and anxiety brought by parody and its multiple layers. The 
possibility for the moderate rhetoric of colonization to be challenged from such different 
directions exposed the lack of a transcendent or transformational move in moderate 
rhetoric. The editors attempted to diminish the critical impact of the Counter Memorial, 
but they offered little that stabilized the irony within the Counter Memorial. "We have 
seen that in political or moral satire," writes Booth, "the reconstruction of ironies depends 
both on a proper use of knowledge or inference about the author and his surroundings."39 
With uncertainty about the author and the point of view, the instability of the irony 
increased. Such instability only highlighted the precarious rhetorical situation facing 
                                                 
39 Booth, Rhetoric of Irony, 120. 
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colonizationists and the failure of moderate rhetoric to overcome the discursive tensions 
of the moment. 
 
Colonizing the Discourse of Colonization: 
The Counter Memorial as Signifyin(g)  
 There was yet another meaning that could be critically discerned from the Counter 
Memorial. This third interpretation emerged from an understanding of African American 
rhetorical practices, where the dialectic and parodic elements of the Counter Memorial 
were enveloped into the rhetorical strategy of Signifyin(g).40 Signifyin(g) is a strategy of 
double-voicedness and misdirection, where rhetorical discourse seems to speak in the 
language of the powerful as a means to direct attention away from the subversive and 
constitutive meanings of the second voice. The use of the strategy of Signifiyin(g) is 
described as "Signifyin(g) on" a given text, as the efficacy of Signifyin(g) builds upon the 
ability of the discourse to speak in the first voice. By Signifyin(g) on the rhetoric of the 
colonization meeting, the Counter Memorial not only refuted the published arguments of 
colonizationists, it used the idea of amalgamation to reveal and challenge the implied 
social order of the colonization project. To delve further into the Signifyin(g) of the 
Counter Memorial, it is necessary to first, elaborate upon Signifyin(g) as a rhetorical 
practice. Then, Signifyin(g) is situated within the immediate historical context of the 
Counter Memorial. From that foundation, the Counter Memorial can be understood as an 
enactment of Signifyin(g) on the rhetoric of colonizationists. 
                                                 
40 The 'g' is placed in parenthesis to "connote the fact that the word is, more often than not, spoken by black 
people without the final g as 'signifyin' . . . The absent g is a figure for the Signifyin(g) black difference." 
Henry Louis Gates, Jr., The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of Afro-American Literary Criticism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 51.   
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Signifyin(g)—Theoretically and Historically Situated 
W. E. B. Du Bois noted the "two-ness" of the African American experience, 
where, "One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, 
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body."41 The tension that Du 
Bois describes manifests in Signifyin(g), a rhetorical strategy that depends upon the 
difficult balancing of the two voices. Signifyin(g) gains rhetorical force by inching ever-
so closely to the language of critique without going so far as to be noticed by the 
powerful class in society. If the first voice (the voice that speaks in the dominant mode of 
address) falls short of speaking in the dominant voice, allowing the second voice to be 
realized by those in power, then the misdirection element of Signifyin(g) has failed and a 
rhetor is left open to the repercussions of dissent. If the second voice (the subversive 
voice the serves to embolden those who can discern it) speaks too softly, allowing the 
dominant mode address to dominate the meaning of the discourse, then the subversive 
element of Signifyin(g) has failed and a rhetor offers little constitutive force to the 
powerless audience. The ratio between the voices is an important factor in how 
Signifyin(g) functions as a rhetorical strategy of the under privileged.  
The tropes used by African Americans in Signifyin(g) offered varying levels of 
explicit critique. In one trope, white texts are made to speak with a black voice—what 
Gates calls the trope of the Talking Book.42 In the Talking Book, the black rhetor 
composed within the formal constraints of the dominant culture. The Talking Book was 
                                                 
41 W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1907, repr. Millwood, New York: Kraus-Thomson, 1973), 3. 
 
42 Gates, Signifying Monkey, 131. Originally published in London in 1770, Gronniosaw's Narrative had 
been published in seven editions by 1811. 
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imitative of the dominant cultural norms, likely because a literate black person would 
have learned to read and write by referencing the texts of the dominant culture. What 
whites observed as mere imitation was a more complex rhetorical strategy when viewed 
within the African American tradition of Signifyin(g). What distinguished the Talking 
Book from mere imitation was the African American experience. That a black person 
published a narrative, poetry, or letters, or petitioned the government for their freedom, 
turned these texts into more than literature; they became "texts of defilement" that 
represented "a reversal of the master's attempt to transform a human into a commodity."43 
By writing (or speaking) in the hallowed space of whites, blacks Signified on the 
argument that they were more fit for slavery than intellectual endeavors.  
 An extension of the trope of the Talking Book was the trope of inversion. 
Inversion went beyond simply inserting a black voice into spheres of white dominance; 
the use of inversion served to verbally challenge one's oppression, but to do so without 
penalty.44 The trope of inversion pushed the second voice of Signifyin(g) closer to the 
surface of discourse. Inversion was frequently used in the Signiyin(g) of slave spirituals. 
Slaves would sing in the fields, where white drivers and masters freely listened. 
However, what the whites took as simple songs to pass the time could function as forms 
of protest and resistance. Slaves could communicate about escapes or uprisings, or simply 
mock their oppressors, masking the subversive message within the context of a work 
song. For example, slaves sang of their master being struck dead in the final stanza of the 
work song, "Hoe Emma Hoe": 
                                                 
43 Gates, Signifying Monkey, 128. 
 
44 Grace Sims Holt, "'Inversion' in Black Communication," in Thomas Kochman, ed., Rappin' and Stylin' 
Out (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1972), 154. 
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Caller: Master he be a hard hard man. 
Chorus: Hoe Emma Hoe, Hoe Emma Hoe. 
Caller: Sell my people away from me. 
Chorus: Hoe Emma Hoe, Hoe Emma Hoe. 
Caller: Lord send my people into Egypt land. 
Chorus: Hoe Emma Hoe, Hoe Emma Hoe. 
Caller: Lord strike down Pharaoh and set them free. 
Chorus: Hoe Emma Hoe, Hoe Emma Hoe, Hoe Emma Hoe.45 
Seeming to sing of the biblical figure Pharoah created enough diversion to allow the song 
to be sung. Yet, the song also served as an indirect criticism of slaveholder practices. This 
song was one of many examples of the use of inversion by slaves. Through inversion, 
"Negroes could be relatively candid in a society that rarely accorded them that 
privilege."46 Like the Talking Book, inversion represented the performance of a black 
voice in the controlled discursive space of elite whites. Yet, inversion went a step further, 
seeking to invert (rather than equalize) the power relationship between blacks and whites.  
In the decades prior to the publication of the Counter Memorial, the Talking Book 
was the most used strategy of public Signifyin(g) on slavery. In public discourse, 
petitions for freedom employed the language and form of petitioning the government for 
the redress of grievances, while doing so in the name of oppressed blacks.47 Petitioning 
                                                 
45 The full text of "Hoe Emma Hoe" can be found at the Colonial Williamsburg website, available at 
http://www.history.org/history/teaching/enewsletter/february03/worksongs.cfm. 
 
46 Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from 
Slavery to Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 240. 
 
47 See, for example, the numerous petitions of slaves and free blacks in Herbert Aptheker, ed., A 
Documentary History of The Negro People in the United States, Volume I: From Colonial Times Through 
the Civil War (1951; repr. New York: Citadel Press, 1990), 1-14. 
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for freedom and against slavery persisted until the gag rule was instituted in 1836; yet, 
the abolition of slavery in Northern states created large communities of free blacks. The 
members of these communities—most notably in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia—
engaged elite whites through traditional means of public argument, such as pamphlets 
and newspapers. Free blacks employed the means of democratic discourse and did so 
within the same forums in which whites discussed issues of public importance.  
The Talking Book proved a particular important strategy when the character of 
free blacks was called into question. For example, in 1793 Philadelphia, Matthew Carey 
published a pamphlet arguing that, while most free persons of color were helpful during 
the yellow fever outbreak, "the vilest of the blacks" had extorted and plundered while 
whites were vulnerable."48 The rebuttal to Carey's claims came from Absalom Jones and 
Richard Allen in the form of their pamphlet, A Narrative of the Proceedings of the Black 
People During the Late Awful Calamity, in which the authors argued, in part, that most 
free blacks were poor and that Carey made more money through the "sale of his 'scraps' 
[his account of the epidemic] than a dozen of the greatest extortioners among the black 
nurses."49 The response of Jones and Allen did not deviate from the dialectic norms of 
public arguments in the pamphlet medium; they isolated troublesome claims made by 
Carey, made counter claims, and marshaled statistical data and anecdotes in support of 
their claims concerning the portrayal of free blacks in Carey's pamphlet. The language of 
their response was the language of elite whites; the black vernacular "voice"—the mode 
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49 Absalom Jones and Richard Allen, A Narrative of the Proceedings of the Black People, During the Late 
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of expression that would be used within the slave quarters or at the meetings of free 
blacks—was not used. By delivering a reasoned response through a public medium of 
communication, Jones and Allen demonstrated their capacity to reason (which Jefferson 
and his ilk doubted). Furthermore, the presence of a black voice in such a public forum 
began the process of normalizing the presence of black voices in public argument.  
The response of Jones and Allen to Carey was not the last time the two leaders 
would assert a black presence in the dominant white public. Jones, Allen, and many other 
free black leaders organized against African colonization approximately six months 
before the colonization meeting took place. James Forten, a member of the free black 
elite in Philadelphia, wrote to well-known colonization supporter (and person of color) 
Paul Cuffe, relaying news of an anti-colonization protest meeting in June 1816.50 Despite 
being members of the African Institution—a British pro-colonization precursor to the 
Colonization Society—Jones and Allen were signatories of the 1817, "Address to the 
Humane and Benevolent Inhabitants of the City and County of Philadelphia" and the 
1819 follow-up, "The Protest and Remonstrance of the People of Colour in the City and 
County of Philadelphia"—both fervent anti-colonization texts. In both texts, the 
rhetorical approach was similar to the Narrative response to Carey. Taking the form of a 
resolution, the facts were asserted in a series of "Whereas" clauses and resolutions 
derived from those facts. The resolution was not exclusive to white governance; black 
organizations created constitutions and debated resolutions just as Congress or other 
white groups did. However, the circulation of such discourses in public had meaning for 
                                                 
50 See Julie Winch, Philadelphia's Black Elite: Activism, Accommodation, and the Struggle for Autonomy, 
1787-1848 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), 35 
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blacks beyond the explicit managerial function; it displayed the reasoning abilities of 
blacks and challenged the prevailing natural theories of racial hierarchy.  
 The works of Jones and Allen help contextualize the Counter Memorial, not only 
in terms of the rhetorical practice of Signifyin(g), but also in terms of how blacks 
Signified on colonization texts in particular. Allen, Jones, and the other leaders in 
Philadelphia represented the most common approach of how free black leaders engaged 
elite whites on public matters in the early nineteenth century, the Talking Book. The 
media and forms of argument were similar to those of elite whites; yet, the authors' free 
black identity added new layers of meaning to the texts. Jones and Allen's discourse not 
only provides a salient example of how Signifyin(g) was used in the public arguments of 
free blacks, their discourse also serves as an important unit of comparison because of 
their criticism of their work against colonization before and after the colonization 
meeting of 1816.   
When read within the immediate context of Signifyin(g) practices and anti-
colonization sentiment, the Counter Memorial sounded both resonant and discordant 
notes within its moment. Much like the advocacy of Jones, Allen, and the free black elites 
of Philadelphia, the Counter Memorial engaged the subject of colonization through the 
rhetorical norms of white public argument. There were also dimensions of the Counter 
Memorial that were not typical in the public arguments of free blacks; most notably the 
advocacy for amalgamation. In a pragmatic sense, arguing for amalgamation would likely 
decimate the perceived reasonableness of the free people of colour and invite the same 
types of restrictive measures against blacks that resulted from past challenges to white 
security. However, the rhetorical impact of Signifyin(g) concerned more than just the 
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practical considerations of the immediate context. Analyzing the Counter Memorial 
within the developing African American rhetorical practice of Signifyin(g) demonstrates 
that despite  losing the adherence with a white audience, the Counter Memorial 
succeeded in revealing the rhetorical weaknesses of the colonizationists' scheme. 
  
Signifyin(g) on Colonization in the Counter Memorial: 
The Talking Book and Inversion and the Destabilization of Moderate Rhetoric 
  The Signifyin(g) in the Counter Memorial addressed the absence of black consent 
in the actions of colonizationists. Colonizationists argued that free people of color 
maintained a "peculiar" standing as neither slaves nor freepersons—as Henry Clay 
asserted in his opening remarks of the meeting. To assert the normality of free blacks, the 
Counter Memorial employed the Talking Book to make the language of citizenship speak 
in favor of blacks. The first line of the Counter Memorial defined the memorialists as 
"free persons of colour, resident in the district of Columbia, born in the United States, 
and of parents born there also." The memorialists "know no country but that of their 
birth" and are of "good morals" (6-7). Defining the memorialists in this manner tapped 
into the language of citizenship from late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
legislative acts. The first Naturalization Act in the United States, passed in 1790, 
established the conditions of naturalization as free, white, and resident in the United 
States for two years, resident in a State for one year, of good moral character, and willing 
to swear an oath to the Constitution.51 By 1816, the naturalization standards for 
citizenship had changed very little.52  
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  The Counter Memorial stopped short of explicitly claiming that free blacks were 
citizens; such a claim would be difficult to defend given the prerequisite "whiteness" of 
citizenship at the time. Instead, the Counter Memorial's tacit argument from similarity—
that the memorialists in fact shared many characteristics of a naturalized citizen—shifted 
the social position of free blacks closer to that of a naturalized citizen (where the term 
"naturalized" carried the implicit sense of normality, not peculiarity). Even more, the 
implication of naturalization in the legal sense responded to the scientific arguments 
concerning the "natural" intellectual inferiority of blacks (a dominant logic in security 
discourse). Tracing the development of the Counter Memorial's citizenship argument 
revealed not only a strong argument against colonization, but a refutation of the degraded 
legal and intellectual status of free blacks in the United States. Working from the 
rhetorical foundation that suggested free blacks were similar to naturalized citizens, the 
Counter Memorial questioned the legality of colonizing free blacks qua naturalized 
citizens.  
Through the trope of the Talking Book, the free people of colour's Signification 
provided a subtle critique of colonizationists' arguments about the status of free blacks. 
On face, the free people of colour seemed to argue with the prescribed rhetorical norms 
of the moment. Using the memorial form, the free people of colour did not deviate from 
the rhetorical norms of the time. Groups frequently expressed their purpose through 
memorials (on January 17, 1817, the Colonization Society would do just that). 
Additionally, the free people of colour appealed to notions of rights that were part of two 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 In 1795, naturalization standards were amended by Congress. The act amended the residency 
requirement from two years to five. A new provision was added, requiring that a person seeking citizenship 
declare their intention at least three years prior to becoming a citizen. In 1802, Congress directed the clerk 
of court to record the entry of all aliens into the United States. 
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fundamentally American idioms: the Declaration of Independence (with its appreciation 
of freedom, liberty, and autonomy) and the Constitution (with its inscription of laws and 
process). As these appeals were familiar to the dominant white audience, the Counter 
Memorial spoke in the first voice (the white voice). Such familiarity provided the 
necessary diversion to make a more subversive argument about the status of free blacks 
in the United States.  
The second voice of the Counter Memorial engaged in the unfamiliar task of 
shifting agency from white colonizationists to the free blacks. The shift was made evident 
in the following passage: 
They [free people of colour] are free men and consider themselves in every 
respect qualified to determine for themselves what is, and what is not, for their 
own benefit and advantage; that indeed of all the rights and privileges which they 
hold under the constitution and laws, they consider the right to determine for 
themselves whether they be happy or not, by far the most natural, the most 
precious, and most inviolable, and your memorialists are firmly resolved never to 
part with it but with their lives. (27-33)  
The free people of colour returned to the theme of what was natural, claiming that the 
right to choose "whether they be happy of not," was "by far the most natural" of rights. 
Taking the implication of naturalization to its extreme metaphorical meaning, the free 
people of colour asserted that they were not suspended in social limbo, but were instead 
rooted in the United States. 
  The claims about rhetorical citizenship were generally advanced in the first voice 
of the dominant white culture. However, there was a more subversive message 
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empowering a black audience. By turning the hallmark arguments of the American 
Republic against whites, the memorialists used the master's tools against the master. 
What made such a move particularly empowering for the black audience was the 
covertness of the act. From a subordinate social position, there was added benefit to not 
only arguing for one's citizenship, but doing so in a manner that makes whites look 
foolish. The foolishness of whites was not brought to the surface—a move consistent 
with the trope of the Talking Book. However, to a class of people who were generally 
excluded from public discourse and oppressed by language and force, the exposure of 
white hypocrisy would be appreciated by blacks. 
  Elsewhere in the Counter Memorial, the second voice was more discernable and 
sharp. The free people of colour moved to the more transgressive strategy of inversion by 
using security arguments against colonizationists. Colonizationists had euphemized the 
fear of slave insurrections and the interracial mixing of the bloodlines, suppressing the 
intense emotion of these fears by using subdued terms and phrases. Free blacks were, 
according to Clay, "peculiarly situated;" it was the "unconquerable prejudices resulting 
from their color" that hindered their ability to "amalgamate with the free whites of this 
country."53 Divested from this description was the sordid history of how these prejudices 
became unconquerable and the agents who worked to differentiate the race. In the 
Counter Memorial, the fear that permeated the security discourse was brought to the 
surface, and its meaning was challenged, through treatments of the fear of despotism and 
the fear of Africa. 
  The fear of despotism became accessible to free blacks through their rhetorically 
constituted citizenship within the Counter Memorial. Despotism ran against the principles 
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for which Americans had fought and won a war against Great Britain. As a symbol, 
claims of despotism recalled revolutionary ideals and what it meant to be American. The 
fear of despotism that emerged in the Counter Memorial had its origin in the discourse of 
the colonization meeting. In their respective speeches, Clay and Caldwell suggested that 
free blacks were not and could not be happy in the United States due to their odd social 
position. Caldwell went so far as to apply the Declaration of Independence to free people 
of color:  
We say, in the Declaration of Independence, "that all men are created equal," and 
have certain "inalienable rights." Yet, it is considered impossible, consistently 
with the safety of the state, and certainly is impossible, with the present feelings 
towards these people, that they cane [sic] ever be placed upon this equality, or 
admitted to the enjoyment of these "inalienable rights," whilst they remain mixed 
with us.54  
Caldwell's featured address invited free blacks into the political realm through his 
application of the Declaration of Independence—perhaps the symbol of American 
political autonomy—to the condition of free blacks. Yet his use of discordant rhetorical 
appeals left room for critique. Caldwell attempted to discipline notions of equality and 
rights with "the security of the state" and the "present feelings" of most whites. Freedom 
versus security, transcendent values versus present circumstances, Caldwell's featured 
address lacked a unifying feature that remedied the tension between his appeals.  
  The free people of colour capitalized on the uncertainty of the colonizationists' 
discordant rhetorical appeals by arguing that colonization would not resolve insecurity; it 
would create it. Such a reversal was the essence of inversion. The memorialists began by 
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responding to colonizationists' claims that free people of color could not be happy living 
in the United States, a claim that Caldwell had advanced at the colonization meeting. 
From this premise, the free people of colour then noted that the colonizationists had taken 
it upon themselves to pass judgment upon the happiness of free blacks. "When therefore 
your memorialists are informed that arbitrary associations of men assume to themselves 
the power to decree that your memorialists are miserable," the memorialists responded, 
"when in truth and in fact they are content and happy, they cannot forbear in duty to 
themselves to call the attention of your honorable body to a species of despotism as 
unprecedented in this or any other country, as it is replete with evil to the best interests of 
your memorialists now and hereafter" (37-42; emphasis mine). Despotism was a political 
fear, a concern for those engaged in the body politik. Fear of despotism and tyranny 
motivated the Patriot cause in the American Revolution. Coordinate terms were used to 
support fears of despotism, as the free people of colour referred to colonization as 
"voluntary exile" (45). Where the security concerns of whites went virtually unmentioned 
and unexplained in the colonization meeting discourse, the free people of colour brought 
fear to the forefront, explicated fear in the political terminology of despotism, and 
implicated colonizationists in the perpetuation of despotism. 
  Inverting fear appeals was also made explicit in the Counter Memorial through 
the exploitation of meanings associated with Africa and its native inhabitants. At the 
colonization meeting, Africa was characterized as both a problem and a solution. Africa 
was the land of the savage, yet it was also supposed to provide the trappings of 
civilization that free blacks could not attain in the United States. Caldwell argued that 
Africa provided the necessary climate for blacks (the pacific northwest of the United 
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States being deemed too cold); yet, earlier in the deliberations, Clay used climate as a 
justification for the early failures of the British free black colony at Sierra Leone 
(although Clay did claim that the climate was "not at all insurmountable").55 Clay 
admitted that previous attempts to colonize Africa—made by Great Britain—confronted 
significant barriers "resulting from the ignorance, barbarity and prejudices of the 
natives."56 Clay argued that a significant motivation for colonization was to Christianize 
the savages of Africa, yet his façade of benevolence failed to conceal the underlying 
motivation of security. To wit, Clay asked, "can there be a nobler cause than that which 
whilst it proposes to rid our own country of a useless and pernicious, if not dangerous 
portion of its population, contemplates the spreading of the arts of civilized life and 
possible redemption from ignorance and barbarism of a benighted quarter of the globe."57 
Despite decrying the savagery of Africans, colonizationists still needed to make the case 
that Africa was the appropriate location for colonized free blacks. Portraying free black 
colonists as missionaries was one way; the other way was to admit that the taking of 
Africans as slaves was, in some way, wrong. Or, as Caldwell put it, "there ought to be a 
national atonement for the wrongs and injuries which Africa has suffered."58 Here again 
Caldwell made an expansive claim concerning the treatment of blacks; and again 
Caldwell attempted to constrain the scope of his claim. For, in this case, the "national 
atonement" was not universal emancipation, citizenship, or reparations; rather, the nation 
could atone by sending a small portion of the blacks in the United States (the free blacks) 
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to a land foreign to most of them. The tensions in Clay's and Caldwell's speeches were 
not difficult to discern. Colonizationists were stuck trying to make Africa sound like a 
fruitful location for colonization, while also maintaining the depiction of Africa's 
inhabitants (and decedents) as intellectually inferior. 
  The subversiveness of the second voice reached a climax when the memorialists 
amplified the obvious contradiction in the colonizationists' depictions of Africa, using the 
same reasoning to reach the opposite conclusion. Where Clay and Caldwell were 
somewhat hamstrung by their choice to depict Africa as a site of savagery as well as a 
nice place for free blacks to willingly relocate, the memorialists' adoption of the ironic, 
anti-Africa position was full-throated in its description of the horrors of Africa. In this 
extended excerpt from the Counter Memorial, nearly all of the negative characteristics 
associated with Africa were boldly asserted as reasons to resist colonization. 
when your memorialists are further instructed that Africa is the place selected for 
their destination, a country inhabited only by savages and wild beasts—with a 
burning sun and torturing insects—poisonous exhalations, corrupted water and 
unwholesome food, your memorialists cannot forbear to indulge a suspicion that 
something more in intended than meets the eye, and that whilst their self-styled 
benefactors profess to leave nothing in view but their prosperity and welfare, they 
are in truth and in fact resolved to banish them from the land of their fathers, 
which they dearly love, and to deliver them over to be devoured by wild beasts, or 
destroyed by ferocious savages or a pestilential climate. (46-54) 
The free people of colour not only turned the racist renderings of Africa into an argument 
that empowered free blacks in the United States, but it explicitly debunked colonization 
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as a benevolent endeavor. There was "more intended than meets the eye" in the 
colonizationists project, as the "self-styled benefactors" actually attempted "to deliver 
them [free blacks] over to be devoured by wild beasts." Colonizationists crudely 
assembled notions of white security and Christian benevolence in their attempt to initiate 
a national movement for African colonization. Africa was both Canaan and Bedlam. 
Exploiting this tension in colonizationist discourse allowed the Counter Memorial to not 
only provide more clarity on the issue of colonization, but to do so using many of the 
colonizationists' own arguments.  
  Questions concerning the reasonability and faculties of blacks, a component of 
both security and political economic discourses, were also challenged by the memorialists 
at the level of enactment (that is, if a white audience member were to read only the first 
three-quarters of the Counter Memorial; the last quarter of the Counter Memorial will be 
discussed shortly). Unlike the discourse of the colonization meeting, the free people of 
colour avoided the problem of containing rhetorical forces. The memorialists unleashed 
the full force of ideas such as citizenship, despotism, and African savagery, and allowed 
the symbols to orbit freely in the text, rather than attempting to contain the expansiveness 
of these symbols. By enacting a clear position against colonization, without spending 
energy qualifying their claims, the Counter Memorial gained momentum in its move 
against colonization. In fact, taking the authorship of the Counter Memorial at face value 
(as authored by a free black), one could explain the subscription of the editors as 
confirmation of the successful enactment of superior reasoning in the Counter Memorial. 
Popular perceptions of the inferiority of the black intellect would create dissonance when 
the deft reasoning in the Counter Memorial was ascribed to a free black. No claims to the 
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equality (or superiority) of the black intellect were made in the Counter Memorial, yet at 
the level of enactment, the free people of colour challenged the claims of inferior 
reasoning by addressing and rebuking colonization on the terms provided by 
colonizationists.  
  By employing the language and forms of argumentation used by elite whites (the 
first voice of blacks' double voice), the free people of colour inserted a free black 
perspective into a public discussion to which they were not previously a part. The 
Counter Memorial was also in conversation with other texts in which blacks sought 
access to racially regulated public forums, most notably the efforts of slaves to petition 
for their freedom. In a more immediate context, free blacks in larger Northern cities such 
as New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, exercised their freedom by inserting black 
perspectives into the realm of pamphlets and public argument. The Counter Memorial 
made an argument against colonization to the white audience who read newspapers; but it 
also conversed with earlier black texts in as much as the strategies used in previous works 
were repeated and revised in the Counter Memorial. The double-voice of the free people 
of colour—as employing acceptable means of argument in a white-controlled society 
while also subverting those norms—was perpetrated through the Talking Book. In the 
Counter Memorial, the strategy of co-opting the language and forms of one's antagonist 
was a strategy used in previous works by blacks attempting to assert their humanity. Yet, 
inversion was also at work in the Counter Memorial. Unlike most public discourses 
produced by blacks in the United States, the Counter Memorial audaciously introduced 
sexuality into the public discussion of slavery and colonization. Advocating 
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amalgamation as the solution to the problems of free blacks, the Counter Memorial 
pushed the second voice beyond the cover provided by the first voice. 
  The free people of colour challenged the quiescence concerning interracial 
relationships by not only mentioning that such activities exist, but by suggesting that the 
encouragement of racial amalgamation would solve the stated problems afflicting free 
blacks in the United States. The memorialists' progression toward amalgamation began 
with the discussion of the concept of color. "It is known to your memorialists," the free 
people of colour stated, "that they have been represented, by some, nuisances in the 
society in which they live, and that they will continue to be so, so long as the prejudices 
exist against the color of your memorialists" (64-67). The first response to the 
denigration of their color swiftly noted that "For their color your memorialists do not 
conceive themselves answerable to man, it being the gift of God" (67-68). Quickly 
asserting color as a dictate of God, the memorialists unmoored the colonization project 
from its transcendent connection to Christian benevolence. Next, the memorialists 
attacked the secular dimensions of benevolence claimed by colonizationists. That color 
was the only reason for relocating free blacks, as Clay and Caldwell articulated at the 
colonization meeting,  the Counter Memorial thusly expressed "astonishment and 
indignation" at such a trivial rationale (2). If color was the only problem concerning free 
blacks, then the nation already had within its means the ability to address the problem of 
color. Or, as stated in the Counter Memorial, "[the memorialists] were inclined to cherish 
the belief, that philosopher and statesmen would see in those prejudices a remedy, at once 
natural, easy and efficacious—your memorialists mean the remedy of amalgamation" 
(70-72). From the standpoint of "philosophers and statesmen," a position in which 
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rationality would be a presumed trait of a person, a solution that claimed to be "Natural, 
easy and efficacious" would seem difficult to oppose. Appeals to God and reason 
extended the practice of blacks using the resources of the dominant culture to assert their 
humanity. However, tropological revision was also at work in the subversive suggestion 
of amalgamation. 
  The suggestion of amalgamation Signified upon white racism through the parody 
of "color" as an a priori source of prejudice. The parodic turn became most pronounced 
when, after previously referring to Congress as "an honorable body" (26) and 
colonizationists as "self-styled benefactors" (43), amalgamation was connected to 
benevolence. It was suggested that the "enlightened benefactors of the African race 
would not hesitate to set the example for bringing about a state of things" (73-74). The 
free people of colour continued, "Among your memorialists are very many young men, of 
industrious and sober habits, of ordinary school education, and of mechanic trades, who 
would not feel themselves degraded by intermarriages with whites" (75-77). Colonization 
was not necessary, as "In a few generations the odious distinction of color would pass 
away, and the posterity of your memorialists would find themselves blended with the 
great American family" (77-79). Using the premise of "color"—which colonizationists 
used to justify their plans—the memorialists revealed the specious reasoning set forth at 
the colonization meeting.  
  The unusual suggestion of amalgamation as a remedy, rather than an ill, 
transfigured the first voice that was used in the earlier portions of the Counter Memorial. 
Using parody to challenge colonizationist efforts added another layer of meaning to the 
Counter Memorial. In the parody, amalgamation took the place of colonization and, thus, 
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free blacks took the place of the white colonizationists. The societal order was turned on 
its head.  Instead of the white "self-styled benefactors" of the colonization society, there 
were "enlightened benefactors of the African race" who "would not feel themselves 
degraded by intermarriages with whites." Agency shifted to the "African race," which, 
within the framework of the amalgamation solution, had the social standing to define 
what was beneath them. There was a novelty, and some dissonance, in a free black man 
inferring that some might see his marriage to a white woman as beneath him. The free 
people of colour assured its readers that free black men would not discriminate against 
white women. Such a reversal was not unusual within the African American rhetorical 
tradition, which had a history of "chiastic fantasies of reversal of power relationships."59  
  Within the Anglo American rhetorical tradition, however, the free people of 
colour spurned the norms of public argument as amalgamation was brought into public 
deliberations. James Callender, a white man, had done the same in his articles about 
Jefferson and Hemings in the early 1800s. Yet, despite the fact that many found 
Callender's claims truthful, he was chastised for his lack of grace and modesty.60 But the 
Counter Memorial was in the voice of free people of color and advocated, rather than 
reported, the mixing of the races. The free people of colour not only unmasked 
amalgamation in a public forum, but it transposed traditional notions of power in 
interracial relationships.  
  At this moment, the discourse concerning slavery provided two frameworks 
through which a white reader could interpret the public assertion of black agency. One 
framework was informed by the practice of blacks asserting agency using traditional 
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argumentative means (dialectic, "rational," and employing the language of elite whites) 
and media (petitions, memorials, pamphlets, and letters to newspapers). The other 
framework for interpreting the assertion of black agency was the discourse of slave 
insurrections. Arguing for amalgamation vacillated between these two frameworks. 
Amalgamation was presented as a "natural, easy and efficacious" (read: reasonable) 
response to the problem; yet, the suggestion of mixing blood implicated anxieties 
underlying the security discourse. Lacking a stable interpretive framework left questions 
as to the appropriate response to the Counter Memorial. 
  The two voices of Signifyin(g) were used by the free people of colour to 
destabilize the moderate rhetoric of colonization. Through the trope of the Talking Book, 
the presence of the black perspective challenged the white-dominated approach of 
colonizationists while also transgressing of the norms of white-dominated public 
discourse in general. The dialectic arguments advanced by the free people of colour 
(before the mention of amalgamation) seemed to conform to the argumentative norms of 
whites, a quality that gave their claims against colonizationists' credibility. In addition to 
challenging colonizationists explicitly, the second voice of Signifyin(g) subverted and 
mocked the norms of elite whites. These two voices—the serious and the subversive—
created a message that spoke differently to members of different audiences.  
 
Conclusion 
  The Counter Memorial could be reasonably interpreted within three different 
rhetorical traditions of the early nineteenth-century United States: dialectic, parodic, or 
Signifyin(g). The interpretation of the Counter Memorial within each tradition 
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compromised the rhetorical foundation of colonization efforts. Colonization rhetoric was 
also challenged by the potential uncertainty of interpretation. Not knowing the Counter 
Memorial's intended meaning could lead to a dismissal of the text, but it could also infuse 
uncertainty into the public discussion of colonization. What Clay and Caldwell had taken 
as self-evident propositions (e.g., the problem was color, the prejudice was 
unconquerable, the solution was obvious), the Counter Memorial contested. That the 
Counter Memorial could be understood as a critique of colonizationists from the 
perspective of blacks or whites suggests that the moderate rhetoric lacked identification 
with either group. 
  The uncertainty and instability of the Counter Memorial emanated most clearly 
from the suggestion of racial amalgamation. The amalgamation solution encapsulated the 
variety of forces working against colonization that the colonization meeting discourse 
failed to address. In the parodic sense, the Counter Memorial could be read as equating 
colonization with amalgamation for the purpose of demonstrating the former's 
ridiculousness. Delving deeper, amalgamation was a source of intense anxiety. 
Amalgamation represented the public objections (of whites) to mixing blood lines and it 
represented the private reality that this was already occurring. Fear of amalgamation was 
premised on a clear racial hierarchy, yet the reality of biracial children challenged the 
chromological ease with which this hierarchy could be asserted. The ease with which 
amalgamation was discussed in the Counter Memorial suggested that interracial sex was 
the norm. If so, then whites and blacks were far more connected than colonizationists had 
(or wanted to) believe. The logic of colonization depended upon the ease of the project: 
Simply move free blacks and the problems of slavery will disappear. The complex of 
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meanings bound up in amalgamation suggested that the United States was beyond the 
point where such a simple suggestion was plausible. The races and classes in the United 
States were interconnected in ways that many whites would not admit or discuss 
publicly.61  
  Interestingly, the Counter Memorial did not garner much attention or response. 
The basic arguments set forth in the Counter Memorial were echoed in the "Resolutions 
and Remonstrances" that were printed after an anti-colonization meeting of black 
Philadelphians on January 15, 1817. However, neither the Counter Memorial nor its 
memorialists were mentioned. Even more, the "Resolutions and Remonstrances" did not 
adopt the argument for amalgamation or the more figurative dimensions of Signifyin(g). 
In Part II of William Lloyd Garrison's Thoughts on African Colonization, the "Sentiments 
of the People of Color" were offered. In his introduction, Garrison asserted, "The first 
public demonstration of hostility to the colonization scheme was made in 1817, by the 
free colored inhabitants of Richmond, Virginia."62 There was no mention or reproduction 
of the Counter Memorial in the seventy-six pages concerning the sentiments of free 
blacks. The duality, nuance, and figuration may explain its omission, as many free black 
communities and abolitionists moved to address colonization head-on. 
  Moreover, the Counter Memorial did not garner the same level of attention as the 
proceedings of the colonization meeting. Free black communities took up the mantle of 
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anti-colonization and used many of the same arguments advanced in the Counter 
Memorial. Colonizationists continued to advance the same claims made at the meeting. In 
a sense, the lack of attention to the Counter Memorial represented the ultimate problem 
with the colonizationists' rhetoric: a failure to confront the dominant rhetorical tensions 
of the time. Colonizationist discourse did make pre-emptive arguments concerning cost, 
feasibility, and the willingness of free blacks to participate. But the colonizationists did 
not engage those whom they sought to colonize and Society failed to move beyond the 
basic rhetorical foundation set forth at the meeting. Rhetorician Stephen H. Browne 
argues that Garrison's Thoughts enacted a radical critique of colonization "whereby the 
language of accommodation is literally and symbolically talked off the stage of public 
reform by a dramatic reassertion of evangelical wrath."63 Well before Garrison supported, 
then decried, the colonization movement, the Counter Memorial enacted a less well-
known, less fiery, yet equally appreciable critique of colonization. Where Garrison and 
others are noted for the singularity and force of their expression against colonization, the 
Counter Memorial should be noted for its double-voicedness. If we appreciate the duality 
of the text and suspend the desire to select one meaning of the text, one can see how the 
Counter Memorial attacked the moderate rhetoric of colonization from both sides. That 
is, the moderation of colonizationists' attempts to float in the middle, between 
transcendent aims and practical purpose and between helping free blacks and helping 
whites. The attack levied by the Counter Memorial outflanked the colonizationists' 
moderate rhetoric. 
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TRACING THE IMPACT OF THE COLONIZATION MEETING 
 The colonization meeting of December 21, 1816, was a historic moment for the 
discourse of slavery in the United States. Prior to this moment, security and morality 
discourses of slavery were antagonistic to one another. The security-morality tension 
intensified the problem of slavery in American life. Yet, the potential to bring together 
differing rhetorical positions was available in the political economic discourse of the 
time. In response to the complexity of slavery in its historical moment, the American 
Society for Colonizing the Free People of Colour of the United States motivated their 
project with moderate rhetorical strategies. By using moderate rhetoric to advance the 
cause of colonization, advocates had access to rhetorical resources that could potentially 
resolve the tensions in slavery discourse. However, colonizationists, most notably Henry 
Clay and Elias Caldwell, failed to tap into the transcendent possibilities of moderate 
rhetoric. This failure was immediately exposed by the Counter Memorial of the Free 
People of Colour of the District of Columbia. Thus, even before the colonizationists had 
the opportunity to submit its Memorial to Congress or begin to raise funds, the 
weaknesses of its moderate rhetorical foundation had been exposed. Yet, one might ask, 
what was the impact of the moderate rhetoric of colonization beyond the colonization 
meeting?  
 To round out the story of the Colonization Society, it seems that this question is 
best answered in two ways. The first is to explore the pragmatic impact of the 
colonization meeting (and the Colonization Society) on slavery in the United States. The 
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pragmatic answer will provide the reader with a brief account of what happened to the 
colonization society after this meeting. Did it accomplish its goals? How many free 
blacks were colonized? Did it receive federal funds? Such details will help show the 
importance of the first meeting to the overall movement. With many of the empirical and 
historical questions about colonization explored, this discussion turns to a second answer 
to the question of impact. Here, the emphasis is placed upon the rhetorical impact of the 
colonization meeting. Rhetorical impact can be discerned by observing how symbols 
from a given moment are repeated or develop over time.1 What role did colonization play 
in the public discourse of slavery? Were the symbols used by colonizationists repeated 
across time? How did the moderate rhetoric of colonization develop and adapt over time? 
Questions such as these are addressed by looking forward from the meeting and tracing 
the symbols used by colonizationists. Ultimately, both the pragmatic and rhetorical 
explorations of impact arrive at the same conclusion: the moderate rhetoric of 
colonizationists failed to overcome the tensions of slavery and did not motivate 
colonization as a viable solution to the problem of slavery. 
 
The Pragmatic Impact of the Colonization Meeting 
One implication of the speeches of Henry Clay and Elias Caldwell was the 
articulation of the goals that a national colonization organization would attempt to 
achieve. Unlike previous efforts at colonization, the newest venture had the explicit goal 
to gain federal support for colonization. More generally, the colonization society shared 
with previous efforts the common goals of alleviating the tensions caused by slavery. 
                                                 
1 Ernest G. Bormann referred to this as "chaining out." See Ernest G. Bormann, "Fantasy and Rhetorical 
Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social Reality," Quarterly Journals of Speech 58 (1972): 396-407.  
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From a practical perspective, then, it seems appropriate to assess the degree to which the 
colonization society met its stated goals. 
Aside from the meeting, the first step to achieving federal support for colonization 
was to communicate to Congress the colonization vision. The movement for federal 
support officially began with the delivery of a Memorial to Congress on January 14, 
1817. The Memorial, signed by Society President, Bushrod Washington, continued to use 
the same appeals that Caldwell and Clay used in their speeches at the germinal meetings. 
The Memorial's description of the problem of slavery (i.e., the presence of free blacks 
within the United States) framed the issue in political terms, stating, "The intermediate 
species of population [free blacks] cannot be incorporated so as to render the Body Politic 
homogeneous and consistent in all its [members] which must be [the] essential 
consideration of every form of government."2 The Colonization Society made initial 
headway in 1819, when colonization sympathizer President James Monroe sent a naval 
officer to West Africa to negotiate the purchase of land for a colony where "recaptured 
Africans" could be located.3 The colony was named Liberia, to signify the liberty given 
to free blacks from the United States. In honor of his support, the capital of Liberia was 
named Monrovia. 
                                                 
2 The Memorial was printed in National Intelligencer, January 18, 1817; and in Annals of Congress, 14th 
Cog., 2nd sess., January 14, 1817, 481-83. 
 
3 In 1819, Charles Fenton Mercer, a leading proponent of African colonization from Virginia, authored a 
Slave Trade Act, authorizing the federal government to transport illegally-smuggled slaves back to Africa. 
Mercer and other colonizationists argued to President Monroe that the law not only authorized 
transportation back to Africa, it also authorized the president to purchase land for a colony. Monroe, a 
colonization sympathizer from his years as governor of Virginia, accepted such an interpretation and sent 
U.S. naval officer Robert Stockton to present-day Liberia to negotiate for land. See P. J. Staudenraus, The 
African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 34, 50-56, 63-
66.  
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The purchase of the colony did not end colonizationists' request for government 
funds. For instance, in 1827, the ACS asked for more federal subsidies and Virginia 
Representative Charles Fenton Mercer submitted a bill for support of colonization in 
1830.4 The ACS was gaining enemies in Congress, most notably (and vociferously) from 
the Lower South. The continued pursuit of federal support by colonizationists—and the 
responses it drew from opponents—led the Jackson administration to halt payments to the 
ACS in the fall of 1830. Colonizationists would continue to petition Congress for 
financial support, however, the days of federally-funded African colonization were all but 
over. From 1830 onward, the ACS relied upon the fundraising efforts of its state-based 
auxiliary societies and private funding for its efforts.5 
Colonization not only received a lukewarm response from Congress, but 
eventually from willing colonists as well. In the Northern states, the free black 
community numbered nearly 100,000 in 1820. Yet, from 1820 to 1830, only one hundred 
and fifty-four black Northerners emigrated to Liberia.6 In the South, free blacks seemed 
more willing to embrace colonization, with seven-hundred and twenty men, women, and 
children departing for Liberia in the 1820s.7 Manumissions were similarly small. Six 
freedpersons were transported to Liberia between 1820 and 1825. The numbers increased 
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over the next five years, with four-hundred seventy nine bondspersons being freed and 
transported to Liberia by 1830.8 From 1817 to 1899, the ACS colonized 15, 386 free 
blacks to Liberia and raised $2,762,467.87 from private donors.9 The quantitatively 
insignificant efforts of the ACS became evident to many—like Alexis de Tocqueville, 
who pointed out that 2,500 free blacks were sent to Liberia in the first twelve years the 
Society's efforts, but that the black population in the South had increased by 700,000 
during that same time.10 Even still, slaveholders throughout the Upper South—most 
notably in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee—continued to 
inquire about emancipating slaves for the purpose of their removal to Liberia. 
 The colony (and later, republic) of Liberia played an ironic role in the overall 
story of the Colonization Society. For most colonizationists, Liberia represented the end 
of their work. Once free blacks were removed, the United States would become the 
thriving, safe, and productive republic that colonizationists thought it could be. Yet in the 
long term, Liberia represents the most lasting legacy of the Colonization Society. The 
formation of Liberia was inauspicious. The first colonists sponsored by the Society 
arrived at Sherbro Island in 1821, but suffered such great hardships that they moved the 
next year to Cape Mesurado, on the coast of mainland Liberia. With subsequent voyages, 
colonists struggled with disease and famine on land and on shore. Health concerns were 
not the only struggles for colonists. The relationship between the Colonization Society 
and its colonists was also tenuous. So too was the relationship between the colonists and 
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the native tribes.11 Liberia gained its independence from the United States in July of 
1847, but, as colonization literature reported, "The tastes, and customs, and sympathies of 
the people are eminently American."12 For example, Liberians wrote their own 
Declaration of Independence and Constitution. They established a legislature with a 
House of Representatives and a Senate. Moreover, they were led by a president and a 
vice-president.  
 Unfortunately, aspects of cultural dominance also made the passage from the 
United States to Liberia. The Colonial Governor of Liberia reported in 1836, that "the 
marriage of a colonist with any one of the neighboring tribes was considered exceedingly 
disreputable, and subjected the individual to the contempt of his fellow citizens."13 At 
least one colonist openly maintained that the native Africans ought to be slaves to the 
colonists.14 Even after Liberian independence was achieved, the fissure remained. In May 
of 1879, Liberia's vice-president, Daniel B. Warner, urged intermarriage as a way to 
breach the divide between settlers and natives. However, Warner recognized that "it 
would require on the part of the man of the least culture, strong moral courage to break 
through the strong prejudice against the intermarriage of the colonists and natives which 
prevails here among Americo-Liberians."15  
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 The attitude persists even today. Helene Cooper, a Liberian by birth, writes in an 
April 6, 2008, New York Times Magazine article, "In Liberia, we are called the Congo 
People—my family and the rest of the freed American blacks who founded Liberia back 
in 1821. It is a somewhat derogatory term, used by the native Liberians. . . We got the 
native Liberians back by calling them Country People—far more derogatory, in our 
eyes."16 Although thousands of miles from U.S. shores, and well beyond the 
consciousness of most Americans, then and now, Liberia has much in common with its 
paternal colonizer. 
 Liberian independence did not end support for colonization in U.S. political 
discourse.  It should not be surprising that Abraham Lincoln supported colonization. 
Lincoln's political hero was Henry Clay, a man whom the future president admired for his 
moderation. In his eulogy of Clay, Lincoln opined,  
 If, as the friends of colonization hope, the present and coming generations of our 
 countrymen shall by any means succeed in freeing our land from the dangerous 
 presence of slavery, and at the same time in restoring a captive people to their 
 long lost fatherland with bright prospects for the future, and this too so gradually 
 that neither races nor individuals shall have suffered by the change, it will indeed 
 be a glorious consummation.17  
Like Clay, Lincoln argued that colonization was a moderate solution to the rising tensions 
caused by slavery. Lincoln articulated his support for colonization in his Springfield 
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speech during the 1857 Illinois senatorial debates. In that speech, Lincoln observed that 
"the separation of the races in the only perfect preventative of amalgamation. . . . Such 
separation, if ever effected at all, must be effected by colonization."18 Once president, 
Lincoln continued to advocate colonization as a remedy to the problems of slavery. 
Lincoln featured colonization in his annual messages to Congress in December of 1861 
and again in December, 1862.19 In between these two messages, Lincoln invited free 
blacks to the White House to discuss the virtues of colonization, after which he delivered 
an address on colonization.20 Lincoln has been canonized as the "Great Emancipator," yet 
in the month before he signed the Emancipation Proclamation the president was still 
supporting colonization—and not emancipation—as the solution to the problems of 
slavery. 
 Even with the support of colonization from Lincoln, the U.S. Civil War 
complicated and compromised the efforts of colonizationists. The confusion of wartime 
and the failure of Lincoln's efforts in the Caribbean hampered any colonization efforts.21 
Colonization was further impacted by the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which granted citizenship to all freedmen. The most significant reason to leave the United 
States for Liberia or the Caribbean was to gain freedom. After the Reconstruction 
Amendments passed, that impetus was void. The Colonization Society attempted to 
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secure government funds once more, in 1867, asking Representative Thaddeus Stevens 
(R-PA) to include $50,000 in an appropriation bill to aid in the emigration of African 
Americans to Liberia. Congress refused the request and ridiculed the society.22 
 After 1865, the Colonization Society withered away. The raison d'être of the 
Society—the peculiarly situated free black in a slave society—was gone. Those who 
maintained connections to the Colonization Society turned their focus on the success of 
the Liberian nation and African civilization. By 1909, five surviving members 
bequeathed the records of the Society to the Library of Congress. The organization 
formally disbanded in 1965.  
 Although the Colonization Society faded from political relevance, the concept of 
African Americans relocating to Africa did not disappear. Colonization was refashioned 
in the 1910s and 1920s with the Back to Africa movement of Jamaican emigrant Marcus 
Garvey. Garvey was the charismatic leader of the Universal Negro Improvement 
Association and advocated that blacks everywhere work to reclaim Africa from European 
colonizers. Garveyism, as it was sometimes called, was most prominent in the United 
States from approximately 1914 to 1927, but had an international resonance beyond this 
period. Garveyism was different than colonization because, at its core, it professed 
African empowerment. The movement was not led by white people telling the blacks 
where to go, it was led by blacks telling the whites where to go. Despite the message of 
empowerment, Garvey's emigration plans suffered from many of the same critiques that 
the moderate rhetoric of colonization had seen. Prominent intellectual and African 
American historian W. E. B. Du Bois stated, "Marcus Garvey is, without doubt, the most 
dangerous enemy of the Negro race in America and in the world. He is either a lunatic or 
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a traitor."23 Du Bois saw Garveyism as a movement that legitimized racism and 
discrimination through the same means as had previously been attempted: segregation. In 
a move that would only confirm Du Bois's critique, Garvey's American supporters—
under the name of the Peace Movement of Ethiopia—worked with white supremacists to 
federally fund the "repatriation" of African Americans. This effort, undertaken in 1937, 
was called the Greater Liberia Act and was introduced by Senator Theodore Bilbo (D- 
MS). The act aimed to federally fund the removal of twelve million African Americans to 
help solve the nation's unemployment issues of the time. From the period spanning World 
War I to World War II, colonization was part of the American discourse on race relations 
in the United States.  Whether the movement was termed emigration, Back to Africa, 
Garveyism, or repatriation, the relationship between the United States, Africa, and the 
peoples of both continents continued to be complicated. 
  In practical terms, the Colonization Society did receive federal support, though 
never at the level it desired and certainly not enough to significantly impact the institution 
of slavery. Furthermore, the governmental support that was received did not help quell 
the tensions of slavery nor lead to the development of a flourishing republic in West 
Africa. Nonetheless, the idea of colonization continued to circulate in U.S. politics. 
   
The Rhetorical Impact of the Colonization Meeting 
 If one judges the Colonization Society by its success in gaining federal support 
and ending the problems of slavery, it would not be difficult to reach definitive 
conclusion. However, as Marie Tyler-McGraw argues, "A political interpretation of the 
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Colonization Society inadequately describes its quixotic appeal, its rhetoric, or its local 
level of persistence."24 The use of moderate rhetoric explains both the longevity of the 
movement and its enduring failure to transcend the problems of slavery. The initial 
failures of colonization's moderate rhetoric were detailed in Chapters Three, Four, and 
Five of this project. Here, a broader assessment of the colonization meeting's rhetorical 
impact is considered. The persistence of colonization beyond the meeting can be 
understood in terms of three rhetorical legacies that emanated from this event: the legacy 
of the meeting, the legacy of moderation, and the legacy of critique. 
   
Legacy of the Meeting and Nostalgia 
 Casting its gaze upon the nation's legislators—and the national purse—the 
Colonization Society organizers sought out well-regarded men to advance their cause. 
Recruiting Bushrod Washington, Henry Clay, and Elias B. Caldwell to speak at the 
meeting signaled that name and celebrity of character were important aspects of the 
Colonization Society's efforts. Attracting high-profile support for colonization remained 
part of the Colonization Society's efforts; still, the men who were a part of the Society's 
founding held a special place in the discourse surrounding colonization. The "Founders of 
this Institution" were associated with "wisdom, patriotism and philanthropy" and 
"operated for in all directions, and without assignable limit."25 Founders were described 
as "eminent" men who "clearly foresaw the vast extent of good" in colonization.26 
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Colonization Society literature praised the "Fathers of the American Colonization 
Society" for creating a scheme that "like the air and light of Heaven" would benefit all 
humans by its existence.27 Even after Liberia declared its independence and the 
Colonization Society dwindled in support, praise of the founders continued. Credit for the 
sovereign Liberian state was connected to the Society's founders, with one article stating, 
"In the organization and progress of the American Colonization Society, to which Liberia 
owes its origin and existence, many of the most illustrious of our public men have given 
the benefit of their wise counsel and powerful support."28 Thus, the founders' ethos 
provided both immediate and long-term appeal for colonizationists. 
 Much like Washington, Jefferson, and Madison were heralded as founding fathers 
of the U.S. republic, Clay, Caldwell, Bushrod Washington, Rev. Robert Finley, Charles 
Fenton Mercer, and others were canonized in pro-colonization literature.29 In 1825, a 
"concise history" of the not-yet-decade-old Colonization Society was offered in its 
literary organ, African Repository and Colonial Journal. In that account, Finley was 
portrayed as the initiator of the Colonization Society, having "aroused the whole vigour 
of his intellect, to form plans for their relief."30 In the Eleventh Annual Report of the 
Colonization Society, the history of meeting preceded the familiar arguments about 
practicability and effects of colonization. The report praised Finley and Caldwell as 
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progenitors of the meeting and mentioned Clay and Washington by name as well.31 The 
Fifteenth Annual Report of the Colonization Society expanded the paternity of 
colonization beyond Finley (though he was effusively praised), implicating Thomas 
Jefferson, Ferdinando Fairfax (a wealthy Virginian landowner), Granville Sharp (an 
antislavery advocate in Great Britain), and Chief Justice John Marshall as founders.32 
Later articles described Mercer as "The American Wilberforce"—a reference to the well-
known British anti-slavery advocate.33 The men (and they were all men) that were praised 
as founders afforded the Colonization Society with political, social, and moral authority. 
Such rehearsals of reverence grounded the society in a rich tradition of U.S. statesmen. 
From such a strong foundation, created by their eminent founders, colonizationists 
continued to argue the benefits of colonization. 
 Although praising the founders offered the Colonization Society a degree of 
authority, such reverence also worked in opposition to the group's scheme. Praise of the 
founders looked backward and not forward, which constrained a movement that still had 
not achieved its goal of widespread colonization. Instead of motivating future action, the 
repeated praise of the founders was nostalgic, or "a yearning for yesterday."34 As Shawn 
J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles note, "Nostalgic appeals are . . . structurally 
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conservative," as "the rhetor invites the audience to validate the past in opposition to a 
vision for the progressive future."35 The conservatism of the Colonization Society's 
nostalgia served as an extension of their failed moderate rhetoric. Focusing on the strong 
character and elevated intellect of the founders was consistent with the rhetorical 
practices at the colonization meeting, and in both cases the focus on character was not 
enough to address the security-morality tension in slavery discourse. Praising the 
founders gave the Colonization Society historical significance, but it did not give the 
project legitimacy in the present or future. 
 
Legacy of Moderation and Benevolence 
 The speeches of Clay and Caldwell at the colonization meeting began the process 
of reducing moderate rhetoric to the affection of benevolence. The reduction of 
colonization to benevolence was perpetuated in the Memorial to Congress of the 
Colonization Society from January 14, 1817, where Southern (slaveholding) supporters 
of colonization were described as "benevolent or conscientious proprietors."36 The same 
characterization was conveyed twenty years later in the Commercial Herald and 
Pennsylvania Herald, where the Colonization Society was described as "originated by 
benevolent and pious citizens of the south, and joined by citizens of the north."37   
Blending the nostalgia for founders and the focus on benevolence, one writer proclaimed, 
"These great men [Colonization Society founders] saw the comprehensive benevolence 
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of the scheme they proposed."38 Subsequent reports from the Colonization Society 
continued to emphasize the benevolent motivation of colonizationists. In the Eleventh 
Annual Report of the Society, colonization to Africa was justified because "if ever the 
vast continent is to experience the blessings of civilization, it must be through the 
medium of foreign benevolence."39 Another correspondent to the African Repository 
wrote of Liberia, "Let her have our help, and our great debt to Africa is paid by our 
benevolence."40 Harkening to Clay's reference to the "great moral debt" owed to Africa, 
benevolence was given tremendous power as it was benevolence, not freedom, liberty, or 
justice that would settle the United States' debt to blacks.41 By describing colonization 
and its supporters as benevolent, rhetors attempted to establish the motivations for 
colonization as beyond reproach. 
 Yet, benevolence was a complicated concept, which created the potential to 
criticize the supposedly-noble motivations of colonizationists. In one criticism of 
colonizationists' benevolence, rhetors accepted benevolence as the guiding principle but 
noted that emancipation was a better means of enacting benevolence. A committee of free 
blacks in Wilmington, Delaware, drafted an address stating, "But we beg leave most 
respectfully to ask the friends of African colonization, whether their Christian 
benevolence cannot in the country be equally as advantageously applied, if they are 
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actuated by that disinterested spirit of love and friendship for us, which they profess?"42 
Virginian Edmund Ruffin charged, "These counselors could act with similar facilities and 
success in inciting as a pious work the testamentary emancipation of the slaves." 
Emancipation was "unquestionably benevolent and pious," while many slaveholding 
supporters of colonization "had indicated anything but piety, benevolence, or a delicate 
sense of propriety."43 Simply because colonizationists claimed their scheme to be 
benevolent, did not make it so, nor was colonization the most benevolent option. 
  In Thoughts on African Colonization, William Lloyd Garrison tactfully and 
carefully unpacked the meaning of benevolence in relation to colonization, demonstrating 
that a claim of benevolence was not a justifiable motivation. Of colonizationists, Garrison 
"concede[d] to them benevolence of purpose and expansiveness of heart," but goes on to 
state,  
 I blame them, nevertheless, for taking this mighty scheme upon trust; for not 
 perceiving and rejecting the monstrous doctrines avowed by the master spirits in 
 the crusade; and for feeling so indifferent to the moral, political and social 
 advancement of the free people of color in this their only legitimate home.44 
Garrison's critique appreciated that colonizationists were attempting to do good, but he 
was also quite clear in asserting that colonizationists' perception of "good" was morally 
flawed.  Three years after Garrison's Thoughts was published, William Jay similarly 
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isolated the claims of colonization as a "benevolent system" and refuted the system as a 
self-interested scheme of slaveholders.45 
 The concept of benevolence became a significant point of contention between 
colonizationists and anti-colonizationists. Although supporters used the term for its 
(supposedly) self-evident implications of morality, opponents of colonization discussed 
the term as a mask for self-interested and immoral actions against free blacks. Recalling 
Adam Smith's discussion of the impartial spectator, the impartial spectator adjudicates 
the morality of an action by considering how a person divested of interest would judge 
the action. This sense of disinterestedness gave moderate rhetoric its grounding and 
authority. By connecting benevolence to self-interest, anti-colonization advocates 
challenged the moderate rhetorical impact of benevolence. Once associated with self-
interested slaveholders, colonization shifted toward one side of the security-morality 
tension in slavery discourse (namely, the security side). Thus, the critique of 
colonizationists' benevolence as being concerned with the security of slaveholders 
stripped benevolence, and the Colonization Society, of its standing as a moderate 
rhetorical approach to the tensions in slavery discourse. 
  
Legacy of Critique and Radicalism 
The moderate rhetoric of colonizationists did not overcome the discursive 
tensions in slavery. To the contrary, the moderate rhetoric of colonization became a 
catalyst for the abolitionist movement and radical opposition to slavery. The Counter 
Memorial of the Free People of Colour provided a glimpse into the variety of ways that 
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colonization could be destabilized, by pro-slavery and anti-slavery advocates alike.46 
After the Counter Memorial, free black leaders Richard Allen, Absalom Jones, James 
Forten, and others led meetings of thousands of blacks in Philadelphia who unanimously 
opposed the Colonization Society.47 Many responses to colonization refuted 
colonizationists through dialectical argument.48  
Some of the most notable anti-slavery rhetors and discourses positioned 
colonization as a significant detriment to the cause of African American rights. Article 
Four of David Walker's Appeal was devoted entirely to the Colonization Society. Once a 
member of the Colonization Society, Garrison devoted considerable attention to 
denouncing colonization in Thoughts and in his newspaper, The Liberator.49  Maria 
Miller Stewart poetically ridiculed colonization thusly: "But ah, methinks their hearts are 
so frozen towards us, they had rather their money should be sunk in the ocean than to 
administer it to our relief."50 In 1849, Frederick Douglass proclaimed, "the Colonization 
Society is one of the most impudent Societies in the world."51 In moments when notable 
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African Americans supported colonization, as was the case with Henry Highland Garnet, 
abolitionists responded negatively.52  
Finally, much in the same way the Counter Memorial played with ridicule, 
abolitionist rhetors responded to colonization with humor and ridicule. Douglass 
delivered numerous speeches in which he illuminated the anti-black motivation of 
colonizationists through irony. For example, in an 1849 speech in New York, Douglass 
opened by stating: 
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen: The resolution which I have been called 
 upon to second is an appeal to the people of Great Britain from us, not to unite 
 with our enemies against us, but to set their faces against our enemies and thereby 
 help us. I shall return to this resolution after I have said a few things in favour of 
 Colonization and against ourselves.53 
Douglass went on to discuss the motivations of colonizationists and the good they 
claimed to be doing. At the conclusion of this description, he stated, "Now are we not an 
ungrateful class of people?" which received laughter from the audience.54 Colonization 
provided abolitionists not only with a serious movement to rebut, but with a host of 
unstable arguments that could be ridiculed and, thus, further destabilized. 
Conclusion 
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 In sum, the moderate rhetoric that colonizationists expounded allowed the 
movement to persist, though without much success. The failed attempt at moderate 
rhetoric that defined the Colonization Society and that pervaded subsequent colonization 
discourses was roundly criticized. Thus, any potential that colonization had to overcome 
the discursive tensions of slavery was diminished from the Society's foundation. The 
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The Meeting on  the Colonization of Free Blacks 1 
[REPORTED FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER] 2 
At Davis's Hotel, Saturday, Dec. 21, 1816 3 
 4 
 Mr. HENRY CLAY, of Kentucky having been called to the Chair and Mr. 5 
THOMAS DOUGHERTY, of this District, having been appointed Secretary— 6 
 Mr. CLAY (on taking the chair) said that he had hoped to have seen called to the 7 
place, for which he had the honor of being selected, a gentleman* who, from his name[,] 8 
his exalted station, and his distinguished virtues, would have communicated an additional 9 
importance to the present meeting. But, as that gentleman was not present, Mr. C. 10 
regretted to learn, from causes beyond his control, he would with great pleasure endeavor 11 
to discharge the duties of the chair. He understood the object of the present meeting, to be 12 
to consider of the propriety and practicability of colonizing the free blacks of color of the 13 
United States and of forming an Association in relation to that object. That class, of the 14 
mixt population of our country, was peculiarly situated. They neither enjoyed the 15 
immunities of freemen, nor were they subject to the incapacities of slaves, but partook in 16 
some degree of the qualities of both. From their condition, and the unconquerable 17 
prejudices resulting from their color, they never could amalgamate with the free whites of 18 
this country. It was desirable, therefore, both as it respected them, and the residue of the 19 
population of the country, to drain them off. Various schemes of colonization had been 20 
thought of, and a part of our own continent, it was supposed by some, might furnish a 21 
suitable establishment for them. But, for his part, Mr. C. said, he had a decided 22 
preference for some part of the coast of Africa. There ample provision might be made for 23 
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the colony itself, and it might be rendered instrumental to the introduction, into that 24 
extensive quarter of the globe, of the arts, civilization and Christianity. There was a 25 
peculiar, a moral fitness in restoring them to the land of their fathers. And if, instead of 26 
the evils and sufferings which we had been the innocent cause of inflicting upon the 27 
inhabitants of Africa, we can transmit to her the blessings of our arts, our civilization and 28 
our religion, may we not hope that America will extinguish a great portion of that moral 29 
debt which she has contracted to that unfortunate continent? We should derive much 30 
encouragement in the prosecution of the object which had assembled us together, by the 31 
success which had attended the colony of Sierra Leone. That establishment had 32 
commenced about 20 or 25 years ago, under the patronage of private individuals in Great 33 
Britain. The basis of the population of the colony consisted of the fugitive slaves from the 34 
Southern states during the Revolutionary war, who had been first carried to Nova Scotia, 35 
and who afterwards, about the year 1792, upon their own application, almost in mass, had 36 
been transported to the western coast of Africa. This colony, after struggling with the 37 
most unheard of difficulties—difficulties resulting from the ignorance, barbarity and 38 
prejudices of the natives; from the climate (which were, however, found to be not at all 39 
insurmountable;—from wars, African as well as European; and such as are incidental to 40 
all new settlements) had made a gradual and steady progress, until it has acquired a 41 
strength and stability which promises to crown the efforts of its founders with complete 42 
success. We have their experience before us; and can there be a nobler cause than that 43 
which whilst it proposes to rid our own country of a useless and pernicious, if not 44 
dangerous portion of its population, contemplates the spreading of the arts of civilized 45 
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life and possible redemption from ignorance and barbarism of a benighted quarter of the 46 
globe. 47 
 It was proper and necessary distinctly to state, that he understood it constituted no 48 
part of the object of this meeting to touch or agitate, in the slightest degree, a delicate 49 
question connected with another portion of the colored population of our country. It was 50 
not proposed to deliberate upon, or consider at all, any question of emancipation, or that 51 
was connected with the abolition of slavery. It was upon that condition alone, he was 52 
sure, that many gentlemen from the south and the west, whom he saw present, had 53 
attended, or could be expected to co-operate. It was upon that condition, only, that he had 54 
himself attended. He would only further add, that he hoped, in their deliberations, they 55 
would be guided by that moderation, politeness and deference for the opinion of each 56 
other, which were essential to any useful result. But when he looked around and saw the 57 
respectable assemblage, and recollected the humane and benevolent purpose which had 58 
produced it, he felt it unnecessary to insist farther on this topic. 59 
 Mr. ELIAS B. CALDWELL (of this district) then rose. He said he had hoped that 60 
the task of bringing forward the business of this day would have devolved on some 61 
person better qualified than himself for this purpose, and with greater claims to the public 62 
attention; and he felt peculiar embarrassment in obtruding himself upon the notice of so 63 
large and respectable a meeting, in which he found some of the most distinguished 64 
characters in our country. I bespeak (said he) your indulgence in offering to the 65 
consideration of the meeting, the resolutions which I hold in my hand, and to a few 66 
explanatory observations. The objects of the meeting have been feelingly and correctly 67 
stated by the honorable chairman. The subject seems to be divided into— 68 
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 1st. The expediency; and 2dly, the practicability of the proposed plan. The 69 
expediency of colonizing the free people of colour in the United States, may be 70 
considered in reference to its influence on our civil institutions, on the morals and habits 71 
of the people, and on the future happiness of the free people of colour. It has been a 72 
subject of unceasing regret, and anxious solicitude, among many of our best patriots and 73 
wisest statesmen from the first establishment of our independence, that this class of 74 
people should remain, a monument of reproach, to those sacred principles of civil liberty, 75 
which constitute the foundation of all our constitutions. We say, in the Declaration of 76 
Independence, "that all men are created equal," and have certain "inalienable rights." Yet, 77 
it is considered impossible, consistently with the safety of the state, and certainly is 78 
impossible, with the present feelings towards these people, that they can ever be placed 79 
upon this equality, or admitted to the enjoyment of these "inalienable rights," whilst they 80 
remain mixed with us. Some persons may declaim, and call it prejudice. No matter—81 
prejudice is as powerful a motive, and will as certainly exclude them, as the soundest 82 
reason. Others may say, they are free enough. If this is a matter of opinion, let them 83 
judge—if of reason-let it be decided by our repeated and solemn declarations, in all our 84 
public acts. This state of society, unquestionably tends, in various ways to injure the 85 
morals and destroy the habits of industry among our people. This will be acknowledged 86 
by every person who has paid any attention to the subject; and it seems to be so generally 87 
admitted, that it would promote the happiness of the people, and the interest of the 88 
country, to get rid of this population, that it is unnecessary to dwell on this branch of the 89 
subject. 90 
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 As to the Blacks, it is manifest that their interest and happiness would be 91 
promoted, by collecting them together where they would enjoy equal rights and 92 
privileges with those around them. A state of degradation is necessarily a state of 93 
unhappiness. It debases the mind; it cramps the energies of the soul, and represses every 94 
vigorous effort towards moral or intellectual greatness. How can you expect from them 95 
any thing great or noble, without the motives to stimulate or the rewards to crown great 96 
and noble achievements? It not only prevents their climbing the steep and rugged paths of 97 
fame, but it prevents the enjoyment of the true happiness of calm contentment, satisfied 98 
with enjoying but a part of what we possess, of using only a portion of what is in our 99 
power. Take away, however, the portion that is not used, and it immediately becomes the 100 
object of our fondest desires. The more you improve the condition of these people, the 101 
more you cultivate their minds, the more miserable you make them in their present state. 102 
You give them a higher relish for those privileges which they can never attain & turn 103 
what we intend for a blessing into a curse. No, if they must remain in their present 104 
situation, keep them in the lowest state of degradation and ignorance. The nearer you 105 
bring them to the condition of brutes, the better chance do you give them of possessing 106 
their apathy. Surely, Americans ought to be the last people on earth, to advocate such 107 
slavish doctrines, to cry peace and contentment to those who are deprived of the 108 
privileges of civil liberty. They who have so largely partaken the blessings—who know 109 
so well how to estimate its value, ought to be among the foremost to extend it to others. 110 
 I will consider the practicability of colonization under three heads: The territory—111 
the expense—and the probability of obtaining their consent. 112 
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 1. The territory—Various places have been mentioned by different persons: a 113 
situation within our own territory would certainly possess many advantages. It would be 114 
cheaper, and more immediately under the eye and control of out government. But there 115 
are some real and some apprehended evils to encounter. Many apprehend that they might 116 
hereafter join the Indians, or the nations bordering on our frontiers in case of war, if they 117 
were placed so near us - that the colony would become the asylum of fugitives and 118 
runaway slaves—added to these difficulties, there are inveterate prejudices against such a 119 
plan, in so large a portion of the country, which perhaps it would be impossible to 120 
overcome or remove. The North West Coast of the Pacific ocean, mentioned in the 121 
proceedings of the Virginia Legislature on this subject, appears to me, with great 122 
deference to that body, to be equally objectionable. The difficulty of procuring a territory 123 
there would be greater than in Africa; the climate is too cold for their constitutions; the 124 
transporting them more expensive, the route by water is much farther and of more 125 
difficult navigation—by land, in the present state of the intermediate country, long, 126 
hazardous, tedious and expensive. Upon mature reflection, with all the light that has yet 127 
been shed upon the subject, I believe it will be found that Africa will be liable to the 128 
fewest objections. The territory could be more easily procured there; the climate is best 129 
adapted to their constitutions, and they could live cheaper. But, Mr. Chairman, I have a 130 
greater and nobler object in view, in desireing them to be placed in Africa. It is the belief 131 
that through them civilization and the Christian religion would be introduced into that 132 
benighted quarter of the world. It is the hope of redeeming fifty millions of people from 133 
the lowest state of ignorance and superstition, and restoring them to the knowledge and 134 
worship of the true god. Great and powerful as are the other motives to this measure; and 135 
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I acknowledge them to be of sufficient magnitude to attract the attention and to call forth 136 
the united efforts of this nation, in my opinion, and you will find it the opinion of a large 137 
class of the community, all other motives are small and trifling compared with the hope 138 
of spreading among them a knowledge of the gospel. From the importance of this view of 139 
the subject, permit me to enlarge a little upon it. Whatever may be the difference of 140 
opinion among the different denominations of Christians, I believe they will all be found 141 
to unite in the belief that the scriptures predict a time, when the gospel of Jesus Christ 142 
shall be spread over every part of the world, shall be acknowledged by every nation, and 143 
perhaps shall influence every heart. The opinion is, perhaps, as general, that this glorious 144 
and happy day is near at hand. The great movements and mighty efforts in the moral and 145 
religious world, seem to indicate some great design of Providence on the eve of 146 
accomplishment. The unexampled and astonishing success attending the various and 147 
numerous plans which have been devised and which are now in operation in different 148 
parts of the world, and the union and harmony with which christians of different 149 
denominations unite in promoting these plans clearly indicate a Divine hand in their 150 
direction. Nay, sir, the subject on which we are now deliberating has been brought to 151 
public view, nearly about the same time in different parts of our country. In New Jersey, 152 
New York, Indiana, Tennessee, Virginia, and perhaps other places not know to me, the 153 
public attention seems to have been awakened, as from a slumber, to this subject. The 154 
belief that I have mentioned leads christians to look with anxious solicitude and joyful 155 
hope to every movement, which they believe to be instrumental in accomplishing the 156 
great designs of Providence. They will receive your proposal with joy and support it with 157 
zeal; and permit me to say, that it will be of no small consequence to gain the zealous 158 
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support and co-operation of this portion of the community. On the subject of the expence, 159 
I should hope there would not be much difference of opinion. All are interested, though 160 
some portions of the community are more immediately so than others. We should 161 
consider that what affects a part of our country is interesting to the whole. Besides, it is a 162 
great national object, & ought to be supported by the national purse. And, as has been 163 
justly observed by the honorable gentleman in the chair, there ought to be a national 164 
atonement for the wrongs and injuries which Africa has suffered. For although the state 165 
legislatures commenced early after our independence to put a stop to the slave trade and 166 
the national government interfered as soon as the constitution would permit, yet as a 167 
nation, we cannot rid ourselves entirely from the guilt and disgrace attending that 168 
iniquitous traffic until we, as a nation, have made every reparation in our power. If, 169 
however, more funds are wanting than it is thought expedient to appropriate out of the 170 
public treasury, the liberality and the humanity of our citizens will not suffer it to fail for 171 
want of pecuniary aid. I should be sorry, however, to see our government dividing any 172 
part of the honor and glory which cannot fail of attending the accomplishment of a work 173 
so great, so interesting, and which will tend so much to diffuse the blessings of civil 174 
liberty and the happiness of man.  175 
 Among the objections which have been made, I must confess that I am most 176 
surprized at one which seems to be prevalent, to wit: that these people will be unwilling 177 
to be colonized—What sir, are they not men? Will they not be actuated by the same 178 
motives of interests and ambition, which influence other men? Or will they prefer 179 
remaining in a hopeless state of degradation for themselves and their children, to the 180 
prospect of the full enjoyment of civil rights, and state of equality? What brought our 181 
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ancestors to these shores? They had no friendly hand to lead them; no powerful human 182 
arm to protect them. They left the land of their nativity; the sepulchers of their fathers; 183 
the comforts of civilized society, & all the endearments of friends and relatives, and early 184 
associations, to traverse the ocean; to clear the forests; to encounter all the hardships of a 185 
new settlement, and to brave the dangers of the tomahawk and scalping knife. How many 186 
were destroyed! sometimes whole settlements cut off by disease and hunger—by the 187 
treachery and cruelty of the savages; yet, they were not discouraged. What is it impels 188 
many Europeans daily to seek our shores, and to sell themselves for the prime of their life 189 
to defray the expence of their passages? It is that ruling, imperious desire planted in the 190 
breast of every man; the desire of liberty, of standing upon an equality with his fellow 191 
men. If we add to these motives, the offer of land, and to aid in the expence of 192 
emigration, and of first settling, they cannot be so blind to their own interest, so devoid of 193 
every noble and generous feeling, as to hesitate about accepting of the offer. It is not a 194 
matter speculation and opinion only. It has been satisfactorily ascertained, that numbers 195 
will gladly accept of the invitation. And when once the colony is formed, and flourishing, 196 
all other obstacles will be easily removed. It is for us to make the experiment and the 197 
offer—we shall then, and till then, have discharged our duty. 198 
 I feel, sir, that an apology is necessary for these crude observations. I feel how 199 
unworthy they are of the occasion, and of this assembly. With the utmost labor and the 200 
greatest preparation, I should fall far short of doing justice to the subject. I have not had it 201 
in my power to have these advantages on the present occasion. My humble endeavors 202 
have been directed rather to attract the attention of those to the subject, who would give it 203 
the aid of their talents, and the weight of their character, which it so justly merits than 204 
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from any efficient support which I could render. This meeting assures me that it will soon 205 
have that support, when my own deficiencies will be lost or forgotten, in the splendor 206 
with which genius and eloquence shall emblazon it. Permit me only further to remark that 207 
the object in view is a simple one. In the first instance, merely to make enquiry and 208 
procure information. The ultimate object which this association has in view, is peculiarly 209 
recommended by its steering clear of all those nice and delicate questions; of all those 210 
feelings, and interests and prejudices which are so intimately connected and interwoven 211 
with every question respecting the slaves, in which rights are violated. It is a plan in 212 
which all interests, all classes and descriptions of people may unite—in which all 213 
discordant feelings may be lost in those of humanity—in promoting "peace on earth and 214 
good will to men." 215 
 Mr. CALDWELL offered the following preamble and resolutions, which were 216 
unanimously adopted: 217 
 The situation of the free people of color in the United States has been the subject 218 
of anxious solicitude, with many of our most distinguished citizens, from the first 219 
existence of our country as an independent nation; but the great difficulty and 220 
embarrassment attending the establishment of an infant nation, when first struggling into 221 
existence, and the subsequent convulsions of Europe, have hitherto prevented any great 222 
national effort to provide a remedy for the evils existing or apprehended. The present 223 
period seems peculiarly auspicious to invite attention to the important subject, and gives a 224 
well grounded hope of success. The nations of Europe are hushed into peace; unexampled 225 
efforts are making in various parts of the world, to diffuse knowledge, civilization and the 226 
benign influence of the Christian religion. The rights of man are becoming daily better 227 
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understood; the legitimate objects of government, as founded for the benefit, and 228 
intended for the happiness of men, are more generally acknowledged, and an ardent zeal 229 
for the happiness of the human race is kindled in almost every heart. Desirous of aiding 230 
in the great cause of philanthropy, and of promoting the prosperity and happiness of our 231 
country, it is recommended by this meeting to form an association or society, for the 232 
purpose of giving aid and assisting in the colonization of the free people of colour in the 233 
United States. Therefore— 234 
 Resolved, That an association or society, be formed for the purpose of collecting 235 
information, and to assist in the formation and execution of a plan for the colonization of 236 
the free people of colour, with their consent, in Africa or elsewhere, as may be thought 237 
most advisable, by the constituted authorities of the country. 238 
 Resolved, That Elias B. Caldwell, John Randolph, Richard Rush, Walter Jones, 239 
Francis S. Key, Robert Wright, James H. Blake, and John Peter, be a Committee to 240 
present a respectful memorial to Congress, requesting them to adopt such measures as 241 
may be thought most advisable for procuring a territory in Africa or elsewhere, suitable 242 
for the colonization of the free people of colour. 243 
 Resolved, That Francis S. Key, Bushrod Washington, Elias B. Caldwell, James 244 
Breckenridge, Walter Jones, Richard Rush, and William G. D. Worthington, be a 245 
Committee to prepare a Constitution and rules for the government of the Association or 246 
Society, above mentioned, and report the same to the next meeting for consideration.1 247 
 Mr. JOHN RANDOPLH (of Roanoke) rose and said, that it had been properly 248 
observed, by the chairman as well as by the gentleman from this district, that there was 249 
nothing in the proposition submitted to consideration which in the smallest degree 250 
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touches another very important and delicate question, which ought to be left as much out 251 
of view as possible. But, Mr. R. said, it appeared to him that it had not been sufficiently 252 
insisted on, with a view to obtain the co-operation of all the citizens of the United States, 253 
not only that this meeting does no in any wise affect the question of Negro slavery, but, 254 
as far as it goes, must materially tend to secure the property of every master in the United 255 
States in, to and over such slaves. It appeared to him that this aspect of the question had 256 
not been sufficiently presented to the public view. It was a notorious fact, he said, that the 257 
existence of this mixed and intermediate population of free Negroes was viewed by every 258 
slaves holder as one of the greatest sources of the insecurity, and also unprofitableness, of 259 
slave property; that they serve to excite in their fellow beings a feeling of discontent, of 260 
repining at their situation, and that they act as channels of communication not only 261 
between different slaves, but between the slaves of different districts; that they are the 262 
depositories of stolen goods, and the promoters of mischief. In a worldly sense of view, 263 
then, without entering into the general question, apart from those higher and nobler 264 
motives which had been well presented to the meeting, the owners of slaves were 265 
interested in throwing this population out of the bosom of the people. Mr. R. said he had 266 
made these remarks because the gentleman from the district had rather alluded to the 267 
possibility that this proceeding might create jealousy in the minds of slave holders. On 268 
the contrary, Mr. R. said, they above all other people were most interested in getting rid 269 
of this sort of population. As to the mode in which the object could be accomplished, he 270 
said he had not thought of it—He had not heard of this meeting until night; but he hoped 271 
measures would be taken to exonerate the country from what he considered not only as a 272 
disgrace, but as a grievous burthen. There was no fear, Mr. R. said, that this proposition 273 
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would alarm the slave holders; they had been accustomed to think seriously of the 274 
subject. There was popular work on agriculture, by John Taylor of Caroline, which was 275 
widely circulated and much confided in, in Virginia. In that book, much read because 276 
coming from a practical man, this description of people were pointed out as a great evil. 277 
They had indeed been held up as the great bug-bear to every man who feels an inclination 278 
to emancipate his slaves, not to create in the bosom of his country so great a nuisance. If 279 
a place could be provided for their reception, and a mode of sending them hence, there 280 
were hundreds, nay thousands of citizens, who would be manumitting their slaves, relieve 281 
themselves from the cares attendant on their possession. The great slave holder, Mr. R. 282 
said, was frequently a mere sentry at his own door—bound to stay on his own plantation 283 
to see that his slaves were properly treated. &c. Mr. R. concluded by saying that he had 284 
thought it necessary to make these remarks, being a slave holder himself, to shew that so 285 
far from being connected with abolition of slavery, the measure proposed would prove 286 
one of the greatest securities to enable the master to keep in possession of his own 287 
property. 288 
 Mr. ROBERT WRIGHT  of Md Said he could not withhold his approbation of a 289 
measure, that had for its object the amelioration of the lot of any portion of the human 290 
race, particularly of the free people of colour, whose degraded state robs them of the 291 
happiness of self government, so dear to the American people. And said he, as I discover 292 
the most delicate regard to the rights of property, I shall with great pleasure lend my aid 293 
to restore this unfortunate people to the enjoyment of their liberty, but I fear gentleman 294 
are too sanguine in their expectations, that they would be willing to abandon the land of 295 
their nativity, so dear to man. However, I have no indisposition to give them that election 296 
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by furnishing all the means contemplated by the honorable and benevolent propositions 297 
submitted to our consideration. But, sir, while we wish to promote the happiness of these 298 
free people of colour, we ought to take care not furnish means of transporting out of 299 
reach of the master his property; which, I am sorry to say, has by the seductive conduct of 300 
a certain set of people under the pretexts of religion and the natural rights of man been 301 
seduced from his service. At this time there are thousands of that class in Philadelphia 302 
and it vicinage, living in indolence and consequent poverty—nothing would have a 303 
stronger tendency to effect the contemplated relief of the free people of colour, than some 304 
efficient laws to secure the restoration of those not entitled to liberty, to their masters, 305 
whose rights ought to be protected by law, and who without such law would be certainly 306 
sacrificed by the transportation of the free blacks with whom they would most certainly 307 
mix for that purpose. However, I feel no hesitation in saying I should be happy to see 308 
some plan for the gradual abolition of slavery, that would prepare the rising generation 309 
for that state, and remunerate the master our of the funds of the nation, amply abundant 310 
for that purpose, without being felt by the American people. 311 
 Mr. F.S KEY (of this District) suggested, that, with a view to exempt the object of 312 
the meeting from the possibility of misapprehension, there should be inserted in the 313 
resolves an express disclamation of any intention of the proposed association to touch the 314 
question of the abolition of slavery. 315 
 The CHAIRMAN suggested that such a clause would better enter into the articles 316 
of association when formed. To which Mr. Key assenting— 317 
 The question of adopting the Preamble & resolutions was taken and decided 318 
unanimously in the affirmative. 319 
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 The Chairman was then authorized to appoint the committees; which having done, 320 
the meeting adjourned to meet again on Saturday next.  321 
 322 
*We understand Judge Washington to be alluded to, who was prevented by indisposition 323 
from attending.--Editors 324 
                                                 
1 In the National Intelligencer account of the meeting, the conclusion of Caldwell's speech (ending with 
"peace on earth and good will to men" was not followed by the resolutions. Instead, the Intelligencer 
offered a bracketed description of what took place, which read: "[After concluding the remarks of which 
the proceedings is a brief sketch, Mr. C. offered a preamble, stating in a few words the object of the 
meeting, as already explained, and resolutions proposing the formation of an association to accomplish it, 
&c. the appointment of a committee to draft a constitution, and report in to the next meeting, and another 
committee to draft a Memorial to Congress relative to the subject.]" 
 The text of the preamble and resolutions was later printed in the African Repository and Colonial 
Journal, February 1836, 55. In the African Repository account, the preamble and resolutions were printed 
after the comments of Robert Wright. However, the African Repository version of the text suggests that 
Caldwell offered the preamble and resolutions before Randolph spoke. The textual evidence in the African 
Repository comes in the reproduction of Randolph's comments, which contained the following opening line 
(brackets included): "The Hon. JOHN RANDOLPH (of Virginia) rose, and said, that it had been properly 
observed by the Chairman, that there was nothing in the proposition [referring to the resolutions which 
follow] submitted to consideration. . . " (54).  
  The placement of the bracketed description in the National Intelligencer, the suggestion that 
Randolph was responding to propositions that had been offered, and the use of the present tense by the 
editors of the African Repository to suggest that the resolutions follow the speech in the printed edition but 
did not follow the speech in the historic moment, provide strong warrants for the placement of the 
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FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER 1 
A Counter Memorial proposed, to be submitted to Congress in behalf of the free people of 2 
colour of the District of Columbia: 3 
 4 
That your memorialists are free persons of colour, resident in the district of 5 
Columbia, born in the United States, and of parents born there also. That they know no 6 
country but that of their birth; and they are as free as they desire to be, and as happy as 7 
man can be. With industry they find plenty—with good morals countenance and 8 
encouragement—are made christians by the gospel, and instructed in the ways of the 9 
world by an enlightened and polished people. That your memorialists, content with their 10 
condition, have at all times endeavored so to conduct themselves, as to merit the good 11 
will and friendship of their white brethren. That if, in particular instances, individuals 12 
have been found wanting in duty to God and to society, your memorialists trust that such 13 
instances have been regarded as exceptions to their general demeanor. Scarcely any 14 
family or society of men being without its unworthy members, and that in estimating 15 
their usefulness by the virtues and vices which characterize them, they have not in the 16 
mass deserved censure or reproach. That, notwithstanding all this, your memorialists 17 
have learned, with no less concern than surprize, that divers white persons, at present 18 
unknown to your memorialists, have assembled together, of their own accord, without in 19 
any manner consulting your memorialists, and without authority of law, and are devising 20 
ways and means for the transportation of your memorialists beyond seas, without the 21 
allegation of any specific crimes or misdemeanor committed by your memorialists, and in 22 
violation, as they believe, of their personal liberty and free will. Your memorialists have 23 
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indeed, been given to understand, that the plans or projects of the aforesaid persons, are 24 
intended for the benefit and advantage of your memorialists, and that persuasion is to be 25 
employed rather than violence to induce your memorialists to leave their native country. 26 
Your memorialists, far from being insensible to the merits of their self-created 27 
benefactors, cannot but protest before your honorable body against the assumed right of 28 
any individuals whatever, by whatever motives actuated, to pass judgment on their 29 
condition. They are free men, and consider themselves in every respect qualified to 30 
determine for themselves what is, and what is not, for their own benefit and advantage: 31 
that indeed of all the rights and privileges which they hold under the constitution and 32 
laws, they consider the right to determine for themselves whether they be happy or not, 33 
by far the most natural, the most precious, and the most inviolable, and your memorialists 34 
are firmly resolved never to part with it but with their lives. 35 
 Human happiness is made up of too many and various ingredients for any one 36 
man to be a competent judge of the happiness of any other man—he who is miserable 37 
will not be happy though the whole world unite in proclaiming him happy—as, on the 38 
other hand, he who is happy will not be miserable though the whole world unite in 39 
proclaiming him miserable. When therefore your memorialists are informed that arbitrary 40 
associations of men assume to themselves the power to decree that your memorialists are 41 
miserable, when in truth and in fact they are content and happy, they cannot forbear in 42 
duty to themselves to call the attention of your honorable body to a species of despotism 43 
as unprecedented in this or any other country, as it is replete with evil to the best interests 44 
of your memorialists now and hereafter. Nor are your memorialists the less alarmed 45 
because they are informed that their self-styled benefactors are to resort to the mild 46 
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influence of persuasion to induce them to leave their country and go into voluntary exile. 47 
The men who assume to themselves the power to decree that other men are miserable, 48 
whether they be so or not, will easily pass from persuasion to force—and when your 49 
memorialists are further instructed that Africa is the place selected for their destination, a 50 
country inhabited only by savages and wild beasts—with a burning sun and torturing 51 
insects—poisonous exhalations, corrupted water and unwholesome food, your 52 
memorialists cannot forbear to indulge a suspicion that something more is intended than 53 
meets the eye, and that whilst their self-styled benefactors profess to leave nothing in 54 
view but their prosperity and welfare, they are in truth and in fact resolved to banish them 55 
from the land of their fathers, which they dearly love, and to deliver them over to be 56 
devoured by wild beasts, or destroyed by ferocious savages or a pestilential climate. Your 57 
memorialists, are therefore filled with terror and anxiety, and humbly pray your 58 
honorable body to interpose your authority in time to save them from calamities so awful, 59 
and afflictions so heavy, and they pray the Almighty to turn the hearts of their persecutors 60 
from the purposes so unrighteous and uncharitable, repeating to your honorable body 61 
their protestation that your memorialists are as happy as a people can be—that they desire 62 
no change whatever in their condition, and that they have no wish but the single one to be 63 
left to the enjoyment of what they have without molestation, and to be saved harmless 64 
from the officious intermeddlings of false friends and self-styled benefactors. Your 65 
memorialists call heaven and earth to witness they would rather die than quit their native 66 
country; that they never will consent to go to Africa, or any other country; but that they 67 
will cling to this their native soil whilst they have breath, and be buried where their 68 
fathers before them are buried. It is known to your memorialists, that they have been 69 
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represented, by some, nuisances in the society in which they live, and that they will 70 
continue to be so, so long as the prejudices exist against the color of your memorialists. –71 
For their color your memorialists do not conceive themselves answerable to man, it being 72 
the gift of God—but they cannot dissemble their astonishment and indignation that those 73 
who profess to acknowledge them their equals in all things should make a difference of 74 
color the cause of their transportation and banishment; they were inclined to cherish the 75 
belief, that philosophers and statesmen would see in those prejudices a remedy, at once 76 
natural, easy and efficacious—your memorialists mean the remedy of amalgamation—77 
For it is very plain and obvious to your memorialists, that the enlightened benefactors of 78 
the African race would not hesitate to set the example for bringing about a state of things, 79 
which, more than any other, would hasten the accomplishment of their grand designs. 80 
Among your memorialists are very many young men, of industrious and sober habits, of 81 
ordinary school education, and of mechanic trades, who would not feel themselves 82 
degraded by intermarriages with the whites. In a few generations the odious distinction of 83 
color would pass away, and the posterity of your memorialists would find themselves 84 
blended with the great American family—their equals in color, as your memorialists are 85 
now acknowledged to be their equals in everything else. That this remedy of 86 
amalgamation may speedily take the place of the detestable one of transportation and 87 
banishment, which your memorialists cannot contemplate but with horror, your 88 
memorialists will ever pray, &c. 89 
 90 
[The reader will not receive the arguments of the proceeding article as the serious 91 
opinions of the writer. His object, it is apparent, is to endeavor, by ridicule, to check the 92 
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progress of the Colonization Plan, which has recently been started in Virginia and New 93 
Jersey, and taken up in this district—we have thought in proper to insert this note, lest 94 








(A NOTE ON METHOD) 
286 
 
Studying the Colonization Meeting through Contextualist History 
This project, like most scholarly endeavors, began with what Bernard L. Brock 
and Robert L. Scott call "an impulse" and Stephen Pepper refers to as "the incidents of 
life."1 I came across the activities of the Colonization in a reading on another subject and 
I had a hunch that there was more going on in the discourse of colonization than I could 
grasp at first glance. Equipped only with my experience as a rhetorician and no 
foreknowledge of early nineteenth century politics, I chased the rabbit of colonization 
into the rabbit hole. The current project, being the product of my "chasing," studies the 
different themes that were significant to colonization and how the speakers navigated 
these themes. This purpose is best pursued by studying rhetoric in the historical moment. 
Raymie McKerrow and E. Culpepper Clark remind us, "History need not function 
separate from the argument that contains it."2 Like McKerrow and Clark, and others, my 
disposition is to understand past events as they are contained in the arguments of the 
time.  
Yet, my work on colonization may also be defined as criticism of the rhetorical 
strategies encompassed with the colonization convention. Brock and Scott argued, 
"[Hu]man[s] cannot completely repress the critical impulse because it is part of learning 
how to act toward something or someone."3 Making sense of colonization, then, has 
critical components. Thus, it is not enough to simply state that my perspective is 
                                                 
1 Bernard L. Brock and Robert L. Scott, eds. Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth-Century 
Perspective. 2nd ed. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1980), 1, 16; Stephen C. Pepper, World 
Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 233.  
 
2 E. Culpepper Clark and Raymie E. McKerrow, "The Rhetorical Construction of History," in Doing 
Rhetorical History, Kathleen J. Turner, ed., (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 42. 
 
3 Brock and Scott, Methods of Rhetorical Criticism, 16. 
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"historical." It is also not enough to define my perspective as "critical." The habits of the 
mind which form my thinking on the current subject encompass assumptions of both the 
historical and critical modes. In this section, I go further to explain the historical-critical 
act as it pertains to my exploration of the rhetoric of the colonization convention.  
It is best to begin with this project at the conceptual level and the historical and 
critical assumptions that inform this work. Hayden White explained how history and 
criticism can coexist as the "mode of argument" in the conceptualization of historic 
work.4 Beyond emplotting a "narrative account of 'what happened,'" the mode of 
argument in history explicates "'the point of it all' or 'what it all adds up to.'"5 In 
explaining the larger meaning of events, White argued, "historical explanations are bound 
to be based on different metahistorical presuppositions . . . that generate different 
conceptions of the kind of explanations" that historians employ to explain their subject.6 
As the kind of explanation is revealed in the "discursive argument" of the writer, the 
historian working in the mode of argument has decidedly critical impulses. White, 
drawing upon the work of Stephen Pepper, offered four kinds of historical explanations: 
formist, mechanist, contextualist, and organicist. The present project identifies most 
closely with contextualism and its ways of explaining the past.  
Contextualism takes the historic event as its root metaphor, or basis of 
interpretation. It sees events as setting within a flow of people and forces that give those 
events shape. A contextualist however, plays the text/context relationship; that is, a 
                                                 
4 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 5. On the notion of criticism and history being linked to argument, 
I am also drawing from Wayne Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 60 (1974): 165-74. 
 
5 White, Metahistory, 11. 
 
6 White, Metahisotry, 13  (emphasis in original). 
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contextualist believes that one of the most important functions of rhetoric is to assemble 
elements of context and turn them into forces that unite people in forging the shape of the 
historical moment. Thus, to a contextualist, history is not studied as a "past event, one 
that is, so to speak, dead and has to be exhumed."7 Instead, the historic event is alive in 
the historic present, "it is going on now."8 This perspective leads to what Stephen Pepper 
calls the "specious present."9 Indeed, the challenge to a contextualist historian is to bring 
the past moment alive in the present, to transport the reader to the place and time to sense 
the creative possibilities of the contextualist moment. In terms of the dissertation project, 
I take the colonization convention in 1816 as the historic event and then seek to 
understand the possibilities available to the speakers of the colonization convention. In 
doing so, I aim to show the dynamic forces at work on the subject of colonization at that 
moment. 
As the contextualist encounters the dynamic historic event, two basic categories 
structure the interpretation of the moment: quality and texture. Pepper explained, "[T]he 
quality of a given event is its intuited wholeness or total character; the texture is the 
details and relationships which make up that character or quality."10 The basic movement 
in contextualist thinking is the move back and forth between quality and texture, between 
having a kind of intuitive sense for an event and detailing an explanation of that event. A 
contextualist historian works between the intuitive sense for that historical moment and 
the antecedent and consequent elements that the text pulls from the context and brings 
                                                 
7 Pepper, World Hypotheses, 232. 
 
8 Pepper, World Hypotheses, 232. 
 
9 Pepper, World Hypotheses, 236. 
 
10 Pepper, World Hypotheses, 238. 
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into power within the moment. It is also important to note that for a contextualist 
historian or critic, this movement between quality and texture describes what is 
happening at the moment under study, but also describes how the historian/critic works. 
That is, the historian or critic works back and forth between their intuitive sense for the 
rhetorical power of a moment and the kind of hard scholarly digging that supports or 
refutes that intuitive judgment. 
Pepper describes this contextualist dialectic between intuition and detail as 
governed by the constant locating and working with "strands." Strands are lines of 
inquiry or themes that are pulled into the historical moment by discourse. In this project, I 
have identified the themes of political economy, security, and morality as the strands that 
are pulled into the discourse of the convention. Pepper's image is of many strands 
meeting in the discourse of the historic moment, pulling context together into a fused 
transformation that creates dynamic history. The act of stranding, of pulling themes into 
the historic moment, is not simply the move of the critic or historian. The contextualist 
paradigm also functions as an explanation of rhetorical invention. In a particular moment, 
rhetors also call upon themes available to them in an attempt to influence or transform 
persons' perspectives on a given subject. For scholar or speaker, Pepper's description of 
how strands are drawn into discourse provides a way of conceptualizing how texts and 
contexts interact. 
To summarize, texture and quality are inseparable categories and as such, the 
contextualist moves between the texture and the quality to make sense of an historic 
moment. This movement or play is dialectical in its pattern. Based upon the movement 
between texture and quality, the result of a contextualist's explanation is a newly formed, 
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synthetic insight. At the conceptual level, then, my way of investigating the colonization 
convention is to derive the significant strands of texture from the text of the convention 
and consider how these strands transform the discourse and how the discourse, then, 
transforms the strands. My efforts in this study are best described in terms of the 
contextualist. Working from "the present event outward," I seek to better understand the 
transformative and novel event that was the colonization convention.11 If successful, this 
movement will not reveal itself in properly labeled sections of "texture" and "quality" for 
each chapter. Instead, the aim is to weave the texture and quality together in order to 
provide new insight on the rhetoric of the national colonization movement.  
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